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Foreword 





 Many historians of utopian thought do pass the Enlightenment 
age with a short mention, focusing instead on early utopias of Pla-
to and Thomas More, or then on the socialist and communist ideas 
developed in the 19th and 20th centuries. One could, however, 
claim with good reason that the Enlightenment period, the 18th 
century, was the age of utopias par excellence. Not only utopias in 
the received sense were presented — that is, more or less fantastic 
descriptions of an ideal state of society or of “bright future,” — the 
whole Enlightenment project set off the seeking of alternatives to 
the order of ancien régime, and was in this sense “utopian.” 
 The Enlightenment is commonly seen as the “Age of Reason” 
and thus the stress on its Utopian moment may sound contradicto-
ry to this view. However, for the men living in the eighteenth cen-
tury, rationalism and utopianism were not mutually exclusive 
modes of thought. On the contrary, it was just the Enlightenment 
rationalism which fostered utopian views and projects for an en-
tirely new social order. 
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 This question is worth a closer look. We can take as starting 
point the well-known definitions of Karl Mannheim in his now 
classical work Ideologie und Utopie (1929). He distinguishes four 
fundamental forms of utopia: (i) the chiliastic movements, as re-
presented e.g. by the Anabaptists in the 16th century; (ii) the liber-
al humanitarian idea; (iii) the conservative idea; (iv) the socialist-
communist utopia. In this listing, the Enlightenment utopianism 
would mainly belong to the second category, although even some 
communist ideas were expressed, albeit in a very foggy manner. 
 But why did utopias play such a prominent role in the social 
thought of the Enlightenment? It seems that the answer is rather 
simple: the Enlightenment thinkers aimed at a new, more rational 
and more just social order than the existing hierarchical society 
with its estate privileges was, but such a new society did not yet 
exist nowhere. The present-day liberal democratic social order, 
which we nowadays — at least in the West — take for granted, ex-
isted in the 18th century only as blueprints in the works of the phi-
losophes. The Enlightenment thinkers wanted a society which did 
not yet exist in the real world, and in this sense the core character-
istics of utopian thought, which according to Mannheim consists in 
“ideas which transcend that which exists at the present,” is indeed 
applicable to most of the social projects of the epoch. 
 To repeat, this utopianism did not contradict the rationalism and 
criticism inherent to the spirit of the 18th century, on the contrary. 
One should not forget, that in the previous century, in the 1600s, 
the natural sciences were yet a similar utopian project. Men of ear-
ly modern science, like Descartes and Galilei, were only beginning 
to apply the new methodological ideas on the research of natural 
phenomena and fell often into utopian visions — the most spec-
tacular example of these is the idea of a characteristica universalis 
by Leibniz, which, according to him, should henceforth settle all 
scientific disputes. Indeed, the example of Leibniz specifically 
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demonstrates, how a strict rationalism and utopianism are able to 
go hand in hand. 
* * * 
 The Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki and the 
St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas organized in 14–15 
September 2012 a symposium on social philosophies and utopias 
of the Enlightenment in Northern Europe and Russia. The sympo-
sium, which had 14 speakers, was the second in a series of Russian 
and Finnish scholars discussing problems of the Enlightenment 
age. The previous symposium was held in 2009. 
 The 2012 symposium was opened by Prof. Markku Kangaspu-
ro, Director of the Research of the Aleksanteri Institute. While the 
papers by Tatiana Artemyeva, Hartwig Frank and Oili Pulkkinen 
dealt with more general problems of analyzing the Enlightenment 
thought in its relation to utopias, the other contributions focused on 
special case studies, and Maren Jonasson presented the project of 
collected works of the important Finnish enlightener Anders 
Chydenius. 
 Both the 2012 symposium and the coming ones will at the 
same time contribute to Aleksanteri Institute’s Centre of Excel-
lence research project on the modernization processes taking 











Le nez de Cléopâtre, s’il eût été plus court, 
toute la face de la terre aurait change 
Blaise Pascal 
 
 The content of “utopia” is much older than the name coined by 
Thomas More. It appeared in the time of Plato and Euhemerus and 
has not changed its general nature. I think we can consider “uto-
pia” as one of the unit-ideas after Arthur Lovejoy or a social ar-
chetype and study it in the context of history of ideas. 
 The term belongs to both scholarly and everyday spheres. Dic-
tionaries and encyclopedias usually give a general explanation of 
this phenomenon (in the British Encyclopaedia “Utopia” is “an 
ideal commonwealth whose inhabitants exist under seemingly per-
fect conditions. Hence ‘utopian’ and ‘utopianism’ are words used 
to denote visionary reform that tends to be impossibly idealistic.”1) 
They describe Utopia in terms ideal (or even idealistic), mytholog-
ical, paradisiacal, heavenly, etc., on the one hand, and critical, sa-
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burg — Helsinki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2013. P. 12–21. 
1 “Utopia,” in: Encyclopædia Britannica from Encyclopædia Britannica Premi-
um Service <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=76516>. 
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tirical, pessimistic, on the other. The notion “utopian” is much 
wider than just an adjective and also has both positive and negative 
connotations. 
 In my article I deal with alternative historical models as with 
versions of utopianism, thus I can use approaches developed by 
Karl Popper and Richard Stites. Popper’s fundamental differenti-
ation of historism and historicism2 is important for me, together 
with Stites’ interpretation of utopia as the key notion for ideology 
of bolshevism and theology of Stalinism.3 Stites correctly be-
lieves that utopia, as a basis of the revolutionary ideology, has 
expressed itself in various forms, and he demonstrates a possibil-
ity to analyze them. 
 Utopian projects are essential components of social philosophy, 
being a sphere of hypothetical speculations. The impossibility to 
realize them is first of all connected with an effort to imagine the 
complex social mechanism ideally as something to be expressed in 
a single act of thinking or describing. So, answering the question 
“What is a Utopia?” I conclude: “Utopia is a way of thinking about 
social ideals”. 
 We may see several ways of thinking about social ideals: 
 1. positive (utopia itself), 
 2. negative (anti-utopia),4 
 3. alternative (alternate history or uchronia, l’uchronie). 
                                                          
2 Popper K. The Poverty of Historicism (2nd ed.). L., 1961. 
3 Stites R. Revolutionary Dreams. Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the 
Russian Revolution. N.Y., 1989. 
4 It is interesting that Jeremy Bentham was a person who coined a special term 
for anti-utopia: ‘cacotopia’ (about 1818), later John Stuart Mill invented more 
successful synonym, ‘dystopia’ without any scatological connotations. It was 
done in a speech in the British House of Commons during the debate on the 
problem of land-ownership in Ireland. See: Trahair R. Introduction, in: Utopias 
and Utopians. An Historical Dictionary. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 
1999. P. xii. 
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 I consider alternative history as a special type of utopianism and 
I argue that considering alternative history as an utopia, but not as 
a history, may give us a possibility to understand better the epoch 
that produces such texts. 
 Historical studies, as any other research activity, are possible 
only as a creative process, thus the criterion of truth can be sacri-
ficed to a refined method, ideological presuppositions, or political 
pressure. “Improved” or alternative history is set off against the 
“wrong” reality and becomes a certain kind of utopia. 
 Roman historian Titus Livius was the first professional who de-
scribed a hypothetical line of the historical development. He pro-
posed to consider what happened if Alexander the Great had not 
died at 33 and continued his conquest. In the ninth book of his Ab 
urbe condita he described Alexander’s would-be campaign against 
Rome in 323 BC. It, according to Livius, was not successful and 
ended by Alexander’s crushing defeat. Much later the great leader 
became a hero of Arnold Toynbee’s paper If Ochus and Filip Had 
Lived on; If Alexander the Great Had Lived on5 where possible 
historical consequences of both extension and shortening of Alex-
ander’s and other historical figures’ lives were considered. 
 Eminent politicians, leaders, rulers, religious reformers are 
often regarded as movers of history, so it is tempting to model 
history by changing their biographies.6 Presumably, it is con-
nected with a radical character of their activities and with unob-
vious results. 
                                                          
5 Toynbee A.J. “If Ochus and Filip Had Lived on; If Alexander the Great Had 
Lived on,” in: Some Problems of Greek History. Oxford, 1969. 
6 Trevelyan G.M. “If Napoleon Had Won the Battle of Waterloo,” in: Westmin-
ster Gazette, July 1907; Fisher H.A.L. “If Napoleon had Escaped to America,” 
in: If It Had Happened Otherwise: Lapses into Imaginary History. Longmans, 
Green, 1931; Kunz D. “Camelot Revisited: What if John F. Kennedy Had 
Lived?” In: Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (ed. Niall Fergu-
son), 2000. 
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 Despite rethinking of history has its own long story, the termi-
nology for this process has started to form only recently, and is not 
finished yet. 
 In his paper Of a History of Events Which Have Not Happened7 
British critic and writer Isaac Disraeli, while described possible 
events, used the expression “imaginary state.” Now, together with 
the most widespread one — “alternative history” — the following 
terms are used: “alternate history,” “contrafactual history,” “coun-
terfactualism,” “experimental history,” “virtual history,” “retro-
future story,” even “historical mannerism,”8 “alt-historical fanta-
sy,” “allohistory” (“other history”), “uchronie.” The last notion 
was introduced by French philosopher Charles Renouvier in his 
essay Uchronie (L’Utopie dans l’histoire), written in 1876.9 Re-
nouvier considers “uchronie” as a situation outside the real time. 
Mikhail Epstein, in turn, underlines a etymological meaning of the 
notion as literally a period without time.10 
 Russian history has often been a testing ground for ideological 
experiments. Stories were rewritten, accents were changed, facts 
were reinterpreted, and heroes emerged and vanished. “Corre-
sponding” heroes can always be found in history: in the epoch of 
enlightened Catherine II it was Princess Olga the Wise, in Stalin’s 
great and terrible epoch there were Peter the Great and Ivan the 
                                                          
7 Disraeli I. Curiosities of Literature. Moxon, 1849 <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu. 
au/d/disraeli/isaac/curiosities/complete.html#chapter205>. 
8 Экштут С.А. На службе российскому Левиафану. Историософские опы-
ты. М., 1997. 
9 Renouvier Ch. Uchronie (l'utopie dans l'histoire): Esquisse historique apo-
cryphe du développement de la civilisation européene tel qu'il n'a pas été, tel 
qu’il aurait pu étre. Paris, 1876. See also: Messac R. “Voyage en Uchronie, 
propos d’un Utopien,” in: Les Primaires. No. 83. Novembre, 1936. 
10 Эпштейн М. “Ухрония,” in: Проективный словарь философии. СПб., 
2003. P. 441. 
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Terrible. Today the past is studied with Evgeny Anisimov’s Histo-
ry of Russia from Rurik to Putin.11 
 Alternative assumptions and their utopian consequences were 
already realized by both storytellers and quite serious authors, for 
example, by Mikhail Shcherbatov in his Russian History.12 In his 
analysis of Ivan the Terrible’s setbacks in Livonian wars, he ar-
gues that one of their causes was the tsar’s unbalanced character, 
when Ivan was fierce and vindictive instead of being friendly or at 
least restrained. According to Shcherbatov, excessive emotions can 
only become obstacles on the way of political success. 
 Shcherbatov blames Ivan the Terrible who, sating his venge-
ance, confirmed his reputation of a cutthroat tyrant. The historian 
puts in his text a special Reflection on Ioann Vasilievich’s Ac-
tion,13 where he discusses political moves missed by the tsar. 
Shcherbatov believes that Ivan the Terrible would be much more 
successful if he used religious controversies between Lithuania, 
Poland, and Livland, and made some political maneuvers instead 
of permanent wars. 
 His social utopia Journey to the Land of Ophyr14 represented 
Russian life as if the reforms of Peter the Great were improved by 
the next generations of rulers. Moving the capital from Peregab to 
Kvamo was the most signifying. We easily find in that anagrams 
the names of Russian capitals Petersburg and Moscow. 
 Because of removing the capital from the center of the empire, 
the emperor had lost the opportunity of direct contact with the 
people and their love. Removal of national shrines led to the de-
struction of moral ideals. Closeness to the borders of enemy states, 
frequent rebellions shook the throne, which therefore repeatedly 
                                                          
11 Анисимов Е.В. История России от Рюрика до Путина: Люди, события, 
даты. СПб., 2010. 
12 Щербатов M.M. История Российская от древнейших времен: в 7 т. T. 5. 
Ч. 2. СПб., 1786. 
13 Размышление о поступке Иоанна Васильевича. 
14 Путешествие в землю Офирскую. 
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passed from hand to hand. Shcherbatov almost literally repeating 
the arguments of the error transfer of the capital, which resulted in 
an article Moscow’s Petition about Its Falling into Oblivion15 writ-
ten in the form of a letter to Catherine II. It demonstrated that Rus-
sian history would be different without the artificial change of the 
place of the capital. 
 Shcherbatov was sure that social development may be acceler-
ated. He even wrote An Approximate Calculation How Many 
Years Russia Would Need to Reach Its Current State of Education 
and Glory without Autocracy of Peter the Great.16 According to 
his calculations, it would be reached only to 1892. 
 In his critical pamphlet On the Corruption of Morals in Russia17 
Shcherbatov analyzed the result of Peter the Great reforms. He was 
sure that they were necessary, but too untimely. 
 Peter the Great is the focusing center of alternative history 
models. Praising his personal contribution to enlightenment and 
development of the country made for politicians who followed him 
possible to use a logical method of “what if” speculation to overes-
timate their significance. One has just to build the simplest syllo-
gism: “If Peter I had not existed, Russia would have been a back-
ward country. Politician N acts like Peter I. Therefore, Russia will 
be a backward country without Politician N.” In this case, the syl-
logism is quite correct, but the first premise is false. To find histor-
ical links and parallels is a mighty method in political argumenta-
tion that allows transferring some qualities of a historical figure to 
an active political one. 
 Panegyric history was another type of utopian models. F.A. 
Emin (about 1735–1770) who was one of the brightest “history 
                                                          
15 Прошение Москвы о забвении ея. 
16 Примерное времяисчислительное положение, во сколько бы лет, при 
благополучнейших обстоятельствах, могла Россия сама собою, без само-
властия Петра Великого, дойти до того состояния, в каком она ныне 
есть, в рассуждении просвещения и славы. 
17 О повреждении нравов в России. 
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writers” and the author of “political novels” is a good example. 
From 1767 till 1769 Emin published three volumes under the title 
A Russian History of Lives of All Ancient Sovereigns from the Very 
Beginning, All Great and Worthy of the Eternal Memory Emperor 
Peter the Great’s Deeds, His Heiresses and Successors Who Fol-
lowed Him That Includes a Description of the Golden Age in the 
North during the Reign of Catherine the Great18. Reasoning about 
aims and tasks of any history, Emin remarked that it could not be 
just a list of facts or a description of political events. The main task 
of the historical writing as well as the work of art is “a direct in-
struction what one must follow and what one must avoid.”19 “The 
historical philosopher” can use both professional and artistic dis-
course. Emin confesses that he put into lips of his historical person-
ages words they could say instead of those they said. He saturated 
his history with monologues and so made it theatrical like a play. 
 Historical events are used in the ideological struggle. Their in-
terpretations saturate figurativeness of political vocabularies. His-
torical heroes are implanted in systems of ideals and moral values 
of any epoch. 
 The Russian political discourse is always oriented to “the glori-
ous past”, though its interpretation is changed incessantly accord-
ing to actual political needs. 
 Historians always analyze events and deeds, which are consid-
ered to be “key” ones, changes in which could turn the historical 
process “upside down.”20 In this I see Russian historiosophical fa-
                                                          
18 Эмин Ф.А. Российская история жизни всех древних от самаго начала 
России государей, все великия и вечной достойныя памяти императора 
Петра Великаго действия, его наследниц и наследников ему последование 
и описание в Севере златаго века во время царствования Екатерины Ве-
ликой в себе заключающая. СПб.: При Имп. Акад. наук, 1767–1769. 
19 “…прямое наставление, чему следовать и чего убегать должно” (Ibid. 
Т. 1. С. V). 
20 See, for example: Бочаров А.В. Проблема альтернативности историче-
ского развития: историографические и методологические аспекты. Авто-
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talism and personologism, i.e. the exaggeration of contingency and 
importance of personal actions. Here is an incomplete list of such 
events: 
 Prince Vladimir chooses the religion for his state (between Ju-
daism, Islam, Byzantine Orthodoxy, and Catholicism); 
 “The challenge of the East”: the Mongolian yoke and Dmitry 
Donskoy’s victory; 
 “The challenge of the West”: the expansion of knight orders, 
the struggle with them and Alexander Nevsky’s role in it; 
 The severe centralization under the aegis of Moscow or an in-
dependent development following suit of Novgorod feudal repub-
lic; Ivan Kalita; 
 Ivan the Terrible’s oprichnina or the reforms of Izbrannaia Ra-
da; 
 The choice of claimants to the Russian throne at the beginning 
of the 17th century (boyar representatives, Polish Prince Wladi-
slaw, Swedish Prince Charles-Philip, Mikhail Romanov); 
 Peter I’s reforms or the traditional development of Russia under 
Sophia (Aleksey Mikhailovich); 
 The successful plot of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 and 
making of a constitutional monarchy or the development of abso-
lutism; the role of Empress Anna Ioannovna; 
 Catherine II’s liberalization or reinforcement of autocracy; 
 The conquest of the Crimea or Catherine II’s reclamation of 
American lands; 
 Napoleon’s possible victory in 1812 and possible changes in the 
political situation of Russia.21 
 Many historiosophical speculations and alternative projects 
have dealt with interpretations of these subjects. 
                                                                                                                                 
реферат диссертации на соискание учёной степени кандидата историче-
ских наук. Томск, 2002 <http://klio.tsu.ru/contents.htm>. 
21 Ibid. 
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 Dissatisfaction with history and hypothetical revision of its real-
ities is one of the favorite topics of modern fiction and works of 
historians who, however, more often analyze missed opportunities 
rather than precluded consequences. Extreme forms, both utopian 
and anti-utopian, which presuppose the development of events ac-
cording to optimal scenarios, are often presented as an analysis of 
possible variants of the social development. 
 Some of them are provided with super-positive (for example, 
the Baptism of Russia, the Petrine reforms) or super-negative (the 
Mongol-Tatar invasion) functions, and this allows seeing them as 
markers of qualitative changes. In the context of public mythology 
and changes in political orientations, some events, for example, the 
Decembrists uprising, Pugachev’s peasant war, were radically re-
evaluated. This fact brought about the belief that, in the end, “the 
class flair” or political expedience is the criterion of historical 
credibility. History is turned into a part of the political discourse 
and used for ideological purposes. 
 On May 19, 2009, the government of the Russian Federation de-
creed that a new President Commission “against attempts to falsify 
history to the detriment of Russia” should be established. It was pre-
supposed that (to the detriment of common sense) the government 
knows what “the real” history is. This ideological casus has not only 
political, but also world-view reasons. It is based on the general vi-
sion of history and on the system of historiosophical archetypes that 
have been generated in history studies and teaching. It is also deter-
mined by the traditions of doing researches in history with the 
strong dependence of the state’s support and approval. This is espe-
cially obvious at moments of social and ideological changes. Thus, 
among the most popular alternative history schemes now are de-
scriptions of possible re-establishment of monarchy in Russia. 
 Alternative history has been studied, first of all, as a certain lit-
erary technique used in science fiction. Some of them were written 
in a form of historical narrative. 
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 Studies in alternative history enable us to understand better 
some peculiarities of the Russian political discourse. The Rus-
sian — as earlier the Soviet, and even earlier the Imperial — polit-
ical discourse is to the great extent orientated to hypothetical sce-
narios of the historical development. Any analysis of history is al-
ways accompanied by regret for lost opportunities (if the Great 
Patriotic War, Stalinist terror, Mongol invasion, and so on… had 
not happened) and by satisfaction in the decisions already made 
(Vladimir’s choice of Christianity, Peter’s choice of the orientation 
to Europe, etc.). Appraisals vary subject to the political situation, 
and this lead to changing in the historical vocabulary: “the Great 
October Socialist Revolution” turns into “the Bolsheviks revolt,” 
“the developed socialism” (the period of L.I. Brezhnev’s rule) be-
comes “the Stagnation Era,” etc. 
 The study of alternative history will help to comprehend both 
the historical discourse, and the political discourse based on the 
first one. Boris Eltsin in his farewell speech on December 31, 
1999, said that he had directed his efforts not to the past, but to the 
future.22 It sounds as if a politician can change the direction or di-
mension of time. Alternative history connotations in Russian poli-
ticians’ discourse should be taken into account to understand the 
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THE VORONTSOV BROTHERS’ UTOPIA 





 Alexander I succeeded to the throne in March 1801. He relied 
upon his four close young fellows Kochubey, Novosiltsev, Stroga-
nov and Czartoryski, and united them into the “Secret” (or “Inti-
mate,” or “Unofficial”) Committee. The body had no official sta-
tus, but up to 1803 discussed almost all projects of reforms. The 
minutes of the first Secret Committee meeting are dated June 
1801. Very soon after the first meeting, in July 1801, Alexander is-
sued an invitation to the Senate to report to him on its rights. The 
emperor, the Senate and the Secret Committee were all agreed on 
the need for reform, but each party had different ideas on its na-
ture. The general problem facing them was whether the Senate 
should have administrative, judiciary or legislative powers, or 
whether it should combine all three.1 
 At the beginning of Alexander’s reign there were other groups 
in St. Petersburg with which the emperor kept in close touch. One 
of them was “the Senatorial party.” This party was hardly more 
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than a group of old friends, who had all served under the Empress 
Catherine, and who had been educated in accordance with the en-
lightened principles of the 18th-century philosophers. These men 
had one other thing in common: none of them took part in the 
grimmer excesses of Paul’s reign. The Senatorial party consisted of 
men who were aristocratic, and who were untainted by any associ-
ation with the favorites of either Catherine or Paul. Their experi-
ence of state matters made them valuable to a young sovereign. 
 The founder of this informal party, Prince Bezborodko, for 
many years chancellor and Catherine’s factotum, was already dead 
when Alexander I succeeded to the throne. From the other mem-
bers the most vocal were the brothers Aleksandr and Simon Voron-
tsov. The former was for a long time a kind of a minister of Rus-
sian commerce, he had western European leanings and was con-
sidered a liberal. The latter had for long been Russian ambassador 
to the court of St James’, and became a convinced supporter of the 
British system of government. He admired the English aristocratic 
way of life and later became domiciled in England. On Alexan-
der’s accession he returned to St Petersburg for a long visit and 
took part in the talks on the Senate reform. Simon was the only 
member of the group not to belong to the Senate. The two Voron-
tsovs were very friendly with some members of the Secret Com-
mittee. However, there was a fight of several court groups for in-
fluence over the emperor,2 and Alexander was often portrayed as 
weak and a sincere liberal who did not know how to use his auto-
cratic powers. The senatorial party has often been treated as a sig-
nificant force, led by experienced and influential statesmen.3 
 Members of the Senatorial party argued that a reformed Senate 
would provide the foundation for a freer and more law-abiding 
form of government. The senators quickly submitted their projects 
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for the emperor’s consideration. Five in all were discussed by the 
Secret Committee, and these were drawn up independently of the 
Senate’s own report. The first project to be discussed was Ale-
ksandr Vorontsov’s memorandum.4 
 Historians have been interested in the Senatorial party largely 
because its members were senior government officials united by a 
common belief in the potential importance of the Russian Senate 
and because its program seemed to embody a sort of muddled aris-
tocratic liberalism of a kind familiar in eighteenth-century Europe. 
The Senatorial party claimed that a powerful Senate could check 
“Despotism” and preserve the “Rule of Law.” They even proposed 
that the Senate be granted a “Right of Remonstrance” which was at 
first sight analogous to that of the eighteenth-century French Par-
liaments. “Thus, the Senatorial party seems to fit well into the 
long-established historiographical tradition which sees the political 
history of Imperial Russia as a long series of attempts to Western-
ize the autocracy by limiting its authority.”5 
 Historians from Karamzin onwards have argued that the Sena-
torial party hoped to curb the powers of the autocracy. This view 
has been summarized by Marc Raeff. He argues that the Senatorial 
party “proposed to give the dominant role in the government to the 
higher nobility by re-establishing the Senate [...] as the highest ex-
ecutive organ and by granting it a consultative voice and limited 
power of initiative in the legislative process [...] In this manner, 
without specifically restricting the absolute power of the monarch, 
the Senate would obtain effective means for safeguarding the ‘fun-
damental laws’ of the realm; that is, the rights and privileges of the 
various classes of the Russian people, most particularly, of course, 
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those of the nobility. These proposals were quite clearly the basis 
for an aristocratic, oligarchic ‘constitution’.”6 
 “However, a close examination of the various reform projects 
submitted by members of the Senatorial party shows that this in-
terpretation does not work.”7 In reality the European analogy is 
misleading. It obscures the peculiarly Russian nature of the Sena-
torial party’s political ideas and of its political behavior. The polit-
ical behavior of the Senatorial party must be distinguished from 
that of European political parties. In the same way, the ideas which 
united the members of the Senatorial party can only be understood 
when distinguished from the European terminology in which they 
were expressed. 
 The politics of eighteenth-century Russia can best be seen as a 
series of conflicts between rival clientele groups. The “Senatorial 
party” was not really a party at all, in the European sense of the 
term. Rather, it was a small clientele group. The real ties between 
its members were personal rather than ideological, and their real 
ambition was not to implement a political program, but rather to 
secure the only significant political prize attainable in an autocra-
cy, namely the right to advise and therefore influence the autocrat-
ic monarch, the source of all real power and influence. 
 In the first place, the members of the Senatorial party kept in-
sisting that they accepted the need for an autocratic government. 
They believed that Russia is an autocratic state. “Second, none of 
their proposals, not even the celebrated ‘Right of Remonstrance’, 
could have created any practical restraints on the powers of the au-
tocracy. The ‘Right of Remonstrance’ was borrowed from the 
Nakaz of Catherine II, and it was intended merely to allow the 
Senate to make suggestions which the monarch could accept or re-
ject. Besides, the members of the Senatorial party suggested no 
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way of increasing the nobility’s influence in the Senate. On the 
contrary, they were quite content for the monarch to continue ap-
pointing its members, as in the past. Third, it is not even possible 
to claim that they intended to create certain procedural limitations 
on the monarch’s power. Certainly, they hoped the monarch would 
exercise his authority exclusively through the Senate. But there 
was no way that such procedures could bind the monarch.”8 
 The language the members of the Senatorial party used to de-
scribe their plans was extremely ambiguous. Their vocabulary 
owed much to Catherine II’s Nakaz of 1767. She, in turn, bor-
rowed the language of European political thought of the early 
eighteenth century, and introduced it into official usage. At first 
sight, the members of the Senatorial party seem to be using this 
language in usual European ways of that time. “Particularly strik-
ing was their use of the emotive words Law, Right, and Despotism. 
They claimed that the Senate was a bulwark against Despotism, a 
guarantor of the Law and a defender of the Rights of the people. 
Further, to enable the Senate to exercise this role effectively, they 
argued that it was necessary to restore to it certain basic Rights 
which had been allowed to lapse.”9 However, they used each of 
these key words in unfamiliar ways. Neither word, remarked D. 
Christian, was used in a definite, universally accepted sense in the 
European discussions of this period. 
 For instance, Western conceptions of Law were not accepted or 
specifically interpreted by the members of the Senatorial party. For 
them civil obligations were both rights and duties: rights over infe-
riors and duties towards superiors. It was impossible to conceive of 
rights over superiors, the kind of rights enshrined in the French 
Declaration of Rights and the American Bill of Rights. On the con-
trary, it was taken for granted that all Rights were delegated and 
could therefore be freely retracted by those who had delegated 
                                                          
8 Ibid. P. 301. 
9 Ibid. P. 302. 
Mikhail Mikeshin  27
them. Rights, like Laws, were an expression of the autocratic will 
and could be freely altered or even cancelled by that will. Obvi-
ously, this conception of Laws and of Rights was not merely per-
fectly compatible with a belief in autocratic government; it was a 
logical consequence of that belief. Similarly, the “Rule of Law” 
meant not that the autocrat should conform to some higher authori-
ty than his own, but rather that his own agents should abide strictly 
by the commands he issued to them. By the “Rule of Law,” they 
understood the rule of the decrees issued by the autocrat. 
 The members of the Senatorial party habitually put the word 
“Despot” to a use, typified in Simon Vorontsov’s phrase, “ministe-
rial Despotism.” When the words “Despot” or “Despotism” were 
used by the members of the Senatorial party, they refer not to the 
behavior of the monarch, but to the arbitrary behavior of his offi-
cials. Alexander Vorontsov wrote, for instance, that 
 
If the various aspects of government are each entrusted [by the auto-
crat] to a particular individual... all will be driven by despotism and 
arbitrariness... and the autocratic power will burden itself... with the 
need to continually check the abuses and caprices of each part. Such 
is the government of viziers and pashas. 
 
 “Despotism” in this sense meant the behavior of government of-
ficials who ignored, flouted or twisted the Laws issued by their 
monarch. “The conviction that there was no authority higher than 
the autocrat forced the members of the Senatorial party to interpret 
each of these words very differently from the European thinkers 
for whom Natural Law, Divine Law, or even the Will of the Peo-
ple, were higher authorities than the monarch.”10 
 Why should the members of the Senatorial party have used 
these words in such a way? A Western historian believes, that “the 
main reason <…> is that the language itself was inadequate to the 
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task of reform. Russian politics was fundamentally different from 
that of Western Europe, and yet Russia had never developed a tra-
dition of political theory designed to cope with the peculiarities of 
autocratic politics.” The politicians had “to stretch the language, as 
the members of the Senatorial party did, to fit the realities of Rus-
sian politics.”11 Moreover, they not only made these words as 
blueprints from French, they conducted their political discussions 
mostly in French. 
 It was a matter-of-fact and quite clear-sighted discussion of 
some typically Russian political problems. The writings of the 
Senatorial party contained a coherent set of ideas about the nature 
of autocratic government, the main weaknesses to which it was 
prone, and the best ways of combating these weaknesses. Their po-
litical ideas started from the axiom that Russia must have an auto-
cratic ruler. As Alexander Vorontsov wrote in July 1801, “Large 
and populous states cannot be governed except by autocratic 
[samoderzhavnymi] Monarchs.”12 He and his colleagues did com-
ments that show they accepted Montesquieu’s view that a large 
country such as Russia should essentially have a despotic govern-
ment. Simon Vorontsov warned against limiting the Russian autoc-
racy in following words: 
 
To introduce such fundamental changes in the largest Empire in the 
universe, amongst a population of more than 30 millions, in a nation 
ill prepared, ignorant and corrupt, and at a time when there is political 
unrest over the whole continent, would be to bring about the collapse 
of the throne and the dissolution of the Empire.13 
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 It means that the brothers adopted an essentially pragmatic ar-
gument, and they did not reject the idea of limited monarchy in 
principle. They believed, however, that in Russia at that very time 
any attempt to introduce such a government would be disastrous. It 
would be as stupid and irrelevant, as to abolish serfdom right 
away. 
 Thus, the idea of limiting monarchical authority was completely 
out of their attention. Instead the members of the Senatorial party 
focused on a number of issues central in the autocratic politics of 
Russia. What chiefly concerned them was a problem arising out of 
the very nature of autocratic government — the difficulty of dele-
gating the autocratic power of the monarch without losing it. In 
theory, the powers of the autocrat were limitless. In practice, how-
ever, one individual could only exercise a very limited authority, 
particularly in a country as vast as Russia.14 The structure of power 
lacked an essential mechanism. 
 “The danger they saw was that the political power concentrated 
in the hands of the autocratic monarch could all too easily slip 
from his grasp. The members of the Senatorial party had their own 
explanation of this phenomenon. They argued that it was particu-
larly liable to happen if the Emperor relied exclusively on the ad-
vice of a small number of favorites.”15 In a letter to the Emperor 
written in the summer of 1801, Simon Vorontsov put it more force-
fully: 
 
How can Your Imperial Majesty be sure of not being seduced deliber-
ately or unconsciously into error by [Your Ministers]? How can You 
know if they are presenting all that ought to be brought to Your atten-
tion? How can You be sure that Your orders have been executed 
strictly according to their intent?16 
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 It was only a short step from ignorance to weakness. If the truth 
was hidden from the autocrat then he had no guarantee that his will 
was being carried out, that his laws were being obeyed. The vision 
of the autocrat would be obscured, his own bureaucracy would be-
come opaque to him and he would no longer know either how it 
operated or how it executed his orders. With his own officials ma-
nipulating the information reaching him, the monarch would find 
himself powerless, stranded in a sort of vast Potemkin village cre-
ated by his own bureaucracy. But it was not only the autocrat who 
suffered under such conditions, for, the brothers continued, once 
he ceased to be the real source of power, the vast concentration of 
authority available to him would devolve upon other men who had 
no broad perspectives, no sense of general responsibilities, and no 
conception of duties higher than those of self-interest. 
 All information reached the Russian tsar through a single bu-
reaucracy interested in presenting its actions in the best light pos-
sible. Thus, the paradoxical result of his unlimited authority was 
that the Russian autocrat was very much dependent on the advice 
of his own officials, so dependent, indeed, that he could on occa-
sion become their captive.17 
 The members of the Senatorial party proposed a solution that is 
quite usual for those who want to start forward: they proposed to 
return to the initial, “genuine” structure of the Russian power. 
They found it in the “Spiritual Regulation” issued by Peter the 
Great in 1721 and written by Feofan (Prokopovich). It contained a 
general description of the collegial institutions Peter the Great had 
been creating during the last few years of his reign. And it was in 
this system, headed by one supreme college, the Senate, that the 
members of the Senatorial party saw a model solution to the prob-
lems that concerned them. It is because of this that their proposals 
look as essentially conservative. Peter the Great, the members of 
the Senatorial party believed, was well aware that ministerial des-
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potism was inevitable wherever the monarch relied on the private 
advice of individual officials. Peter the Great “realized that a large 
country could not possibly be administered by the Sovereign 
alone. But to entrust this administration to 10 or 12 individuals 
subject to no control would do nothing but create 10 or 12 despots 
who through human nature would inevitably abuse their power.”18 
 The logical solution was to appoint groups of officials collec-
tively responsible for the decisions they took. Alexander Vorontsov 
(following Feofan) argued that those appointed to such institutions 
would be obliged to take a broader, more considered, and less self-
interested view of their tasks. Each individual would act as watch-
dog over his colleagues, and they would all be exposed to the 
searching glare of a sort of artificial public consisting of other 
members of the college. This was an attempt to solve within a sin-
gle bureaucracy the problems solved in Western Europe by the 
clash between rival groups.19 The collegial principle was also in-
tended to ensure that the bureaucracy remained transparent to the 
monarch. In theory he would always be able to observe its work-
ings clearly and to see through it to the real condition of the people 
over whom he ruled. It was in this sense that the members of the 
Senatorial party occasionally described the Senate as a “‘mediating 
power,” using another phrase from the language of Montesquieu. 
 For the Vorontsov brothers and other members of the Senatorial 
party, the main task of reform was to turn to a conservative utopia, 
that is to (re)establish a bureaucracy in which each link consisted 
of a group of individuals, a Petrine “college,” which would neces-
sarily act in conformity with the wishes and interests of the mon-
arch. The Senate, as they believed it had been in the time of Peter 
the Great, would crown the system, coordinate and supervise the 
work of the colleges. Thus, the Senatorial party’s design in fact 
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was to increase the monarch’s power by increasing his control over 
the bureaucracy through which it was transmitted. 
 The proposed solution to the problem of ministerial despotism 
was not at all strong. The administrative history of the eighteenth 
century showed its weak points. The collegial institutions founded 
by Peter the Great all without any exception tended to shrug off re-
sponsibility on to some persons who then were glad to monopolize 
the authorities of these institutions. “As Speranskii argued later, 
collegial institutions were in any case not well adapted to the ex-
ecutive functions which the Senatorial party hoped they could ful-
fill. Like all large committees, they were poor at initiating policy 
and they reacted very slowly when quick or merely routine deci-
sions had to be taken. They were, however, […] well adapted to 
the essentially passive tasks characteristic of judicial institutions, 
and it is because of this that the various collegial institutions, and 
in particular the Senate, had transformed themselves so naturally 
into judicial institutions.”20 
 The political behavior of the Senatorial party members was pe-
culiarly characteristic of an autocratic political system. They knew 
that in reality it was impractical to insist upon their ideas, they 
were of course ready to accept some compromise if proposed by 
the tsar. They hoped that the battle under the banner of “We are for 
collegial institutions!” with their opponents would give them per-
sonally a preponderant influence in the new system of government, 
the monarch taking their side, for they presumably had the best 
methods to support and strengthen the efficiency of the autocracy. 
The underlying conflict was about who would be appointed to run 
the reformed bureaucracy. 
 The Emperor had at first been extremely enthusiastic about the 
idea of a reform of the Senate. The members of the Senatorial par-
ty were quite influential, therefore, if their advice had been taken, 
its immediate effect would have been to reduce the influence of the 
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Secret Committee and bring the members of the Senatorial party 
within the circle of advisors which ultimately determined the poli-
cies of the Russian government. 
 At some moment the tsar made some appointments to fill va-
cancies in newly established ministries. The majority of members 
of the Senatorial party filled main positions in them. These mem-
bers immediately lost their former perspective, because they 
achieved their main goal — to take the most important control po-
sitions near the tsar. The problem of ministerial despotism ceased 
to appear so urgent for Alexander Vorontsov and others. Only Si-
mon retained his theoretical outlook because he remained in his 
former position. 
 The political behavior of the Senatorial party, like its political 
program, can be understood when seen in its context. It becomes 
clear that the Senatorial party, like most of the other informal 
groupings which were so characteristic of autocratic policies, was 
fighting above all for access to the monarch. Their program was 
designed to secure this end. However, D. Christian believes that 
the program was more than a mask for their ambitions; it was de-
signed to sustain the authority of the monarch whose advisors they 
wished to become, and it was based on an intimate knowledge of 
the workings of the bureaucratic machinery through which that au-
thority was exercised.21 
 Within a month of issuing the decree initiating the reform de-
bates the Secret Committee made its retaliatory move. Alexander I 
had been persuaded by its members that he had behaved impul-
sively. Its detailed memorandum argued that the real task facing 
the Emperor was to create barriers not simply to the despotism of 
ministers but to the use of his own autocratic powers, so the Sena-
torial reform was merely an irrelevance.22 
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 In February 1802 Czartoryski presented to the Secret Commit-
tee a plan for the establishment of an executive machinery consist-
ing of a number of formally constituted ministries. The “proposal 
shows that he and his colleagues had now come to accept some of 
the arguments in favor of collegial government. As a result they 
adopted from the start the principle that the new ministries should 
be subjected to the authority of various collegial bodies including 
the Senate.”23 But they appear to have gone even further in their 
compromise with the notion of collegiality. They decided that the 
ministers as a group should be organized in a separate collegial in-
stitution, a Committee of Ministers, to which they were obliged to 
submit any proposals before presenting them to the Emperor. It 
was because of the extent to which they incorporated the collegial 
principle that Simon Vorontsov could regard the reforms as a mod-
est triumph for his party. 
 “Clearly, then, the fate of the collegial principle after the re-
forms would depend on the success with which the collegial insti-
tutions managed to enforce their control over the ministers. And it 
soon became clear that in practice the collegial institutions would 
be powerless. […] The Committee of Ministers survived for over a 
century, but while retaining considerable influence, it never man-
aged to prevent ministers from establishing private, ‘individual’ 
contacts with the Emperor. […] Thus, within a year or two of the 
reforms, it was already clear that the hopes of the Senatorial party 
would not be realized.”24 
 Why did the reforms fail? A possible explanation was suggested 
by Simon Vorontsov in his letters in 1803.25 The younger brother 
felt that the basic principles of the Senatorial party remained valid. 
Indeed he argued that they contained, in the notion of “ministerial 
despotism,” a perfectly adequate explanation for the failure of the 
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reforms. Newly appointed ministers had simply succumbed to the 
pleasures of ministerial authority. They now enjoyed regular ac-
cess to the monarch and were determined that no collegial body 
should limit their freedom of action. As a result they had systemat-






THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 
AND UTOPIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: 





 Utopian political thought is rarely linked with the Scottish En-
lightenment, which is often called a Newtonian Enlightenment be-
cause of its attempts to apply the experimental method to the hu-
man sciences. David Hume and Adam Smith in particular attempt-
ed to introduce a natural history of man, or science of man, as a 
body of knowledge that covered several branches of human life. 
The scientific approach to human life would appear to be incom-
patible with the notion of ‘utopia’, a place, state or a condition 
with perfect political laws, customs and social conditions, or alter-
natively, an ideal but imaginary political or social system. 
 The word itself was rare in Scottish philosophy; it was used by 
only Thomas Reid in his unpublished papers, in a section entitled 
‘Some Thoughts on the Utopian System’.1 Scottish intellectuals 
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mostly wrote about the best possible form of a society (a com-
monwealth) rather than a utopia. In this paper I shall read these 
texts by contextualizing them within the utopian genre. 
 Craig Smith has addressed the question of utopian political 
thought, especially millenarianism, stating that in Scotland there 
was some difference between Scottish political thought, especially 
Presbyterian and Calvinist political thought, which were reflected 
for example in the National Covenant, on the one hand, and eight-
eenth-century Enlightenment philosophy on the other.1 I further 
suggest that the roots of eighteenth-century utopian political 
though lay not in the Reformation but in the classical, and in par-
ticular the Platonic, tradition of political philosophy. In this paper I 
shall construct the link between classical political theory and uto-
pian political thinking in Scottish philosophy. 
 The most famous descriptions of a utopia in Western political 
thought are Thomas Moore’s Utopia and James Harrington’s 
Oceana, both of them still controversial treatises in political phi-
losophy. They were an important source of political theorizing and 
were republished several times in the 18th century. The eight-
eenth-century editions were often just republications of previous 
translations with prefaces by the original translators and editors. 
This may mean that the prefaces were already more or less archaic 
at the time of publication. Despite this, the introductions may tell 
us something about the reception of these works. 
 
The Biblical New Jerusalem as a Political Utopia? 
 
 One source for the social utopias can be found in the Bible, es-
pecially the Biblical Judeo-Christian theocracy after the future re-
incarnation of Jesus Christ. Craig Smith has made a distinction be-
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tween Christian millenarian expectations about the future state of 
God and the eighteenth-century political and social utopias. The 
Christian vision predicts the divine, perfect state of life to come 
without any detailed description of that state, whereas the political 
utopias speculated about and constructed the most perfect social 
and political system.1 The eighteenth-century political utopias 
were often secular; there was no explicit Divinity, and they reflect-
ed various modes of scepticism rather than Christian belief.2 The 
eighteenth-century intellectuals are known far more for their de-
istic and even sceptic views than for their acceptance of Christian 
theology. Several Scottish philosophers, even those with a Chris-
tian background, detached themselves from the fundamental Bibli-
cal prophecies of the future and held that the Bible was not the sole 
arbiter of good and evil in society. 
 
More’s Utopia: From Political Atlantis to Daily Politics 
 
 The English translation of More’s De Optimo Republicae Statu 
deque Nova Insula Utopia (1516) was republished several times in 
the 18th century, based on the translation and preface by Gilbert 
Burnet; the preface dealt mainly with the process of translating and 
the progress of language.3 The book was written for the amuse-
ment of its readers; this statement reflected the classical idea that 
only free citizens (men) were able to engage in politics because 
they did not have to work to fulfill their primary needs (p. 43). In 
the Epistle the author wrote that Utopia was part of a recently 
found world (p. 6); the reference to the discovery of America was 
clear to 18th-century readers (p. 42). According to the narrator, it 
was a work of political fiction (p. 41), although so well written that 
some might take it for the truth. The author/narrator often referred 
                                                          
1 Smith C. ‘“Great Reformation in the Manners of Mankind”…’ P. 224. 
2 Ibid. P. 233. 
3 I refer to the edition published in Dublin in 1737, unless otherwise stated. 
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to Plato’s Republic, translating it as “common-wealth”, and the 
book covered the history of manners, constitutions and laws in that 
commonwealth (p. 37). The word optimo was translated as com-
plete rather than optimal, perfect or the best (ed. 1751, title page). 
Moreover, Utopia was defined as the “singular good common-
wealth” (1743, XV). 
 As modern readers, we can claim that More argued against the 
ambitious desire of private property. However, in his preface (p. 
VIII), Burnet claimed that More did not wholeheartedly defend the 
rejection of private property, which was the basis of his Utopia. 
This was a fundamental question in eighteenth-century political 
theory: according to the Scottish philosophers, the human desire 
for private property and wealth was the motor of economic devel-
opment and the progress of civic virtue. 
 More’s Utopia was seen in the context of sixteenth-century pol-
itics; for example, Burnet suggested that More was so cautious on 
the subject of marriage because as a Member of the House of 
Commons he was against King Henry VIII’s proposal for the mar-
riage contract of his daughter Margaret. Although Utopia was a 
work of political speculation, some references to sixteenth-century 
political life were detected and reflected or revised in the eight-
eenth-century translations. Although More’s Utopia was a state 
(both geographically and politically) that did not exist, the book it-
self also seemed to reflect some general problems in British poli-
tics, which represented common issues in the political systems that 




 Another well-known political utopia in Western political 
thought was James Harrington’s Oceana, republished in 1737, 
1758 and 1771 with a preface written by John Toland in 1699–
1700. J.G.A. Pocock’s famous modern edition of Harrington’s 
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Oceana is based on Toland’s editions.1 In the preface, Pocock 
states that Harrington combined 17th-century republican ideals, 
especially civic humanism, with a Machiavellian reason of state.2 
According to Toland, Harrington described the “good polity,” a 
society that was admirably constituted and thus “produced […] 
great and excellent men” (1737, V). He continued by stating that 
Harrington’s model of a commonwealth was based on holistic 
views of society, not just one branch of leaning and science (ibid.). 
 Toland extolled the seventeenth-century state of liberty, plural-
ism, trade, colonial commerce, luxury and enlightened manners in 
Britain, but he also mentions the change in military virtue. For 
Harrington, each citizen was connected to the state by military cit-
izenship. Pocock describes Harrington’s principle of citizenship: 
“…the individual’s political capacity depended upon his capacity 
to his ability to bear, and to possess, the arms to be exercised for 
common cause.”3 This kind of political ideal originated from the 
practice of small states in Greece during the classical era, and was 
often seen, as it was by Harrington, as an alternative to a standing 
army, which was regarded as economically impossible. In this kind 
of system, for Harrington, corruption (of the citizen) was the most 
serious threat to civic virtue. In the 18th century, the political im-
pact of luxury (the consumption of luxury items exceeding primary 
needs for convenience and societal status) was discussed, and the 
classical conception of luxury as corruption was contested by 
Hume. In the culture of the Enlightenment, luxury was more a 
source of civilized manners than a threat to virtuous citizenship, 
and Harrington’s Oceana was criticized for its agrarian principles; 
again utopian economics was seen as problematic or inapplica-
                                                          
1 The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. J.G.A Pocock (1977, CUP, 
Cambridge). Page numbers refer to J.G.A. Pocock’s ‘Historical Introduction’ to 
this edition. P. 1–152. 
2 Ibid. P. 124. 
3 Ibid. P. 131. 
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ble in the commercial society of the 18th  century and the British 
Empire. 
 Toland (1737, IX) constructed a link between Oceana and Pla-
to’s Republic by comparing Plato’s heathen commonwealth to 
Harrington’s “Christian” utopia. Toland suggested that in his 
Oceana Harrington had proposed a new political system based on 
Roman ideals for Britain. Toland further claimed that Harrington’s 
political vision was so different from the existing British political 
system that there was nothing left of the latter at the ‘national lev-
el’ except the local government of the city of London. Seven-
teenth-century London seemed to be (the equivalent of republican) 
classical Rome; in his Dedication to the Lord Mayor, Alderman, 
Sherifs, and Common Council of London, Toland appraised politi-
cally and economically flourishing London and continued: “Lon-
don… well deserves the name of a New Rome in the West, and like 
the old one, to becom Sovereign Mistress of the Universe/ THE 
Government of the City is so wisely and completely contriv’d, that 
HARRINGTON made very few alterations in it, tho in all the other 
parts of our National Constitution he scarce left any thing as he 
found it” (p. IV). 
 
Thomas Reid on Utopian Political Thought 
 
 In his posthumously published manuscript on the utopian politi-
cal system, Thomas Reid mentioned1 Thomas More and connected 
utopian political thought with classical philosophy by dividing po-
litical theory into the speculative and the practical, which had to be 
distinguished from each other. The former concerned the best form 
of government for the improvement and happiness of man, while 
the latter concerned the variants of and changes in real political 
systems.2 The distinction is the same as that which Plato made in 
                                                          
1 Reid T. Practical Ethics… P. 283. 
2 Ibid. P. 277. 
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The Republic and The Laws: in the former Plato reconstructed the 
ideally best political system and in the latter he introduced political 
systems that were humanly as good as possible. After a lengthy 
section containing several passages on the superiority of a peace-
ful, gradual alteration of political systems over violent revolutions, 
Reid turns to a discussion of speculative systems.1 Reid defined 
“speculative theorizing” as a method of reasoning in which the 
systems concerned may not have existed or would not exist in the 
future and were thus most impracticable and inapplicable. Specula-
tive theorizing itself was useful in that it enhanced human wisdom; 
it extended the human understanding of political systems and could 
even facilitate the introduction of new conceptualizations and views 
about political matters.2 However, people should be careful in ap-
plying the speculative principles of the utopian system, since “[w]e 
cannot borrow Examples from Utopian Governments, because no 
Nation was ever so governed,”3 and thus we are unsure of the ef-
fects of such political principles; human behavior is a complicated 
phenomenon, and it is impossible to predict. In general, political 
reasoning attains to probabilities, not demonstration. 
 The utopian models should, according to Reid, answer three 
questions concerning political systems. 1) How to improve the 
human mind so that the members of a political system could make 
the distinction between right and wrong, virtue and vice? 2) How 
to decrease criminal conduct in society? And 3) how should public 
merits and ranks be justly allocated in society, especially with re-
gard to the social status or labor of the members of that society?4 
In practice, the utopian system analyses various means to organize 
human society and control human passions, especially the desire of 
private property, by means of education and legislation. In the best 
                                                          
1 Ibid. P. 280–1. 
2 Ibid. P. 281. 
3 Ibid. P. 297. 
4 Ibid. P. 283. 
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political system, there should not be any conflict between private 
and public interests.1 
 
Hume’s essay ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’ 
and the Utopian Genre 
 
 Hume wrote an essay on the idea of a perfect commonwealth in 
order to “revive” the political debate on the topic. He mentioned 
Plato’s Republic, More’s Utopia and Harrington’s Oceana as re-
markable contributions to this genre, and Harrington’s model of the 
best form of government as the most valuable utopian model ever 
published in Britain.2 However, he claimed that there were a few de-
fects in Harrington’s political system: the proposed rotation of posts, 
its agrarian economy and its insecure provisions for liberty. 
 For Hume, the best form of government was a system in which 
the individual features of the people, culture or nature, including 
natural resources, did not affect the system.3 The best form of gov-
ernment was more like a mechanism than an application of the 
most appropriate political system. As the best possible common-
wealth, Hume proposed a political system of a mixed form of gov-
ernment or limited monarchy, in which separate democratic coun-
ties, small republican bodies, were firmly united under one gov-
ernment. Unlike many of his contemporaries who regarded the 
Greek idea of the small polis the best one, he did not ascribe to the 
idea that an ideal political system was not possible in large states, 
like France or Britain.4 His ideal political system was character-
ized by adequate representation and powerful central government.5 
                                                          
1 Ibid. P. 287. 
2 Hume D. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. I–II, (1764, London/Edin-
burgh), vol. I. P. 541. It is noteworthy that Hume referred to Plato’s The Repub-
lic as an “imaginary republic” in the footnotes to his essay Of Civil Liberty. 
3 Ibid. P. 540. 
4 Ibid. P. 551, 554–6. 
5 Ibid. P. 552–3. 
44  Oili Pulkkinen 
According to Hume, his ideal model was almost perfect, although 
some problems still remained concerning the status of the sover-
eign and the militia.1 Although Hume was not able to present an 
immaculate political system, he stated that in Sweden there was a 
balance between limited monarchy, regular government and a 
standing army, and thus the Swedish political system was “less 
dangerous than British.”2 
 Although Reid’s and Hume’s descriptions of political utopias 
were almost contrary to each other, they had one common feature: 
Hume, too, claimed that the establishment of the best possible po-
litical system was impeded by numerous personal attributes, espe-
cially human ambition; he wrote, for example: “We know not to 
what lengths enthusiasm, or other extraordinary motions of the 
human mind, may transport men, to neglect of all order and public 
good.3 In addition to their nature as imaginary political systems 
without existence in spatial or temporal reality, there is another 
weakness in models of utopian political thought. For Reid, utopian 
political systems were impossibilities precisely because the human 
condition was deeply dependent on improvement by trial and er-
ror, which required “temptation”, private desires and interests, and 
as a utopian political system was already the best possible one, 
there was no role for this kind of development in it.4 Adam Smith, 
too, arrived at the conclusion that it would be impossible to im-
plement More’s Utopia or Harrington’s Oceana; private interests, 
which nurtured economic progress, made More’s political utopia 
impossible.5 
                                                          
1 Ibid. P. 553–4. 
2 Ibid. P. 554. 
3 Ibid. P. 555–6. 
4 Reid T. Practical Ethics... P. 297–8. 
5 “To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored 
in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect Oceana or Utopia be established in it. 
Not only the prejudices of the publick, but what is more unconquerable, the pri-
vate interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it” (Cited from Craig 
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Utopias and Eighteenth-Century Political Science 
 
 As already mentioned, the Scottish philosophers, apart from 
Thomas Reid, did not explicitly write about political utopias but 
about the best possible political systems or commonwealths. These 
political constructions were introduced as an element of the aca-
demic discipline of political science. 
 “Political science” is a somewhat vague term in the Scottish En-
lightenment; usually it was described as subordinate to moral phi-
losophy and laws, interwoven together under the discipline of the 
natural history of man, or, as Hume called it, the science of man. 
However, if we take a closer look at the elementary lectures on po-
litical science, politics was almost always located at the end of the 
lectures, after sections dealing with man as a psycho-social crea-
ture and the philosophical foundations of jurisprudence. Political 
utopias — constructions of the best political systems — often 
completed the section on politics. Despite the theoretico-philoso-
phical differences that existed between Scottish (academic) philos-
ophers, the written scheme of the lectures on moral sciences, poli-
tics and the best political system often follows the same pattern; 
constructions of the ideal political systems were a crucial part of 
elementary lectures in eighteenth-century political science. 
 Hume called the ideal commonwealth as an “immortal form of 
government.”1 In classical political theory, the demise of a politi-
cal body (a state) was unavoidable: political life followed the same 
kind of pattern as natural life: from birth to adolescence, maturity, 
decay and death. For Hume, a political utopia, if it could be real-
                                                                                                                                 
Smith 2005, 234). Craig Smith argues that Scottish political thought, which was 
based on empiricism and scepticism, opposed the utopian system, but here Ad-
am Smith was presenting Utopia and Oceana as any models of a political society 
based on (faulty) political reasoning. The criticism is directed not against utopi-
an political thought itself but against the particular principles introduced in 
More’s Utopia and Harrington’s Oceana. 
1 Hume D. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. P. 556. 
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ized, offered a way to overcome the death of political systems. A 
similar vision of a decay-free political system was presented by 
Francis Hutcheson. Although he did not introduce any model of a 
utopian political system, he envisioned something similar. Hutche-
son wrote that there were the seeds of death and destruction in eve-
ry political state but if some political system could promote “good 




 Characteristic of eighteenth-century political science was the 
positivist assumption of the perfection of political science in the 
near future. There were two different approaches in eighteenth-
century political science, following the Platonic dichotomy: politi-
cal reasoning aimed at describing either the best possible universal 
political system, which can be seen as the aim of classical utopian 
reasoning, or the most appropriate system for each political socie-
ty. A similar distinction existed in the texts of Reid and Hume — 
although Hume wrote about the best possible form of common-
wealth rather than a utopia in his essays. In the 18th century a uto-
pia was seen either as a purely theoretical imaginary model of a 
political state or a political ideal that did not yet exist but which 
could exist some time in the future. 
 Although the word “utopia” literarily referred to a place that did 
not exist, utopian models were connected to contemporary political 
problems. The most famous political utopias were published in the 
18th century, and although the utopias of Thomas Reid and James 
Harrington were much appreciated as political speculation, during 
an age of economic expansion their rejection of private property 
                                                          
1 Hutcheson F. A System of Political Philosophy I–II (1755, Glasgow/London), 
vol. II. P. 372, 377. A Divine Power, whose guidance was fundamental in the 
human search for a political system that was good for all, was a part of Hutche-
son’s moral philosophy and politics (ibid. II, 380). 
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was seen as problematic. By contrast, several Scottish intellectuals 
claimed that owing to human desires and passion for wealth, it was 





                                                          
The Philosophical Age. Almanac 39. The Northern Lights: Social Philosophies 
and Utopias of the Enlightenment in Northern Europe and Russia. St. Peters-
burg — Helsinki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2013. P. 48–62. 
 
VON DER KLARHEIT ZUR MÜNDIGKEIT. 
ZU DEN IMPLIKATIONEN 
EINES METAPHERNWECHSELS 





 This paper analyzes the change of metaphors in the self-reflection of 
the Enlightenment thought during the 18th century from “Klarheit” 
(clarity) to “Mündigkeit” (coming of age, majority). It argues that in the 
philosophy of Kant this change of metaphors is connected with the trans-
formation of the Enlightenment from a utopian project to a realistic one. 
 
 Der Ausdruck „Aufklärung“ als Bezeichnung einer Bewegung 
und einer Epoche in der europäischen Kultur, die vor allem mit 
dem 18. Jahrhundert verbunden werden, hat bekanntlich seinen 
Ursprung in der Metaphorik des Lichts. Im englischen enlighten-
ment und im russischen просвещение wird auf Licht und Hellig-
keit ausdrücklich Bezug genommen und ebenso ist es in der fran-
zösischen Bezeichnung für die Aufklärungszeit als le siècle des 
Lumières der Fall. Im deutschen Wort Aufklärung erscheint die 
Bezugnahme auf Licht und Helligkeit dagegen zunächst nur indi-
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rekt über das Aufklären, ursprünglich Aufklaren, als einer meteo-
rologischen Erscheinung: das Aufbrechen des bewölkten Himmels 
und das Durchbrechen des Sonnenlichts. Der eigentliche Bezug 
liegt hier auf der Klarheit. Von der Klarheit geht im Deutschen 
dann auch die Aufklärungsmetaphorik aus. So weist Kaspar Stie-
lers Teutscher Sprachschatz von 1691 unter „Klarheit“ auf die 
„Klarheit der Sonnen“ (splendor solis) und auf die Verstandes-
klarheit (lumen, acumen ingenii) hin1 und verbindet damit zwei 
schon etablierte Gebrauchsweisen des Wortes miteinander in der 
Lichtmetaphorik.2 Mit „Klarheit“ und „klar“ öffnet sich so ein für 
die Aufklärungsthematik weitreichendes Metaphernfeld, das vom 
Klären über das Analysieren (Zerlegen) bis zum Auflösen, vom 
Klarmachen über das Erklären bis zum Entzaubern reicht. Damit 
schließt das Metaphernfeld um das Wort „Klarheit“ an eine Haupt-
forderung der rationalistischen Philosophie der Neuzeit an, an die 
Forderung nach klaren und deutlichen Begriffen (notio clara et 
distincta).3 Diese Forderung bleibt ein leitendes Motiv der europä-
                                                          
1 Vgl. Peter Pütz, Die deutsche Aufklärung, Darmstadt 1991, S. 11. 
2 Pütz bemerkt dazu: „In Analogie zu dieser doppelten Bedeutung dürfte auch 
das Wort ‚Aufklärung’ später von der wetterkundlichen auf eine allgemein geis-
tige Ebene übertragen worden sein.“ (Ebd.). 
3 Die Linie der Aufklärung, die mit der Forderung der rationalistischen Philoso-
phie nach clarté vorbereitet wird, geht auf René Descartes zurück. „Am Ur-
sprung des Sinnes von Aufklärung steht Descartes’ Thema der clarté.“ Dabei 
geht es nicht nur um eine kognitive Forderung, sondern „um klare Begriffe um 
der eigenen Urteilsfähigkeit willen, und die Urteilsfähigkeit bestimmt die Füh-
rung der Leidenschaften.“ Schon für Descartes ist dabei der moralische Aspekt 
grundlegend. Letztlich geht es ihm um die Selbstachtung, die in „Unabhängig-
keit von Leidenschaften und Freiheit von Fremdbestimmung“ besteht und durch 
Wissen erreicht werden kann. (Vgl. Gerd Irrlitz, Kant. Handbuch. Leben und 
Werk, Stuttgart / Weimar 2010, S. 15)  Einen kurzen und prägnanten Überblick 
über die Einteilung der Begriffe in der rationalistischen Version gibt Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, Betrachtung über die Erkenntnis, die Wahrheit und die Ideen 
(1684), in: Ders. Kleine Schriften zur Metaphysik. Philosophische Schriften Bd. 
1, hg. von Hans Heinz Holz, Frankfurt am Main 1996, S. 25 ff. Vgl. zur empi-
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ischen Aufklärung in ihrem Kampf gegen Aberglaube und Vorur-
teile und für rational begründetes, wissenschaftliches Denken. Sie 
liegt dem zugrunde, was als der „rationalistische Aufklärungsbe-
griff“ bezeichnet werden kann.1 
 Insofern mit der „Klarheit“ aber auch der Übergang zur Licht-
metaphorik möglich wird, wie Stielers Hinweis auf den lateini-
schen Ursprung des Ausdrucks „Verstandesklarheit“ als lumen in-
genii ausdrücklich anzeigt, öffnet sich mit dem rationalistischen 
Aufklärungsbegriff ein weiteres Metaphernfeld: das Aufhellen als 
Leuchten, Beleuchten, Erleuchten und schließlich als das Denken.2 
 Während das erste Metaphernfeld das Aufklären in eher sachli-
cher Hinsicht beschreibt: geklärt werden Begriffe, Urteile, Vorur-
teile, Mythen, Strukturen, Konventionen, Weltbilder, ist das zweite 
auf das Aufklären in subjektiver Hinsicht gerichtet: erleuchtet wird 
der Mensch, vor allem sein Intellekt oder Geist. 
 Insgesamt schließt die Metaphorik von Klären und Erleuchten 
durch das Licht im rationalistischen Aufklärungsbegriff an die äl-
tere Metapher vom natürlichen Licht der Vernunft (lumen natura-
le, lumen rationis) an.3 
                                                                                                                                 
ristischen Version John Locke, Über den menschlichen Verstand (1689), Bd. 1, 
Berlin 1968, S. 455 ff. 
1 Nach dem rationalistischen Aufklärungsbegriff, so Werner Schneiders, besteht 
Aufklärung in dem Streben nach „Wahrheit durch Klarheit“, nämlich Klarheit 
des Geistes, genauer Klarheit des Verstandes, daher: „Aufklärung des Verstan-
des“ („Ausbesserung des Verstandes“, „Erhellung des Verstandes“). (Werner 
Schneiders, Einleitung, in: Ders. (Hg.), Lexikon der Aufklärung, München 1995, 
S. 10 f.). 
2 Bis „fast in die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts bleibt das Wort ‚aufgeklärt’ auf den 
Sinnbezirk von Intellekt und Psyche bezogen.“ (Pütz, Die deutsche Aufklärung, 
S. 11). 
3 Für die Inanspruchnahme des natürlichen Lichts als entscheidender Berufungs-
instanz im 17. Jahrhundert lassen sich, so Martin Schneider, mindestens vier 
Motivationen bzw. Aspekte nennen: die Berufung auf den gesunden Menschen-
verstand, die Kritik an Vorurteilen und traditioneller (aristotelisch-scholas-
tischer) Wissenschaft, die Rationalisierung der Religion, die Letztbegründung 
Hartwig Frank   51
 Kant eröffnet der Aufklärungsthematik mit dem Stichwort 
„Mündigkeit“ ein neues Metaphernfeld. Die Ausdrücke „mündig 
sein“ und „Mündigkeit“ kommen aus dem juristischen Sprachge-
brauch. Danach ist mit Mündigkeit derjenige Zustand gemeint, der 
ein Individuum in die Lage versetzt, sich in wirtschaftlicher Hin-
sicht selbst zu erhalten. 
 Kant nimmt diese Gebrauchsweise auf, erweitert sie aber in 
zwei Richtungen: erstens vom Individuum auf die Menschen über-
haupt, nämlich das Menschengeschlecht, und zweitens von der 
bloß wirtschaftlichen Selbsterhaltung auf die Selbständigkeit im 
Denken (Selbstdenken) und im Leben (den Mut, für das eigene 
Leben Verantwortung zu übernehmen).1 Durch diese Erweiterung 
wird die Mündigkeit nach Kant zu einem zentralen Stichwort, mit 
dem der Prozess der Aufklärung beschrieben werden kann.2 Und 
                                                                                                                                 
des Wissens durch das natürliche Licht (vgl. Martin Schneider, Das Weltbild des 
17. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt 2004, S. 16-50). 
1 Mündigkeit wird damit von Kant allgemein als Ausgang aus Unmündigkeit 
durch Befreiung von Vormundschaft verstanden. Die erste der genannten Erwei-
terungsrichtungen wird z.B. deutlich in Kants Mutmaßungen über die Mensch-
heitsgeschichte, „daß der Ausgang des Menschen aus dem, ihm durch die Ver-
nunft, als erster Aufenthalt seiner Gattung vorgestellten, Paradiese nicht anders, 
als der Übergang aus der Rohigkeit eines bloß tierischen Geschöpfes in die 
Menschheit, aus dem Gängelwagen des Instinkts zur Leitung der Vernunft, mit 
einem Worte: aus der Vormundschaft der Natur in den Stand der Freiheit gewe-
sen sei.“ (Immanuel Kant, Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, A 
12 f.) Exemplarisch für beide genannten Richtungen ist aber vor allem Kants 
Aufsatz Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? 
2 Das Stichwort „Mündigkeit“ steht damit für das, was Werner Schneiders in 
Unterscheidung zum „rationalistischen Aufklärungsbegriff“ den „emanzipatori-
schen Aufklärungsbegriff“ nennt. Nach dem „emanzipatorischen Aufklärungs-
begriff“ zielt Aufklärung auf freies Denken oder „(mit dem zeitgenössischen 
Ausdruck)“ auf „Selbstdenken“ und besteht zugleich in der Aufforderung an 
den Willen („Habe Mut“) zur „Autonomie des Denkens“ und „Selbstbestim-
mung im Handeln“ (Werner Schneiders, Einleitung, in: Lexikon der Aufklärung, 
S. 10 f.). Die Worte „Mündigkeit“ im durch Kant erweiterten Sinn und „Eman-
zipation“ werden seit der Spätaufklärung in ihrer Bedeutung nahezu deckungs-
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das damit verbundene Metaphernfeld (Sprechen, Stimme Erheben 
und Abgeben, Bestimmen und Mitbestimmen, Gesetzgeben, Auto-
nomie) wird konstitutiv für die kritische Philosophie Kants.1 
 Ich möchte im Folgenden drei Thesen zu den Implikationen des 
Metaphernwechsels von der Klarheit zur Mündigkeit kurz erläu-
tern: 
 (1) Mit diesem Metaphernwechsel ändert sich der Schwerpunkt 
im Selbstverständnis der Aufklärung vom rationalistischen Aufklä-
rungsbegriff, nach dem Aufklärung vorrangig ein Projekt der 
menschlichen Vernunft ist, hin zum emanzipatorischen Aufklä-
rungsbegriff, wonach im Zentrum der Aufklärung der Prozess des 
Selbständigwerdens des Menschen steht. Signifikant für diese 
Schwerpunktverlagerung ist Kants Bestimmung des Selbstdenkens 
in Verbindung mit der Mündigkeit. 
 Vor Kant bedeutet Selbstdenken die Bereitschaft und die Fä-
higkeit, verschiedene Meinungen zu prüfen und sich seine eigene 
Meinung nach keinem anderen Kriterium als der eigenen Vernunft 
                                                                                                                                 
gleich und doch noch lange Zeit unabhängig voneinander gebraucht. So wurde 
die „Rolle des Begriffs Mündigkeit [...] seit 1830 fast schlagartig vom Begriff 
der Emanzipation übernommen, der zum ‚wichtigsten aller Begriffe’ wurde. 
Daß die beiden Begriffe bis etwa 1965 nirgendwo in eine wechselseitige Bezie-
hung treten konnten, liegt an ihrer unterschiedlichen Herkunft: Mündigkeit 
stammt aus dem deutschen Recht, emancipatio dagegen aus dem römischen 
Recht. Die Emanzipation war der Akt der Entlassung des Sohnes aus der väter-
lichen Gewalt in die zivilrechtliche Selbständigkeit. Erst unter dem Eindruck der 
Französischen Revolution änderte sich dieser Begriffsgebrauch dauerhaft dahin-
gehend, daß (1) Emanzipation nicht passiv, sondern eigene Tätigkeit ist und daß 
(2) auch Gruppen (Stände, Klassen) sich emanzipieren können.“ (Michael Alb-
recht, Mündigkeit / Emanzipation, in: Lexikon der Aufklärung, S. 277 f.). 
1 Die Linie Selbstdenken bis Mündigkeit und ihre Bestimmung als Kern der 
Aufklärung findet sich tatsächlich erst beim späten Kant. Dagegen dominiert in 
Kants vorkritischem Programm der Aufklärung „ein Verständnis von Aufklä-
rung im Sinne von Erhellung der Begriffe und Vorstellungen, wie es Christian 
Wolff formuliert hatte.“ (Lothar Kreimendahl, Kants vorkritisches Programm 
der Aufklärung, in: Heiner F. Klemme (Hg.), Kant und die Zukunft der europäi-
schen Aufklärung, Berlin / New York 2009, S. 124). 
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zu bilden. Der Selbstdenker wird in der Frühaufklärung in diesem 
Sinne als der Auswählende oder Eklektiker bezeichnet und dem 
Sektierer, als dem Anhänger einer Schulmeinung, entgegenge-
setzt.1 
 Bei Kant wird das Selbstdenken zu einer Maxime, der im theo-
retischen Vernunftgebrauch eine analoge Bedeutung zukommt wie 
dem kategorischen Imperativ (der Selbstgesetzgebung) im prakti-
schen Vernunftgebrauch. So wie ich mit dem kategorischen Impe-
rativ meine Handlungsmaximen auf ihre moralische Qualität hin 
prüfen soll, indem ich mich frage, ob ich wollen könne, dass sie 
Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung sein könnten, so soll man 
durch Selbstdenken die Gründe und Regeln seiner Annahmen auf 
ihre epistemische Qualität hin prüfen, indem man sich frage, „ob 
man es wohl tunlich finde, den Grund, warum man etwas an-
nimmt, oder die Regel, die aus dem, was man annimmt, folgt, zum 
allgemeinen Grundsatze seines Vernunftgebrauchs zu machen“.2 
Man kann Günter Zöller zustimmen, wenn er feststellt: „Mit der 
Verpflichtung der Aufklärung auf die mögliche Universalität von 
epistemischen Gründen und Regeln rückt Kants fortentwickelter 
Aufklärungsbegriff in unmittelbare Nähe zu seiner Konzeption von 
der Selbstgesetzlichkeit der Vernunft.“3 
 Mit dieser Nähe zur Selbstgesetzgebung der Vernunft erhält das 
Selbstdenken im emanzipatorischen Aufklärungsbegriff eine über 
die bloß kognitive Komponente hinausgehende normativ-prakti-
sche Bedeutung.4 Denn Selbstdenken wird von Kant nun so mit 
der Mündigkeit verbunden, dass dabei nicht nur der Intellekt, son-
                                                          
1 Vgl. Michael Albrecht, Eklektik, in: Lexikon der Aufklärung, S. 92 f. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Was heisst: Sich im Denken orientieren?, A 330 Fußnote. 
3 Günter Zöller, Aufklärung über Aufklärung. Kants Konzeption des selbständi-
gen, öffentlichen und gemeinschaftlichen Gebrauchs der Vernunft, in: Klemme 
(Hg.), Kant und die Zukunft der europäischen Aufklärung, S. 90. 
4 Zum Verhältnis von kognitivem und normativ-praktischem Aspekt im Aufklä-
rungsbegriff vgl. Rainer Enskat, Bedingungen der Aufklärung. Philosophische 
Untersuchungen zu einer Aufgabe der Urteilskraft, Weilerswist 2008, S. 38-45. 
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dern der ganze Mensch in Betracht kommt. Für Kant ist Aufklä-
rung dann „nicht nur eine Sache des ‚Selbstdenkens’, sondern 
ebensosehr des ‚Selbsttuns’“.1 Selbstdenken wird zu einer Bedin-
gung, um das Leben selbständig leben zu können.2 
 Rainer Enskat leitet aus der Verbindung von kognitiver und 
normativ-praktischer Komponente im Aufklärungsbegriff ab, dass 
„das Zentrum der Aufklärungsfunktion“ die Diagnose sei. In Ana-
logie zur Aufklärung des Patienten durch den Arzt liege auch der 
Aufklärung der Menschen durch die Philosophie eine Diagnose 
darüber zugrunde, „was aus praktischen Gründen wert ist, gewußt 
zu werden“.3 Und so wie die diagnostische Funktion in der Aufklä-
rung durch den Arzt mit einer kommunikativen Beziehung ver-
bunden ist, die nicht nur das Expertenwissen auf Seiten des Arztes 
voraussetzt, sondern auch die Mündigkeit auf Seiten des Patienten, 
mit der Diagnose des Arztes selbstverantwortlich umgehen zu 
können, ebenso fordert die Aufklärung eine Öffentlichkeit mündi-
ger Bürger, die die Diagnose darüber, was zu der je eigenen Zeit 
Aufklärung bedeutet, kritisch beurteilen kann.4 Auch der Philo-
                                                          
1 Norbert Hinske, Eklektik, Selbstdenken, Mündigkeit – drei verschiedene For-
mulierungen einer und derselben Programmidee, in: Ders. (Hg.), Eklektik, 
Selbstdenken, Mündigkeit (Aufklärung Bd. 1 H. 1), Hamburg 1986, S. 6. 
2 Bezeichnend für den Zusammenhang von selbständig Denken und selbständig 
Leben beim späten Kant könnte folgende Beobachtung sein, die Ludwig Ernst 
Borowski über dessen Lehrtätigkeit machte: „Selbst denken – selbst forschen – 
auf seinen eigenen Füßen stehen, – waren Ausdrücke, die unablässig wieder 
vorkamen“. (Ludwig Ernst Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters 
Immanuel Kants. Von Kant selbst revidirt und berichtigt, Königsberg 1804, zit. 
nach: Alois Winter, Selbstdenken – Antinomien – Schranken. Zum Einfluß des 
späten Locke auf die Philosophie Kants, in: Hinske (Hg.), Eklektik, Selbstden-
ken, Mündigkeit, S. 30). 
3 Enskat, Bedingungen der Aufklärung, S. 43-45. 
4 Da Aufklärung wohl nie ein für alle Male geleistet sein wird, sondern immer 
wieder neue Formen der Unmündigkeit sich herausbilden können, stellen sich 
auch immer wieder neue Anforderungen an die diagnostische Funktion von 
Aufklärung. Im Hinblick auf solche Diagnosen fordert Herbert Schnädelbach 
ein „strukturelles Aufklärungsverständnis“: „Das Aufklärungszeitalter hat nicht 
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soph wird in diesem Sinne erst mündig, wenn er sein Philosophie-
ren unter dieser zeitdiagnostischen Bestimmung zu sehen vermag. 
Nach Michel Foucault war es Kant, der erstmals in diesem zeitdi-
agnostischen Sinne auf die Aktualität seines eigenen Philosophie-
ren reflektierte, und zwar in dem Text, in dem er Aufklärung nicht 
mehr unter dem Aspekt der Klarheit, sondern unter dem der Mün-
digkeit bestimmt, nämlich in dem Aufsatz Beantwortung der Fra-
ge: Was ist Aufklärung?1 
 Damit komme ich zu einer zweiten Implikation, die sich mit 
dem Metaphernwechsel von der Klarheit zur Mündigkeit wieder 
zunächst bei Kant zeigt. 
 (2) Mit diesem Metaphernwechsel vollzieht auch sich eine Ver-
änderung des Zeithorizonts, in dem das Projekt Aufklärung ge-
                                                                                                                                 
alle Unmündigkeiten beseitigt; auch ‚nach der Aufklärung’ bestehen Unmün-
digkeiten fort, und in dem globalen Aufklärungsprojekt sind immer wieder neue 
Unmündigkeiten entstanden, womit auch in Zukunft zu rechnen ist; also brau-
chen wir ein strukturelles Aufklärungsverständnis, das es uns erlaubt, Aufklä-
rungsbedarf in den verschiedensten kulturellen Kontexten zu identifizieren und 
ihre Deckungschancen genauer einzuschätzen.“ (Herbert Schnädelbach, Das 
Projekt ‚Aufklärung’ – Aspekte und Probleme. Zusammenfassende Thesen, in: 
Renate Reschke (Hg.), Nietzsche. Radikalaufklärer oder radikaler Gegenaufklä-
rer?, Berlin 2004, S. 48). 
1 So meint Foucault: „Ich möchte die These vorschlagen, daß dieser kleine Text 
gleichsam am Schnittpunkt von kritischer Reflexion und der Reflexion der Ge-
schichte lokalisiert ist. Es ist eine Reflexion Kants über die Aktualität seines ei-
genen Unternehmens. Ohne Zweifel ist es nicht das erste Mal, daß ein Philosoph 
die Gründe dafür angibt, warum er zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt mit seiner 
Arbeit beginnt. Aber es scheint mir das erste Mal zu sein, daß ein Philosoph so 
eng und von innen die Bedeutung seines Werkes hinsichtlich der Erkenntnis mit 
einer Reflexion der Geschichte und einer besonderen Analyse des einzigartigen 
Moments verbindet, in dem er und wegen dem er schreibt: Die Reflexion auf 
das ‚Heute’ als Differenz in der Geschichte und als Motiv für eine bestimmte 
philosophische Aufgabe scheint mir das Neuartige dieses Textes zu sein.“ (Mi-
chel Foucault, Was ist Aufklärung, in: Eva Erdmann / Rainer Forst / Axel Hon-
neth (Hg.), Ethos der Moderne. Foucaults Kritik der Aufklärung, Frankfurt a.M. 
/ New York 1990, S. 41). 
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dacht wird: die Zeitdiagnose ändert sich von einem aufgeklärten 
Zeitalter zu einem Zeitalter der Aufklärung. 
 Solange es der Aufklärung um die Klarheit der Gedanken und 
die Erhellung des menschlichen Geistes, also um die kognitive 
Seite von Aufklärung, ging, solange schien der Optimismus der 
Aufklärer durchaus nachvollziehbar, dass Aufklärung als ein so 
verstandener Prozess, einmal in Gang gekommen, zu einem dauer-
haften Zustand werden würde. Von daher konnte man auch die 
Zeitdiagnose stellen, in einem aufgeklärten Zeitalter zu leben. 
 sAuch der junge Kant teilt diesen Optimismus und spricht 1757 
davon, in „aufgeklärten Zeiten“ zu leben, wobei „er ein aufgeklär-
tes oder ‚erleuchtetes Zeitalter’ in Übereinstimmung mit seinem 
Aufklärungsverständnis konsequenterweise als ein solches, das 
über deutliche Begriffe verfügt“ bestimmte.1 Mit der neuen Ak-
zentsetzung auf Mündigkeit in seinem Aufklärungsverständnis, die 
mit dem Aufsatz Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? 
vollzogen wird, ändert sich bekanntlich Kants Zeitdiagnose. 1784 
beantwortet er die Frage: „Leben wir jetzt in einem aufgeklärten 
Zeitalter?“ mit nein, um dann hinzuzufügen: „aber wohl in einem 
Zeitalter der Aufklärung.“ Und er begründet diese Diagnose mit 
dem Hinweis auf „deutliche Anzeigen“ darauf, dass „die Hinder-
nisse der allgemeinen Aufklärung, oder des Ausganges [der Men-
schen] aus ihrer selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit, allmählich 
weniger werden“.2 Solche Anzeigen sind, wie Kant im Folgenden 
dann der Sache nach erläutert, die konsequente Trennung der Ein-
flussbereiche von Regierung bzw. Staat einerseits und Religions-
gemeinschaften andererseits, die öffentliche Diskussion von Vor-
schlägen zur Gesetzgebung und schließlich, und hinsichtlich der 
Nachhaltigkeit der Aufklärung für Kant wohl am wichtigsten, die 
durch die staatlich garantierte Meinungsfreiheit im öffentlichen 
Raum ermöglichte allmähliche Veränderung der „Sinnesart des 
                                                          
1 Kreimendahl, Kants vorkritisches Programm der Aufklärung, S. 132. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, A 491. 
Hartwig Frank   57
Volks“, wodurch das Volk immer mehr zum politischen Handeln 
befähigt, insofern also mündig wird, und die Regierung immer 
stärker dem verpflichtet wird, was ein mündig gewordenes Volk 
über sich selbst beschließen wird. Wenn Kant diese Anzeigen mit 
dem preußischen König Friedrich II. verbindet, so nicht, weil er 
Aufklärung überhaupt an das Wirken eines aufgeklärten absoluten 
Herrschers bindet, das wäre nach seiner Neubestimmung von Auf-
klärung als Ausgang der Menschen aus ihrer selbst verschuldeten 
Unmündigkeit nicht mehr plausibel nachvollziehbar, sondern 
vielmehr nur als „ein glänzendes Beispiel“ dafür, dass die Aufklä-
rung unter den vorhandenen Bedingungen realisierbar sei. Dieses 
Beispiel zeige, so Kant, „daß bei Freiheit für die öffentliche Ruhe 
und Einigkeit des gemeinen Wesens nicht das mindeste zu besor-
gen sei. Die Menschen arbeiten sich von selbst nach und nach aus 
der Rohigkeit heraus, wenn man nur nicht absichtlich künstelt, um 
sie darin zu erhalten.“1 Mit dieser Diagnose unterscheidet sich 
Kants Verständnis von Aufklärung, trotz der emphatischen Be-
merkungen zu Friedrich II., von den utopischen Hoffnungen der 
Aufklärer der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts auf einen aufge-
klärten Absolutismus. 
 Und damit komme ich zur dritten Implikation des Metaphern-
wechsels von der Klarheit zur Mündigkeit, die nun direkt auf das 
Thema dieses Symposions, das utopische Moment der Aufklärung 
weist. 
 (3) Dieser Metaphernwechsel zeigt auch an, dass eine ursprüng-
lich praktisch-politisch utopische Ausrichtung der Aufklärung ei-
ner eher nüchternen und realistischen Erwartung Platz macht: der 
aufgeklärte absolute Herrscher, auf den das rationalistische Auf-
klärungsverständnis seine Hoffnung für die Verwirklichung der 
Aufklärung setzte, übernimmt im emanzipatorischen Aufklärungs-
verständnis bei Kant nur noch die Funktion eines Katalysators in 
der Initialphase der Aufklärung. 
                                                          
1 Ebd., A 492. 
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 In der europäischen Frühaufklärung hatte man die Realisierung 
der aufklärerischen Ideen mit dem Einfluss des absoluten Herr-
schers verbunden. Die Aufklärer sahen sich als Berater des Fürsten 
und setzten darauf, ganz im Sinne des rationalistischen Aufklä-
rungsprogramms, nämlich durch Klärung und Erklärung der Be-
griffe den menschlichen Geist zu erhellen, auch den Fürsten auf-
zuklären, um seine absolute Herrschaft für die Ziele der Aufklä-
rung zu nutzen. „Mit diesem Versuch“ – so Andreas Heyer in sei-
nem Resümee der Forschungsliteratur – „war die Frühaufklärung 
gescheitert. Der absolute Herrscher herrscht eben absolut. [...] die 
Idee des Fürstenberaters [war] spätestens mit Diderots Rückkehr 
aus Russland 1774 endgültig obsolet. Diderot, der am Hofe der 
russischen Zarin Katharina II. weilte, sah dort in aller Deutlichkeit 
die Diskrepanz zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der absolutis-
tischen Systeme und ihrer Repräsentanten. Zur selben Zeit erkann-
ten auch die ‚aufgeklärten Minister’ der 70er Jahre in Frankreich 
die Schranken ihrer Wirksamkeit und traten zurück bzw. scheiter-
ten an unüberbrückbaren Widerständen des Hofes. Auch in Preu-
ßen bzw. Berlin war die Tafelrunde Friedrich II. primär ein kultu-
reller Zirkel, der so gut wie keinen Einfluss auf die Regierungsge-
schäfte im Speziellen oder die Politik im Allgemeinen besaß. 
Wenn die Vertreter der Aufklärung wirken wollen, so die Feststel-
lung Diderots, dann gehe dies nur über die Mobilisierung der Öf-
fentlichkeit und der öffentlichen Meinung, d.h. als Fürsprecher des 
‚dritten Standes’ und damit verbunden durch die Aufklärung des 
Volkes. Genau dies war ja der Anspruch der Encyclopédie.“1 
 Kant zeigt nun, dass dieser Perspektivenwechsel der Aufklä-
rung vom utopischen Konzept der Fürstenberatung zum realisti-
schen Konzept der Mobilisierung der Öffentlichkeit und der öf-
fentlichen Meinung nicht mit dem rationalistischen Ansatz der 
Aufklärung als Bemühen um Klarheit allein zu rechtfertigen sei, 
                                                          
1 Andreas Heyer, Die französische Aufklärung um 1750, Bd. I, Berlin 2005, S. 
178 f. 
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sondern ein verändertes Verständnis der Aufklärung selbst erfor-
derte: bei der Aufklärung gehe es nicht nur um den klarblickenden 
und klardenkenden Menschen,1 sondern auch und vor allem um 
den mündigen Bürger. Zwar hält auch Kant später noch an der Me-
taphorik der Klarheit fest, verbindet sie aber nun mit der Aufklä-
rung des Menschen als Privatperson (bzw. Geschäftsmann) z.B. in 
Fragen der Moral. Für die Aufklärung des Menschen als Bürger 
(Staatsmann, Untertan) und damit als Person in der Öffentlichkeit 
wechselt er dagegen zur Metaphorik der Mündigkeit.2 Die Verbin-
dung der Öffentlichkeit mit der Mündigkeit wird zu einem zentra-
len Topos in Kants Aufklärungsaufsatz. In diesem Aufsatz wird, so 
soll abschließend angedeutet werden, Aufklärung als ein unter den 
gesellschaftlichen und politischen Bedingungen Europas im 18. 
Jahrhundert realisierbares Projekt bestimmt, das ohne die utopi-
schen Hoffnungen der Frühaufklärung aber auch ohne radikalen, 
revolutionären Bruch mit der bestehenden Ordnung gedacht wer-
den kann. Damit komme ich auf die schon erwähnte Behauptung 
zurück, dass dem aufgeklärten absoluten Herrscher für Kant nur 
noch die Funktion eines Katalysators in der Initialphase der Auf-
klärung zukommt. 
 In dem Aufklärungsaufsatz erklärt Kant, dass, damit Aufklä-
rung wirklich werde, Freiheit erforderlich sei, und zwar Freiheit 
als notwendige Bedingung („Zu dieser Aufklärung wird nichts er-
fordert als Freiheit“) und zugleich hinreichende Bedingung („Daß 
aber ein Publikum sich selbst aufkläre, ist eher möglich; ja es ist, 
wenn man ihm nur die Freiheit läßt, beinahe unausbleiblich“). 
Wenn Freiheit sowohl notwendige wie hinreichende Bedingung 
für Aufklärung ist, so gilt aber auch umgekehrt, dass Aufklärung 
                                                          
1 Siehe Eclairé et clairvoyant („Aufgeklärt und klarblickend“), so der Titel eines 
Artikels von Denis Diderot in der Encyclopédie. 
2 Vgl. Immanuel Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig 
sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, A 208 ff., bes. A 222 f. zur Klarheit und A 
232 ff. zur Mündigkeit (bzw. Unmündigkeit) und Selbständigkeit.  
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sowohl notwendige wie hinreichende Bedingung für Freiheit ist. 
Tatsächlich ist ja auch plausibel, dass nur durch die Freiheit, „von 
seiner Vernunft in allen Stücken öffentlichen Gebrauch zu ma-
chen“, Aufklärung stattfinden kann, dass zugleich aber auch nur 
ein aufgeklärter, also mündiger Mensch ist der Lage ist, wirklich 
diese Freiheit zu nutzen, also „von seiner Vernunft in allen Stü-
cken öffentlichen Gebrauch zu machen“. Freiheit und Aufklärung 
bedingen sich also wechselseitig. 
 Die Frage ist dann, wie dieses Wechselverhältnis überhaupt in 
Gang kommen kann. Und dazu ist, modern gesprochen, das syste-
mische Funktionieren einer solchen Wechselwirkung von einer 
Initialphase zu unterscheiden. Ich möchte behaupten, dass es Kant 
in seinem Aufsatz zunächst um eben diese Initialphase geht. In der 
Initialphase müssen außersystemische Faktoren ins Spiel kommen, 
die förderlich für die Herausbildung des Systemverhaltens sind. 
Genau solche Faktoren sucht Kant, um rechtfertigen zu können, 
dass Aufklärung unter den Bedingungen seiner Zeit kein utopi-
sches Projekt bleiben müsse, sondern tatsächlich realistische 
Chancen habe. Allerdings könne bei dieser Rechtfertigung zu-
nächst einiges paradox erscheinen. Das Paradoxe besteht hier da-
rin, dass zur Herausbildung einer solchen Ordnung, in der Aufklä-
rung und Freiheit sich wechselseitig bedingen und damit erhalten 
können, zunächst Faktoren erforderlich sind, die dann durch die 
neue Ordnung obsolet werden. Ein solcher Faktor ist nun für Kant 
der aufgeklärte Monarch. Seine Funktion in der Initialphase der 
Aufklärung besteht darin, den öffentlichen Raum der Meinungs-
freiheit aufgrund seiner absoluten Herrschaftsbefugnis besser ge-
gen Okkupationsbestrebungen partikularer Interessen in der Ge-
sellschaft sichern zu können als dies ein republikanisch verfasstes 
Staatswesen kann – solange die Mehrheit des Volkes noch nicht 
hinreichend aufgeklärt ist, um von seiner Freiheit vernünftigen 
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Gebrauch zu machen.1 Ist die Aufklärung aber so weit fortgeschrit-
ten, dass die Mehrheit des Volkes dazu in der Lage ist, so kann das 
Volk sich nicht nur eine entsprechende republikanische Verfas-
sung geben, sondern deren Wirksamkeit auch selbst garantieren. 
Dann wäre die Initialphase abgeschlossen und der Monarch nicht 
mehr als absoluter Herrscher, sondern nur noch als höchster Re-
präsentant des Staats zu rechtfertigen. 
 Mit dieser Interpretation von Kants Aufklärungsaufsatz dürfte 
sich auch eine scheinbare Ungereimtheit ausräumen lassen, auf die 
Peter Weber im Nachwort zur Reclamausgabe der Berlinische 
Monatsschrift hingewiesen hat. In dieser Zeitschrift veröffentlichte 
Kant im Abstand nur eines Monats (November und Dezember 
1784) zwei Aufsätze, die scheinbar sich widersprechende Auffas-
sungen zum Verhältnis von Aufklärung, Freiheit und Staat enthal-
ten. Ich zitiere Weber: „In der ‚Idee zu einer allgemeinen Ge-
schichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’ war gesagt worden, die ‚bür-
gerliche Freiheit’ könne ‚jetzt auch nicht sehr wohl angetastet 
werden, ohne den Nachteil davon in allen Gewerben, vornehmlich 
dem Handel, dadurch aber auch die Abnahme der Kräfte des Staats 
im äußern Verhältnis zu spüren. Diese Freiheit geht aber allmäh-
lich weiter.’ Sie führe zur Entfaltung der Aufklärung und deren 
schließlichem Einfluß auf die Regierungsgrundsätze. In der nun 
aber nicht geschichtsphilosophischen, sondern aktuell-programma-
tischen ‚Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’ erscheint 
dieser Begründungszusammenhang geradezu auf den Kopf ge-
stellt: Es wird zu erweisen gesucht, daß eben der erkanntermaßen 
geringe Grad ‚bürgerlicher Freiheit’ in Preußen die Möglichkeit 
des freien öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauchs biete. Damit blieb keine 
sichere Grundlage dieser Freiheit; vielmehr war allein der ‚gute 
                                                          
1 Dass dazu nach Kant zunächst äußere Faktoren erforderlich sind, belegt auch 
die Anmerkung B 291 f. in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen 
Vernunft. Dort heißt es: Man könne zur Freiheit „nicht reifen, wenn man nicht 
zuvor in Freiheit gesetzt worden ist“. 
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Wille’ des Fürsten entscheidend. Um den fürstlichen Willen gera-
de angesichts der zwielichtigen Haltung des preußischen Thron-
folgers noch als Garantie politisch-literarischer Öffentlichkeit er-
scheinen zu lassen, kam Kant nicht umhin, Friedrich II. zur Galli-
onsfigur der Aufklärung zu stilisieren.“1 Wie Weber selbst betont, 
handelt es sich um unterschiedliche Aspekte, unter denen Kant das 
Verhältnis von Aufklärung, Freiheit und Staat behandelt, und da-
mit dürfte sich die scheinbare Ungereimtheit nun so aufklären las-
sen: Im ersteren Aufsatz wird das systemische Verhältnis in ge-
schichtsphilosophischer Perspektive thematisiert, im Aufklärungs-





                                                          
1 Peter Weber, Die „Berlinische Monatsschrift“ als Organ der Aufklärung, in: 
Berlinische Monatsschrift (1783-1796). Herausgegeben von Friedrich Gedike 
und Johann Erich Biester. Auswahl, Leipzig 1986, S. 374. 
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THE BEEHIVE METAPHOR 
AND THE AMBER ROOM 
IN THE CATHERINE PALACE 





 My research interest lies in the area of cultural history of palac-
es and court residences, mainly the ways of representation of pow-
er in the architectural space, decorative programs of interiors, the 
usage or functioning of architecture and landscapes or their parts. 
Once, among other subjects, I attempted to analyze from this point 
of view the Amber Room in the Catherine Palace in Tsarskoye Se-
lo — one of the most famous palace interiors of the 18th century, 
seemingly devoid of any narrative programme. This material was 
published in the papers, and then I included it into the monograph.1 
This paper develops and continues previous conclusions or rather 
is an attempt to inscribe a curious baroque artifact in a broad cul-
                                                          
The Philosophical Age. Almanac 39. The Northern Lights: Social Philosophies 
and Utopias of the Enlightenment in Northern Europe and Russia. St. Peters-
burg — Helsinki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2013. P. 63–80. 
1 Никифорова Л.В. “Стены, ‘текущи млеком и медом’. Янтарный кабинет 
Екатерининского дворца в Царском селе,” in: Никифорова Л.В. Чертоги 
власти. Дворец в пространстве культуры. CПб.: Искусство–СПб., 2011. С. 
346–356. 
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tural context. But at first I would like to dwell on some points of 
the executed researches. 
 The glory of the Amber Room is so resplendent, and its creators 
are so famous, that the question about the narrative structures of 
this interior seemed abundant. Yet, every artwork of the 18th cen-
tury was created as a reasoning on a particular topic, and the inte-
riors of emperor palace had a very rich content. The Amber room 
as other palace interiors “told” something to its owners, customers, 
creators… But what did it speak about? 
 Thus, I suggested that the Amber room not only appealed to the 
sight, but was saturated with philosophical and moral reflections. I 
tried to spell out the semantics of amber, the images of amber and 
their contexts in poetic, journalistic, political, scientific discourses 
of the 18th century and to link them with the Amber room. Three 
relevant sets of ideas, tied with amber and familiar to the people of 
the 18th century, were vivid. 
 On the first place, amber was able to “delight the senses” (sight, 
taste, smell and touch) and represent them allegorically. Bacon 
called the senses “the virtues of the body,” and the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment attributed the senses to human nature. And so I 
suppose that amber referred to the idea of the fullness of human 
nature with the meaning of sensitive and perceptional experience 
of a person. 
 On the second place, amber was a well-known emblem of the 
Time, not made by hand emblem of the correlation of greatness 
and smallness, eternity and moment, past and present. Most clearly 
this signification opened up in the case of “ant in amber” or “fly in 
amber”. 
 And finally amber was represented as honey-colored stone, beer, 
Falernian wine, as Pliny wrote of it. Besides, the amber is like hard-
ened honey, butter and vine. The amber literary, i.e. visually embod-
ied the image of paradise and the “golden age” well-known due to 
liturgical texts, lyrical and panegyric poetry. And I called Amber 
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room — “The walls flowing with milk and honey.” It seems to me, 
the Amber Room may be interpreted as a hardened panegyric. 
 When I applied to the semantics of amber for the first time the 
Amber room still had not been recreated. My reasoning was specu-
lative and based on verbal texts and on my own experience of 
small amber things. When I saw the renovated Amber Room with 
my own eyes, I was convinced in the correctness of my assump-
tions. Amber walls in reality look soft, sticky, and sweet. The Am-
ber Room indeed has the walls flowing with milk and honey. 
 The Amber Room was created and existed as a part of the pal-
ace interior. The palaces, especially the palaces of the 18–19 centu-
ries, were not just works of art, but a unique form of political rep-
resentation, or even a form of manifestation of ideological pro-
grams. This referrers to the meaning of the word “manifestation” 
(derived from the Latin manus — hand, to make by hand) contain-
ing direct identity of a statement and an action. Palaces, paintings, 
sculptures, dresses etc., as well as ceremonies and holidays were 
not purely aesthetic objects or just demonstration of personal taste 
or entertainment. The art works involved in court life had value for 
their symbolic qualities inseparable from the aesthetic ones in the 
epoch where the ideology existed not in form of direct political 
statements, but in the form of symbolic practices. 
 It has to be mentioned that the use of amber in political representa-
tion was not common. Not amber, but diamonds decorated the crowns 
of the rulers. Amber was considered a gem of cooks. It was the view 
of the 19th century, but in the 18th century amber epithets were rele-
vant mainly in the so-called “low” style of literary language, in lyric 
poetry (Bacchus songs, fable, pastoral), which is directly related to 
the ability of amber to “delight the senses.” Amber walls at the Royal 
and then imperial palace were a Baroque curiosity, a witty invention, 
a unique possibility to visualize the basic metaphor of paradise plenty 
and paradise bliss in a statuesque monument. 
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 This is where my previous reflections ceased. I seemed to have 
completed the task and indicated relevant contexts that forced the 
language of interior decoration “to speak.” I also suggested that 
semantic diversity and wealth of amber walls, and not only their 
beauty and attractiveness, were the reason for several powerful 
monarchs to create the Amber room and to cherish this beautiful 
but very vagarious wall covering. The Amber mosaic is susceptible 
to temperature and humidity changes, its wooden bases may easily 
scale off, the mosaic may buckle and crumble. The Amber Room is 
the only example of amber being used for a monumental work, 
which no one has ever tried to repeat as it proved to be too expen-
sive, labor-consuming and fragile. Of course, it was common for 
the 18th century, especially for the rococo style, to apply unusual 
and innovative materials and technologies in the interior decoration. 
But the difficulties of creation and maintaining of amber walls sur-
pass all known porcelain, mirror, and pearl rooms. In spite of this, at 
least seven monarchs during seventy years were engaged in the cre-
ation of the Amber Room: Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm I and 
his wife Sophia Charlotte, Friedrich II, another Prussian King, Rus-
sian emperor Peter I, Empress Anna, Empress Elizabeth and Cathe-
rine the Great. Some of them were eccentric enough to order to de-
stroy newly built palaces or to construct new ones.1 
 My previous conclusions didn’t touch upon the problem of 
Utopia, my goal was to show the plenty of philosophical, intellec-
tual, literary content of this vacuous interior — without any clear 
decorative program. 
 How is all this linked to Utopia? 
 If we keep in mind the difference between the utopian and ideo-
logical mentality, conducted K. Mannheim, then we deal with arti-
fact of ideology rather than of utopia. K. Mannheim wrote: 
                                                          
1 About the history of Amber room see: Воронов М.Г., Кучумов А.М. Янтар-
ная комната. Л., 1989; “Янтарная комната,” in: ГМЗ “Царское село” 
<http://www.tzar.ru/museums/palaces/catherine/amber_room> (23.09.2012). 
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In limiting the meaning of the term ‘Utopia’ to that type of orientation 
which transcends reality and which at the same time breaks the bonds 
of the existing order, a distinction is set up between the Utopian and 
the ideological states of mind. One can orient himself to objects that 
are alien to reality and which transcend actual existence — and never-
theless still are effective in the realization and the maintenance of the 
existing order of things. <…> Such an incongruent orientation be-
came Utopian only when in addition it tended to burst the bonds of 
the existing order. <…> Every period in history has contained ideas 
transcending the existing order, but these did not function as Utopias; 
they were rather the appropriate ideologies of this stage of existence 
as long as they were ‘organically’ and harmoniously integrated into 
the world-view characteristic of the period (i.e. did not offer revolu-
tionary possibilities).1 
 
 S. Baer, who studied the poetics of paradise myth in Russian 
literature of the 18th century, pointed out a strong closeness of the 
ideological and utopian texts, their genre models, images and mo-
tifs of the “golden age.” “Paradise topics have frequently been 
used for panegyric and propagandistic purposes, praising a person, 
place, period, product or concept through a ‘spatial correlative’ — 
a paradisal place corresponding to the goodness of the subject 
praised.”2 Continuing Mannheim’s distinction between utopia and 
ideology S. Baer distinguished the Utopia (U-topos, description of 
a place that does not exist) and the EU-topos, description of a good 
place, a blessed place. Panegyric literature according to S. Baer 
can be considered eu-topia. “’Panegyric eutopia’ was partly made 
possible by the rhetorical structure of the traditional utopia, which 
is actually panegyric, praising some good place (eu-topos) for its 
                                                          
1 Mannheim K. Ideology and Utopia. Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. 
N.Y. Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1954. P. 
173–174 <http://archive.org/details/ideologyutopiain00mann> (13.01.2013). 
2 Baehr S.L. The Paradise Myth in Eighteen Century Russia. Utopian patterns 
in early secular Russian literature and culture. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1991. P. 11. 
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good government and good life, using a guide like narrator who in 
his enthusiasm resembles a person of the panegyric ode.”1 
 S. Baer like other researchers of utopia, analyzed mainly the lit-
erature, and also some court festivals and Masonic rituals. Yet, 
utopia and eu-topia were not limited by verbal texts only. We can 
recall performative texts and monumental texts, among them — 
the Amber Room, a frozen, hardened image of the “golden age.” 
 The ability of Amber to portray the hardened honey lets us put 
this curious invention in the context of the Beehive metaphor. It 
may seem a stretch, because in Paradise topics is not necessarily 
produced by bees. In blessed lands, in the “golden age” the earth 
was flowing with milk and honey, the oaks oozed with honey. But 
Amber Room is not a landscape object. Honey inside a closed 
space is rather a hive, not the Garden of Eden. Besides the bees 
were conceived  and visualized as blessed people as they are born 
miraculously, their family is immortal, they are chaste and do not 
give birth to children in pain (“they don’t indulge in sexual union, 
or lazily relax their bodies in love, or produce young in labor,” 
Virgil “Georgics”). Bees live, work and raise their children collec-
tively and feed on God’s dew.2 Honey (wisdom) was a worthy re-
ward for their virtues. Bee family was like a reminder of a lost 
golden age for human society. 
 The “Beehive metaphor” is not the term in a strict sense. The 
scholars who study poetics of fiction, social imagination, icono-
graphy and visual culture mostly in interdisciplinary vein created it 
inadvertently. Christopher Holigsvort called his book “Poetics of 
the Hive” and analyzed the functioning of images of hive and bees 
in literature from Homer and Virgil to Kafka, Sartre and Kobo 
                                                          
1 Baehr S.L. Ibid. P. 11. 
2 About “bee” virtues see, for example: “О пчелах,” in: Басни нравоучитель-
ные с изъяснением господина барона Голберга. Перевел Денис фон Визин. 
М., 1761. С. 54–57; Локцений И. Общество пчел, или Краткое сравнение 
правительства пчел с правлением гражданским. СПб.: Типогр. Академии 
наук, 1772. 
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Abe.1 Juan Antonio Ramirez called his book “Beehive Metaphor” 
and studied how the architects of the 20th century were inspired by 
the real “bees’ architecture,” by visual images of hives.2 Following 
these authors I used the concept of “Beehive metaphor.” 
 This concept refers to various forms of comparison of bee soci-
ety with human society in positive or negative sense. Since the 
classical antiquity the beehive has served as a model for an ideal 
society, while honey and wax provided the basis for countless 
positive images of plenty and productivity. Beehive and a life of 
bee’s family were a symbol of wisdom and knowledge, of disci-
pline and order, of social hierarchy, a symbol of industry and co-
operated work. C. Hollingsworth described the Beehive metaphor 
as “a building block of the imagination,”3 as “a habit of seeing and 
thinking,”4 that may be called the unit-idea in the research lan-
guage of History of ideas (following Arthur Lovejoy). According 
to Hollingsworth such intellectual habit appeared every time when 
“individual and social order in relation to each other”5 became the 
subject of reflection. The Beehive metaphor provided a cultural 
transfer of philosophical thought, social dreams, political declara-
tions through ages and countries. 
 Beehive as a matter of description, a metaphor, a figure of com-
parison has similarities with the Island as a Utopian locus (secular-
ized locus amoenus). The hive as well as the Island is an isolated 
place where algorithmic social order is equipped. Contacts from 
this “place” to the outside world are limited, and its inhabitants 
tend to self-defense. Genre features of literary Utopia as well as 
the description of beehive include the detailed explanations of po-
                                                          
1 Hollingsworth C. Poetics of the Hive. The Insect Metaphor in Literature. Iowa 
City: University of Iowa Press, 2001. 298 p. 
2 Ramíres J.A. Beehive Metaphor. From Antonio Gaudi to Le Corbusier. L.: Re-
action books Ltd, 2000. 
3 Hollingsworth C. Ibid. P. IX. 
4 Ibid. P. X. 
5 Ibid. P. IX. 
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litical system, family and gender relations, special language of 
communication as another form of closeness of the locus, educa-
tion, religion.1 
 Researchers of Utopia believe that the motive of Island as the 
Utopian locus was the reflection of the Age of Exploration. The 
motive of an unknown island, upon which the traveler stumbles 
and the way to which cannot be found again, was born from the 
experience of early long-distance maritime expeditions.2 The same 
happens with the hive. Its symbolic value was nourished with the 
real circumstances for a long time. It is important to note, that for a 
long time the beekeeping  was a risky and adventurous activity. 
 The man almost could not observe the life of bees inside the 
hive. It was actually a closed, hard-to-reach object, full of secrets. 
And beekeepers, in masks surrounded by smoke were as Mediators 
between the worlds.3 It is not surprising that the Beehive was used 
as a symbol of secret knowledge hidden from the profanes as life 
in the hive is invisible to people. In this quality beehive was used 
in symbolic language of alchemists and Freemasons. 
 The revolution in beekeeping practice took place in the 19th 
century when the movable comb hive was invented and the epoch 
of so called “rational beekeeping” or “rational apiculture” began. 
Then the man could truly get inside the hive, and even fulfill an 
old dream about a glass hive in order to observe the life of bees 
through the transparent walls. Furthermore, glass hives became a 
common piece of laboratory equipment.4 
 The description of hive and bees’ life implies a comparison with 
the existing social order and a critical reflection or ironical un-
                                                          
1 Шадурский М. Литературная утопия от Мора до Хаксли: Проблемы 
жанровой поэтики и семиосферы. Обретение острова. М.: Изд-во ЛКИ, 
2007. С. 27–28. 
2 For instance: Ferns C. Narrating Utopia. Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 1999. P. 31–66. 
3 See, for instance, the print of Piter Brueghel “Beekeepers.” 
4 Халифман И.О., Васильева Е.Н. Пчелы. Повесть о биологии пчелиной се-
мьи и победах науки о пчелах. М.: Молодая гвардия, 1981. С. 33. 
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masking. Not only fiction literature or social philosophical treatis-
es refer to such a comparison. The beekeeping manuals, practical 
or scientific works about bee-culture certainly include a compo-
nent of comparison and edification. 
 Beehive metaphor was diverse and very adaptable to different 
political systems. 
 
It is known, for instance, that the ancient Egyptians saw in a bees’ 
nest a state headed by a bee-pharaoh surrounded by his suite of serv-
ants, fanning him with their mustaches. The bee-pharaoh observed 
from the height of his wax throne how the caravans of bees-slaves 
piled sweet gifts to his feet. Plato following the Egyptians and after 
him Aristotle found the slaveholding society in the bees’ nest con-
trolled by drones-aristocrats. [...] The English writers of the 16th cen-
tury drew a bee colony ridiculously similar to the merchant society of 
Elizabethan England, but at the same time the bee-colony in the writ-
ings of French authors of the 17th century was represented basing on 
the classical feudal principles. Now it is difficult to read without a 
smile the essay of French writer Simon, who describing the ‘state of 
bees’ told how the bees-porters at the entrance to the city-nest greeted 
weary bee-travelers, who came from far away with the goods, how 
before the swarming the king bee signaled about the forthcoming 
campaign with a silver pipe.1 
 
 Beatrice Wilson, the author of the book “The Hive: The Story of 
the Honeybee and Us” summarized the describing of Beehive po-
litical order in such a way: “The hive has been, in turn, monar-
chical, oligarchic, aristocratic, constitutional, imperial, republican, 
absolute, moderate, communist, anarchist and even fascist.”2 Peo-
ple invented political system of hive in some cases, to justify the 
existing order of things, in other — to correct and change it. 
                                                          
1 Ibid. С. 6–7. 
2 Wilson B. The Hive: The Story of the Honeybee and Us. N.Y.: Thomas Dunne 
Books, St. Martin's Griffin, 2006. P. 106. 
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 It is well-known that a rich mythological tradition shaped 
around the hive and bees. But in the Modern times the hive was al-
so in demand as a model of society, a sample of lifestyle and a spa-
tial envelope organizing the behavior order. It is also important 
that in the Modern Period, the Beehive metaphor changed its po-
tential — from praising and edificatory to transforming and break-
ing the order of things. In this context the work of Juan Antonio 
Ramirez is very interesting and convincing. He devoted his re-
search to the Beehive metaphor in architecture of the 20th century. 
“My interest, — Ramires wrote, — has been to show that artistic 
(and architectural) significance can be detected at several levels: 
the beehive has provided a social model, sometimes explicit and 
sometimes implicit; it seems to me that it has served as a quarry 
for multiple references to shape. Architects and artists have imitat-
ed the appearance and structures of traditional beehive or honey-
comb with its hexagonal sockets, and it has also played an im-
portant role as the model of a rational beehive. One can see how 
many metaphors build up and are modulated.”1 
 The famous “catenary arch” of Antoni Gaudí — the distinctive 
feature of his architectural style — proved to be inspired by the 
shape of rural hives. For the first time he used this arch in the 
building of workshop for the Mataró workers’ cooperative. In his 
youth Antoni Gaudí maintained a close personal and professional 
relationship with Salvador Pagès i Anglada, a textile industrialist 
whose views were close to Utopian Socialism and who founded 
the Mataró workers’ cooperative in 1864. Gaudí worked enthusias-
tically in planning the cooperative’s premises and attributes of 
“working beehive.” He designed the emblem of the textile cooper-
ative, that was used in the organization banners and posters. A bee 
at the loom was in this emblem, a bee adorned the cooperative’s 
banner. The structure of the catenary arch provided the basis for 
                                                          
1 Ramíres J.A. Ibid. P. 14. 
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many Gaudí’s masterpieces, including the Sagrada Família — 
“mystical beehive.”1 
 The first design of skyscraper by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe 
was inspired by rational beehive with transparent outward walls 
and was called “Crystal honeycomb.”2 
 Some Frank Lloyd Wright’s architectural projects were based 
on the hexagonal structures or the image of hive. The unrealized 
project of the cathedral for million people was conceived as a 
“mystical beehive.” “Hana-Honeycomb House” located in the 
Stanford University’s campus was designed on the basis of hexa-
gon-shaped spaces surrounding a brick chimney. It was built for a 
young family of professors, intellectuals close to the positions of 
John Dewey with critics of the city and society. Famous Guggen-
heim Museum in New York was carried out as a stylized form of 
“rural Beehive.”3 
 Inexplicable shapes of the house of Soviet architect Konstantin 
Melnikov, Ramires compared to a beehive (rustic hives made of 
cork bark). The house consisted of two interpenetrating cylinders, 
one of which had windows just like honeycombs — the emblem of 
the idea that inspired the architect.4 
 It is important to note, that the reference to the beehive didn’t 
have only aesthetic sense. It was at some point a certain social 
program. In some cases it was a dream of a perfect society or har-
mony of life and work. In some cases it was an escape from real 
social order. Ramires suggested that the attitude to the hive meta-
phor changed in the interwar period — from mostly positive to 
negative. “The life in a dwelling that can be described as being 
‘like a beehive’ is for an ordinary man, it is the height of misfor-
                                                          
1 Ibid. P. 36–68. 
2 Ibid. P. 98–102. 
3 Ibid. P. 101–115. 
4 Ibid. P. 13. 
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tune. The beehive evokes images of overcrowded rootlessness and 
impersonal existence.”1 
 However, the Beehive metaphor survives, but in a new way, in a 
new quality. For a long time bees had been appreciated as a sym-
bol of order, discipline and strong hierarchy. But today this idea is 
not relevant. Contemporary researchers, who look for analogies 
between human society and bee family, state that beehive is a 
model of self-organization. 
 Thomas Seeley, professor, neurobiologist at Cornell University, 
supposes that these incredible insects have much to teach us when 
it comes to collective wisdom, collective intelligence and effective 
decision making. Every year, faced with the life-or-death problem 
of choosing and traveling to a new home, honeybees stake every-
thing on a process that includes collective fact-finding, vigorous 
debate, and consensus building. He also provides a few points on 
how rules of honeybee democracy may be applied to decision-
making in human groups, with minimal dependence on a leader, 
competition among a diversity of viewpoints, and a method for de-
termining a majority-based resolution.2 
 The beehive metaphor inspires the researches of computer 
based problem solving. The exploration of selection processes 
based on limited information, the selection of best sources of in-
formation, source quality evaluation, the creation of search engine 
and hypertext.3 
 Having completed a brief history of the Beehive metaphor, I 
would like to note that it is a very stable and strong image, a 
                                                          
1 Ibid. P. 16. 
2 Seeley Th.D. Honeybee Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
3 Navrat P., Ezzeddine A.B., Jastrzembska L., Jelinek T. “Exploring the bee 
hive metaphor as a model for problem solving: search, optimisation, and more,” 
in: Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agents. Ed. by Zeeshan-Ul-Hassan Usmani. 
Published: March 1, 2010 <http://www.intechopen.com/books/web-intelligence-
and-intelligent-agents/exploring-the-bee-hive-metaphor-as-a-model-for-
problem-solving-search-optimisation-and-more> (19.09.2012). 
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source of inspiration that nourished utopian as well as ideological 
projects. The Beehive metaphor had been embodied for a long 
time only in verbal texts and emblematics. In Modern times the 
monumental and even social texts were added (for instance, the re-
searchers adduce the Mormon society, the artistic commune 
“Hive” in Paris). Early Modern age for the beehive metaphor was 
the epoch of intense rethinking and reconfiguration from “ideolog-
ical” quality to “utopian.” Ideological content of the beehive meta-
phor was primarily associated with the images of the golden age 
and Paradise bliss where the honey was a miraculous gift. The uto-
pian content was linked with images of hard work and selflessness, 
where the honey was a fair reward. At this crucial time the Amber 
Room was created, it was probably the first monumental embodi-
ment of the beehive metaphor. 
 I would like to remind that the Amber Room can be considered 
a monumental panegyric. Literary panegyrics of the same period 
responded to concrete events, clearly expressed different ideologi-
cal program and author’s position in their rhetorical clichés.1 The 
known history of Amber room doesn’t give an opportunity to ex-
plain in detail its ideological/utopian message. We only can make 
some suggestions. 
 I would like to show how the significations of Amber room 
changed. It is a challenge and I’ll only try to make some guesses. 
The panegyric meaning must have been more important in the 
Elizabethan age. The Amber room was assembled in the Winter 
palace in 1746 and began to serve as the setting for official recep-
tions. The Empress appeared there in all the splendor of her digni-
ty. Then in 1755 Elizabeth ordered to move the Amber Room to 
the Great Palace at Tsarskoye Selo (the Catherine Palace). 
                                                          
1 Погосян Е. Восторг русской оды и решение темы поэта в русском па-
негирике 1730–1762 гг. Тарту, 1997. <http://www.ruthenia.ru/document/ 
534639.html> (дата обращения: 10.10.2012). 
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 Tsarskoye Selo in the Elizabethan age and then in the epoch of 
Catherine II was a private residence in a certain way. Privacy then 
of course was not understood in its modern sense. It is hard now to 
imagine privacy and solitude, when the empress was surrounded 
by courtiers, who lived in enfilade walk-through rooms. At that 
time privacy was determined by the absence of ceremonial or spe-
cial etiquette rules. The empress Elizabeth emphasized that Tsar-
skoye Selo was her inheritance from her mother (the empress 
Catherine II) and Peterhof belonged to her father (the emperor Pe-
ter I). In the time of the Catherine II the images and functions of 
suburban palaces were also different. Catherine II kept on distin-
guishing between residences as male and female, but also added 
this distinguishing within different types of behavior — private 
and public ones. The privacy, freedom from convention, simplicity 
were female features, whilst publicity, triumphalism, officiality 
were considered male. Of course, the luxury festivities took place 
sometimes in Tsarskoye Selo and some elements of private behav-
ior can be found in Petergof. And still the contraposition of cozy 
Tsarskoye Selo to the prime Peterhof  was a common theme in the 
correspondence, memoirs, travelogues of the Catherine’s age. 
 Catherine called Tsarskoye Selo “my village,” “my estate,” em-
phasizing the life “without ceremony” surrounded by a limited cir-
cle of intimate friends. “In this place decorated with her excellent 
taste she slumbered away from her work, and there was not any 
court etiquette. We, the courtiers, paced dressed in the tails and 
spent the life very calm and pleasant. Our treatment, we can say, 
was much more courageous than in the city. During her evening 
strolls we would rope, run after each other, play different games, 
which always pleased the Empress.”1 Catherine often left for and 
                                                          
1 Голицын Ф.Н. “Записки [Предисл. П.И. Бартенева],” in: Русский архив. 
1874. Кн. 1. Вып. 5. Стб. 1318. 
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came from Tsarskoye Selo “incognito,”1 but her way to Peterhof 
was always a ceremonial procession. 
 The Amber room turned into a part of private space as Tsar-
skoye Selo in whole, it became a personal treasure. Attendance at 
the Amber Room was a part of a private visit to the Empress, 
available only to chosen ones. 
 The Amber room in the Catherine palace was supplied with the 
allegories of the five senses painted by Yakob Groot. Thus the sig-
nificance of amber as of sensitive experience was highlighted. 
Catherine II in the beginning of her reign undertook a big recon-
struction of the Amber room, which proves its value. The painted 
allegories of the five senses were substituted for Florentine mosa-
ics on the same subjects. So this set of ideas was not lost. Later in 
1770, when the works in the Amber Room were completed, the 
chamber was crowned with the plafond “Wisdom Protecting Youth 
from the Temptations of Love” (or “The Triumph of Wisdom over 
Sensuality”).2 Thereby the metaphor of wisdom was emphasized. 
 It is important to remember that bees and beehive played an im-
portant part in the emblematic language. The age of Catherine II was 
“the period of flourishing of bees emblematics in Russia. The seman-
tics of bee was symbol of use.”3 E. Pchelov, one of the leading Rus-
sian experts in heraldry, lined the value of honey bees in political em-
blems of Catherine II with Napoleon and Italian family Barberini. 
 Catherine II ordered to make new amber panels for the Amber 
Room in 1763. In 1765 she wrote to Voltaire describing her personal 
emblem: “My motto is a bee, which flies from one plant onto anoth-
er to collect honey for its hive.” Catherine bestowed her emblem to 
the Free Economic Community established in 1765. The tasks of its 
                                                          
1 Грибовский А.М. Записки о императрице Екатерине Великой полковни-
ка, состоявшего при ея особе статс-секретарем, Адриана Моисеевича 
Грибовского. Изд. 2-е с доп. М., 1864. С. 24. 
2 Успенский А.И. Императорские дворцы. Т. 2. М., 1913. С. 249. 
3 Пчелов Е.В. “Пчёлы в европейской и русской эмблематике и геральдике,” in: 
Труды ‘Русской антропологической школы’. Вып. 10. М.: РГГУ, 2012. С. 221. 
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members were to “care about the agriculture and housekeeping.” 
The word “housekeeping” did not have only pragmatic meaning, but 
was closer to the biblical “dispensation of grate.”1 
 At last, there is a very big temptation to connect the Amber 
room and the idea of beehive with the representation of woman’s 
monarchy. By the way, Shakespeare described the head of the hive 
as a King bee. The discovery that the big bee, the center of the hive 
activity was female (Queen bee) was the result of the invention of 
microscope. It took place in the beginning of the 17th century. One 
of the first detailed writings on this subject was the book of 
Charles Butler “Women’s monarchy. History of Bees,” which ap-
peared in several publications (1609). 
 In his book Butler, in the best tradition of the works about bees 
referred to scientific and philosophical arguments, compared bee 
family to human society, described specific language of bees, and 
even published a note of bees’ madrigals — he tried to write down 
the sounds produced by bees in musical notation.2 
 But this point was not totally accepted even in the 18th century. 
For instance, the book by Johann Loccenii, translated into Russian 
and published in 1772 (original title “Republica apum”), imparted 
that it was unknown who was at the head of the beehive — Queen 
bee or King bee. On the other hand, the idea of a single female, 
adored by crowds of “gallants” was ambiguous and doubtful in 
moral sense and provoked disagreeable association with the favorit-
ism practice of real queens and empresses. By the way Charles But-
ler believed that Queen bee was a virgin. In other words, the idea of 
Queen bee was not relevant for the symbolism of power. 
                                                          
1 Из письма Екатерины II Вольтеру (11/12 August 1765), in: Бумаги импе-
ратрицы Екатерины II, хранящиеся в государственном архиве министер-
ства иностранных дел. Сборник русского исторического общества. Т. 10. 
СПб., 1872. С. 38. 
2 Beekeeping collection at the National Library of Scotland <http://digital.nls.uk/ 
moir/piping.html> (15.10.2012). 
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 Indeed, to have a woman on the throne was not a common sit-
uation at that time. Thus, the representation of power for a female 
ruler involved special difficulties in the Elizabethan Britain as well 
as in Russia of the 18th century. In the epoch of court coups practi-
cally every ruler ascended to the throne in the absence of direct le-
gitimacy, then the significations of the symbolic practices of legit-
imacy were very important. But symbolic justification of female 
reign had special difficulties. In letters of Lady Rondeau wrote 
during the reign of empress Anna Ivanovna (1730s) we can see the 
next dramatic episode. Anna Ivanovna asked the Chinese Ambas-
sador to tell about all Russian customs that seemed the most unu-
sual. Chinese man replied: “A woman on the throne” (Letter 
XVI).1 Note that Europeans of 18th century usually put paradoxi-
cal and shrewd opinions into the mouth of the Chinese. 
 J. Casanova repeated something alike thirty years later without a 
reference to the Chinese wisdom. For him Russia itself was a coun-
try of paradoxes, this strange thing — only one of many others. 
 
It seems that Russia is a country where the relationships between sex-
es are put completely inside out: the women are at the head of gov-
ernment here, chairing academic institutions, are in charge of the state 
administration and high politics. The only thing that is still wanting in 
Russia and the only advantage lacking for these Tatar beauties (à ces 
beautés tartares) is the spectacle of some celebrated women com-
manding its armies.2 
 
 But the empresses commanded the troops, especially in the days 
of palace coups, they conferred themselves military ranks, took 
                                                          
1 Письма Леди Рондо. Письма дамы, прожившей несколько лет в России к 
ее приятельнице в Англию. The text cited from: Безвременье и временщики. 
Воспоминания об “Эпохе дворцовых переворотов” (1720-е — 1760-е годы). 
Л., 1991 <http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus10/Rondo2/Briefe/26.phtml?id=1267> 
(16.11. 2012). 
2 Казанова де Сеингальт Дж. “Записки веницианца Казанова. 1765–1766 
[Отрывки],” in: Русская старина. 1874. Т. 9. № 3. С. 540. 
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part in military maneuvers, hunted passionately. All of this cus-
toms were not just individual features, but symbolic practices 
demonstrating male incarnation of the ruler. Or, in the words of R. 
Wortman, “reflection of classic concept of gender identity and 
sexual ambivalence.”1 
 Despite the practices of masculine qualities representation dic-
tated by symbolic language of the epoch, and creatively performed 
by Catherine II, she demonstrated a feminine style of management 
and policy. Catherine the Great emphasized in certain cases her 
womanly nature, her personal efforts for good of the empire. She 
was proud of the order in her “small household,” was busy with 
her “hive.” And she chose the image of work bee, not the Queen 
bee for the emblem. 
 In conclusion I should mention that the Amber room is the 
unique masterpiece of decorative art that seems to have neither 
roots nor replicas. But if we plunge the Amber room into the histo-
ry of Beehive metaphor running through different activities, differ-
ent kinds of texts, we can discover its rich context. The Beehive 
metaphor is the connecting link between the two types of Uto-
pia — Utopia addressed to the past (lost golden age) and addressed 
to the future. The Beehive metaphor is the connecting link between 
the Utopia and Eutopia: Utopia as the critical reflection on con-
temporary society and image of positive changes; Eutopia as a 
kind of political representation of wisdom and the state cares of re-
al government. The Amber room is an exceptional form of the 
Beehive metaphor, the first attempt of its monumental representa-
tion in the period, when different significations of beehive existed 
simultaneously: panegyric and liturgical, mystical and esoteric, 
ideological and utopian. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Уортман Р. Сценарии власти. Т. 1. М.: ОГИ, 2004. С. 124. 
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 “In a perfect and finished world all utopias are homeless” (Ernst 
Bloch). 
 The Swedish poet, philosopher and political pamphleteer 
Thomas Thorild (1759–1808) called his prose fragments and pam-
phlets Utopias and even some of his poems under the title “Pas-
sions” (“Passionerna”). Generally passionate poems have been 
classified under the label of Romanticism, a leading trend in litera-
ture of that time. Romanticism can be an escape from harsh reality 
but it can degenerate into style (stil). Is there a difference between 
this and a more radical notion, an escape into the future, that can 
be called radical utopianism in a more positive sense? What did 
Thorild actually pursue with his “poetic dreaming” (poetiska 
drömmandet or as Kivi says in Finnish: poetillinen uneksunta) and 
why in Sweden? 
 “This Age is so full of Light, that in Europe there is hardly any 
country or region, whose rays don’t mix with each other or inter-
sect” (Laurence Sterne, 1768). 
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 There has been the trend for the Enlightenment to be under-
stood as a strongly cosmopolitan phenomenon. David Hume re-
garded Sweden in the Era of Liberty “nearest to the perfect Com-
monwealth among existing societies.” Jouko Nurminen cites Jona-
than I. Israel, who abandons the national paradigm and classifies 
European eighteenth-century philosophers and philosophies on the 
basis of their degree of radicalism. Sweden was a periphery in the 
European Enlightenment and “mostly the ideas of the radical En-
lightenment were avoided in Sweden. Rather than an oppositional 
movement, the Enlightenment took the form of an enlightened 
consensus” (Nurminen). 
 If Sweden was so perfect and not very radical, how does Thomas 
Thorild fit in these pictures as a radical and a cosmopolitan thinker 
and a political activist, in opposition to many dominant forces, and 
also as a passionate utopian poet and a philosopher, who praised not 
only reason but also weakness and imperfection as creative forces? 
Was he merely a peripheral thinker in the periphery? Frängsmyr 
does not pay any attention to Thorild’s ideas, only mentions his 
name in the debate about the Enlightenment in Sweden. 
 Thorild was an enthusiastic cosmopolite. He studied thoroughly 
the ideas of French and British Enlightenment (especially Voltaire, 
whose works he knew by heart, Rousseau, Holbach, Hume, Young, 
Shaftesbury etc.), made his dissertation on the critique of Montes-
quieu, spent two years in England publishing political pamphlets 
under the name “A Philosopher of the North,” and started there to 
collect an international network to promote his ideas. He dreamed 
of an utopian cosmopolitan “World Government” of the wise and 
collected names and addresses of people who could participate in 
it (Mirabeau, Mercier, Bergasse, Raynal, Wieland, Lavater, et al.). 
This work was interrupted by the French revolution which Thorild 
called “the greatest event of mankind ever since the Deluge,” and 
he wrote in his diary: “This Revolution saved my troubles and 
freed me from the role of a world-reformer. Now it is time to go 
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back to Sweden and establish a Nature-State in Oestrebotn (Ostro-
bothnia).” Further knowledge of this utopian idea, which he obvi-
ously planned to realize in Finland, is not available. He started to 
promote cultural revolution in Sweden as a “Critic of the Critics.” 
For all these efforts he needed philosophical thinking which can be 
called not only enlightened but perhaps also utopian. 
 “It is one of the duties of history to wipe the makeup off the 
painted idols and show them as they are themselves” (Sven Lager-
bring). 
 Ideals, idols and utopias have been constructed many times in 
history as imagined societies of the best possible future. The futur-
istic Utopia of Louis-Sebastien Mercier, L’an 2440, published in 
1771, was translated into Swedish already as early as in 1773. 
 Spinoza (like David Hume) said that ethical and political pre-
scriptions should be derived from claims about the way humans 
really are, not from the way that we would like them to be. Other-
wise such prescriptions cannot be put into practice, to “have prac-
tical application”: 
 
Philosophers conceive of the passions which harass us as vices into 
which men fall by their own fault, and therefore, generally deride, 
bewail, or blame them, or execrate them, if they wish to seem unusu-
ally pious. And so they think that they are doing something wonder-
ful, and reaching the pinnacle of learning, when they are clever 
enough to bestow manifold praise on such human nature, as is no-
where to be found, and to make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, 
exists. For they conceive of men, not as they are, but as they them-
selves would like them to be. Whence it has come to pass, instead of 
ethics, they have generally written satire, and that they have never 
conceived a theory of politics, which could be turned to use, but such 
as might be taken for a chimera, or might have been formed in Uto-
pia, or in that golden age of poets when, to be sure, there was least 
need of it” (Spinoza). 
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 According to Arvidson, Thorild tried “to modernize Spinoza.” 
In this article it is not possible to go further to his relationship with 
Spinoza. I want only to mention his phrase “Spinoza, a poet, not a 
pantheist.” Was he in contradiction with Spinoza, because rather 
than ethics he wrote parodies and satire, and also criticized them, 
wrote rather than philosophical theories long poems and pam-
phlets, which could be called “verbal attacks or […] chimeras 
formed in Utopia” (Spinoza)? Spinoza uses here Utopia as a place, 
a topos, or actually ou-topos, a place which neither exists nor has 
not yet become reality. As places they can be the wishful but factu-
ally unrealized history of mankind (Holbach’s Golden Age, l’age 
d’or) or the possible future of recent historical situation. 
 Is Utopia an unreal fictional construction? According to Marin 
it is a figure of a discourse that produces it by means of specific — 
rhetorical or poetic — discursive operation. Utopia is a figure pro-
duced as a fantasy or phantasm, “imaginary dreaming,” outside so-
ciety, history and ideology. This figure plays the role of an inde-
pendent and relatively free representation (utopic stage). If utopia 
is other than real society, and if utopic transgression is the obverse 
of current institutions, its critical negativity remains fictional. 
However in many Utopias there is an inherent idea of hope and 
progress in order to promote the project of perfecting the social or-
der (Saint-Simon: “projet de perfectionnement de l’ordre social”). 
Thorild used “imaginary dreaming” as a way to a better under-
standing of human nature and as a way to a better future for man-
kind. In practice some Utopias also try to work inside their histori-
cal situation and societal trends. Utopic practice is not only the 
construction of a theoretical object, but the formation of its histori-
cal conditions of possibility. This formation is produced and con-
tained within the utopic figure. It exposes courageously the aporias 
of its own times and its own possibilities. “Utopic practice as an 
active force wedges itself, or forces itself, in between reality and 
its Other” (Marin). If utopias are theoretically the Other, where 
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utopian practices are absent from practical applications, they are 
passive and negatively charged. If practice is connected actively to 
utopian ideas, utopias become active and are “charged with opti-
mism” (Habermas). 
 Except social utopias there can exist rhetorical and poetical uto-
pias. Can utopias be unknown thoughts for the philosopher to dis-
cover? Can utopias be “the utmost outreach of thinking” (Bloch, 
Bachelard and Barthes). “Not-yet is possible in a world which has 
a vision beyond its own horizon” (Bloch). Did Thorild have poeti-
cal visions on the Other of his historical reality which worked to-
wards a future which can be called utopian? 
 
Nature and Utopias 
 
 “Reason knows no other laws than those of Nature, than those 
of highest powers and highest beauties” (Thomas Thorild). 
 Many philosophers claim that their ideas are natural and use na-
ture as a justification of their ideas. How do intellectual ideas be-
come natural? Is this wishful utopian or metaphorical thinking? 
What is the real connection between Nature and Utopias? 
 Enlightenment meant knowledge of the natural world (Buffon, 
Holbach, Mesmer, Marat) and “all Nature was linked by a univer-
sal fluid” (Mesmer). This fluid was electricity, which ran through 
all living organisms and helped to sustain life by re-establishing 
the necessary electrical equilibrium. In 1784 Mesmer linked natu-
ral harmony — that is the physical balance of the “universal fluid” 
of electricity — with social and moral harmony. 
 “Lightning composes the world” (Heraclitus). 
 Born Thomas Thorén he changed his last name into Thorild, 
which means Thors Eld, Thor’s Fire, Thor-God’s Lightnings in an-
cient Scandinavian mythology. Symbolism of lightning is one of 
instantaneous, both in its judgment and destruction. Thorild took 
as his motto: “Follow the instants!” (Följa ögonblicken!). 
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 Lightning was a popular political metaphor at the age of the En-
lightenment. Very short Jacobin era in the French Revolution used 
many natural metaphors such as floods, earthquakes, mountains 
and swamps, volcanoes and lightnings as social metaphors. The 
lightning bolt — which had been a symbol of tyranny and arbitrar-
iness in l’Ancien Regime, long understood as a signifier of sover-
eignty, as lightning bolt of absolute kings — became now an agent 
of revolution. For enlightened men the real question was how to 
control lightnings and thus lightning rods demonstrated the devel-
opment of man’s power over nature and they were used in the ef-
forts of enlightened men to control nature and society. Franklin 
had seized lightning from heavens and the specter from tyrants. 
After learning to direct lightning in natural sphere, man could de-
ploy its power in the political one. One of Franklin’s supporters in 
France made experiments with lightning rod and was accused of 
witchcraft. His advocate was a young lawyer Robespierre. 
 By explaining the causes of lightning, philosophers and scien-
tists hoped to remove its mystique and thereby take away some of 
the power and awe wielded by monarchs and religions. They 
sought both to enlighten and empower the people by tearing the 
thunderbolt from the hands of the kings and returning it to nature. 
The language of lightning provided a powerful metaphor for 
changing notions of sovereignty; it also applied the language of 
science to the rhetoric of political revolution. Lightning was a nec-
essary force whose purpose was not to destroy but instead to main-
tain equilibrium and balance in the atmosphere or in social harmo-
ny. “The political machine never rights itself except through vio-
lent convulsions (secousses) like the air is purified only by storms” 
(Marat). 
 Frenchmen had truly stolen lightning from gods and kings, sig-
nifying thus a fundamental shift in power and sovereignty: “The 
world has changed, it should change again… Man has conquered 
lightning and diverted lightning from heaven […] Everything has 
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changed in physical order; everything should change in the moral 
and political order [...] And is it not to strike the heads of the pride-
ful that lightning is destined? Let us exercise justice by the exam-
ple of nature […] let us strike like lighting, so that even ashes of 
our enemies disappear from the soil of liberty […] hurl lightning at 
our enemies!” (Robespierre, 1794). 
 
 
The Volcano of Liberty 1792: Pure Republicanism 
and a regenerating fire flow from the crater of the Jacobin volcano. 
 
 “France’s regeneration and the raising of the day’s star makes 
us tremble with the joy of Nature” (David, 1793). 
 By 1793 nature seemed to have taken the legitimation of gov-
ernance. Revolution was not a guarantor of individual agency or a 
product of human will, but instead it was a part of natural process 
of change. The language drawn from the natural world in revolu-
tionary language was common, even ubiquitous, in France. Nature 
became a space of authority, and a basis for understanding human 
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relationships. In France revolutionaries seized upon natural image-
ry to describe the force and justice of their political activity: “pure 
republicanism and regenerating fire flows from the crater of the 
Jacobin volcano.” By 1794 France was defined as a nation which 
is revolutionary like nature and powerful like liberty. Nature, ra-
ther than people, became the force behind revolution: “Nature had 
been returned from exile” (Robespierre). This was used to justify 
revolutionary violence and terror as “The Terror of Natural Right.” 
Violence was a “Revolution of the Earth,” terrible like an earth-
quake where nature purifies itself through violent convulsions. 
 For some philosophers war was natural in positive sense: “war 
is a natural state among men” (Hobbes). “Messieurs, I see thick 
clouds swaying over our heads; nothing but a thunderbolt can dis-
perse them […] To War! To War!” (Robespierre, 1792). But for 
Holbach, an apprentice of Spinoza and one of Thorild’s intellectual 
heroes, peace was natural: “War is a convulsive and violent sick-
ness of the body politics; this body is only healthy — that is to say 
in its natural state — when it is in peace.” Thorild shared Hol-
bach’s opinion: 
 
Enemies of Enlightenment, “Enemies of Light” use violence. Vio-
lence is not natural, the revolt against violence is Human Natural 
Right. As soon as violence ends freedom increases and uses free de-
bates. Enlightenment creates totality and unity — if it is free. Only 
through Freedom can Philosophy clarify its thoughts which can for-
ever sustain Humanity and Peace… Enlightenment shall throw away 
despotism and violence… All Power which is used against the Soul, 
is a relic of Barbarism. Then it was excusable and pardonable. But 
when a Nation begins to reach for Reason and Wit, the Government 
must have a higher one. Power is then lost. The divine condition of 
the State will smash the mistakes and errors not with force but just 
with the Light towards which it reaches (Thorild). 
 
 Thorild polemicized against Rousseau’s idea that we have 
abandoned the nature in favor of the society, that we have hidden 
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the nature and our “overcivilization” leads us away from the nature 
and therefore man should “return to nature” or “the state of na-
ture.” Thorild argues that actually it is civilization that leads us to 
nature. We should not be pessimistic and sigh for the good days, 
but be optimistic and not to return back to the state of nature but 
instead towards a natural civilization, natural culture. In society 
this means a development from the primitive phase of nature to a 
better, cultivated time, through the time of virtue and culture: 
 
We are destined to all we can be; everybody aspires to everything (Al-
la åstunda Allt), and all is Nature. Nature and society are basically 
alike. A good society is organized according to the laws of nature 
which are invariable. A Societal Harmony (Holbach’s harmonie so-
ciale) leads us to Harmonic All-Nature (Harmonisk Allnatur). The 
way of development where the developing displaces the undeveloped 
leads to All-Harmony (Allharmoni). As Holbach says there is a differ-
ence between natural laws (les loix naturelles) and civil laws (les loix 
civiles). But both these elements are in a compound between each 
other. Only when they are in balance and in dynamic process with 
each other we are able to say that everything in Nature is right. Socie-
ty is a power, a Harmony (Krafternas Samverkan) because it unifies 
the dispersed forces of men. All in Nature is True and Society is the 
perfection of Nature (Thorild). 
 
 Was this only an empty utopia or wishful thinking of a natural 
basis for a sketch of a peaceful Utopia? Was French revolutionary 
state finally not natural at all and was it necessary to think of 
something else? 
 
Freedom, Sovereignty and Monarchia Mentum 
 
 Thorild shared Spinoza’s concept of Freedom: “Freedom reaches 
as far as one’s longings and abilities — without being restricted by 
others. All humans have this! Freedom can be taken or not, but no 
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human being can neither nullify nor destroy the laws of his nature 
[…] man can deviate from morals but not from nature” (Thorild). 
 In 1792 he wrote an article “On the Liberty of Common Rea-
son” (Om det Allmänna Förståndets frihet). Here he appealed 
sharply to the Sovereignty of the People: “Know your value, Citi-
zens! You are Everything in this country, which lives by your 
Highness and Power. These Laws are your Laws. This Brilliance 
which shines in public, is, or should be, Light of your Independ-
ence.” This was one of Rousseau’s main ideas which has its roots 
in antique times. Now it was an expression of the freedom de-
mands of the uprising bourgeoisie which aimed at destroying the 
old feudal society by opposing all God’s Grace, all self-evident 
natural-born privileges. Thorild connects this to rationalism and 
talks about “Common Reason” or “Common Wit”: 
 
Reason is First in All. This, based on the fundamental Law of the 
Soul, is Free; when a decent, great Man upraises it is only because he 
Sees, that he Understands, something better. Society is an Association 
to promote Common happiness and blessing (Allmän Lycksalighet) of 
the Reason of All, and this means Merit and Virtue. The Government 
itself is nothing else but a whole and a part of Common Reason. The 
domain of Reason is nothing but the Truth itself or the real circum-
stances of a Thing. And without knowing this what is there to be done 
by a mortal? Common Reason stands in analogy with Individual Rea-
son: No human thinks but only through a combination of his scattered 
thoughts; and as little thinks a State but through given knowledge and 
combination of all her Citizens Reason and happy thoughts (Thorild). 
 
 Thorild unites the doctrine of Common reason with the Sover-
eignty of the People. Only when Common Reason has reached a 
certain level, Freedom is possible. The development stage of the 
state is therefore dependent on the degree of development of the 
Enlightenment. In Sweden Andreas af Botin declared that Enlight-
enment as knowledge and illumination (upplysning), is directly 
linked to progress and change that take place in one way or anoth-
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er in underdeveloped, “not progressing” societies. People were not 
enlightened; on the contrary, their lack of enlightenment proved 
their underdevelopment. 
 According to Thorild Enlightenment stems first from the devel-
opment stage of Philosophers, Genius and Wits: 
 
Human society is a part and a reflection of Nature and it functions ac-
cording to its common laws. The Genius, that is to say, those who 
have penetrated its secrets are therefore the only ones to enlighten 
principles of governance and should therefore stand in the leadership 
of the Society. An establishment of an association of the wise, The 
Kingdom of the Wise, Monarchia Mentum, is needed to lead the peo-
ple to a new stage of development. A wise government can only 
through wisdom guide the thoughts of a country. In good societies, al-
ready in ancient times, always the free citizens made the laws. The 
very few leaders came from the Wise. Rank gave neither reason nor 
reliability. A higher light, a more divine fire, is needed for the welfare 
of community. In Germany some similar answers were given by the 
poet Klopstock in his thoughts on “Gelehrtenrepublik” (Thorild). 
 
 Can this be unified with the idea of People’s Sovereignty? Can 
this lead to the despotic State of the Learned and to the tyranny of 
the intellectuals and eventually to social Dystopias because it ex-
cludes natural freedom of the people? 
 In the first place Thorild’s utopian Intellectual Aristocratism has 
its point against despotism: 
 
A powerful and stable government can never be built on Power, Vio-
lence and Oppression. New Intellectual Aristocratism (Aristos meant 
the Best) is aimed at aristocratic society´s principle of choices which 
has now turned into kakistocracy (“kakistokratik”— Kakistos meant 
the Worst). Innate abilities and rank shall exit as starting points in the 
fight for high and leading positions and shall be replaced by merit, 
talent and noble will (Thorild). 
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 According to Voltaire and many other Enlightenment philoso-
phers, philosophers utilize the true interests of society and people. 
He did not want to know anything about people’s power but spoke 
in favor of enlightened despotism. Rousseau was on the opposite 
side of Voltaire: his “General will” (volonté générale) presumed 
people’s power, whose judgement was a genuine expression of 
people’s wishes which only could be disturbed by the interference 
of the wise. Thorild does not believe in the people’s power as such. 
It takes enlightened people to create real power. His enlightened 
optimism is so big that he figures that such enlightened people’s 
power brings about almost automatically a government of the phi-
losophers. But he demands at the same time high political rational-
ism and virtue among the wise, which means an absolute release 
from egoism, group interests and dependence on the milieu (Mon-
tesquieu). The role of the wise is restricted: its virtue is only to se-
lect the best of the wise and let them shine their light. This also 
shall make ultimately laws unnecessary because there exists no 
problems between the wise and the people. The wisdom of the 
government can lead the people to decide everything with the 




 “The Thinking World is a Republic; there man shall begin to 
understand the Spirit of Freedom” (Thorild). 
 Thorild combines the supremacy of wise with absolute Liberty 
of the Press. All different interests and ideas can talk and freely 
fight against each other and so the best and most useful for nation 
and people shall be crystallized as an outcome of this process. 
Peace, happiness and virtue shall according to Thorild be clear 
consequences of the liberty of expression: 
 
Enlightenment without freedom is sterile. Freedom without Enlight-
enment is barbarism in disguise. The task of Philosophy is not to raise 
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its own value but to help People to know its own value. Liberty of the 
Press is as natural right as the right to light (absolut tryckfrihet är lika 
naturlig rätt som rätten till ljuset). The home country of Philosophy 
is the country where Freedom lives. The task of the Philosopher is to 
know the possibilities of free mankind (Thorild). 
 
 In the idea of “Natural Republicanism” (he uses this word) Tho-
rild sees democratism emerging. The opinion of the people that 
shall become Common Reason makes last decisions. The task of 
the enlightened people is to create freedom: “Freedom of all best 
reasons is a way to peoples emancipation” (Thorild). Freedom of 
people starts with the recognition of “natural highness of women 
gender.” He wrote in 1793 a sharp short pamphlet Om kvinnokö-
nets naturliga höghet. This was one of the first great philosophical 
openings towards women’s emancipation at the same time as Mary 
Wollstonecraft did same work. August Strindberg called this 
“Magna Charta of Women’s Liberation.” 
 
Poetry and Cultural Revolution 
 
 “Classical poetry is the poetry of revolution” (Osip Mandel-
stam). 
 True revolution needs as its means also strong democratic poetry 
which abandons classicism and the pursuit of perfect rhyme in favor 
of new poetry, often without rhyme. Thorild was one of the first 
democratic poets in Europe and his “Göta poems” (Götaman-
nasånger och dalvisor) were greatly admired by August Strindberg. 
 “Free arts are not free in Sweden. Art and literature are the 
fields of true freedom to come” (Thorild). In 1791–2 Thorild pub-
lished a series of articles under the heading “Critique of Critics” 
(En Critic öfver critiker). The critique of literature was one of the 
fields to promote freedom which was notified also in Germany in 
Franz Mehring’s Die Lessing-Legende: 
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Auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie und Theologie, der Rechts- und 
Staatswissenschaft lagen die Fußangeln des fürstlichen Despotismus; 
unter seinem bleiernen Joche war längst alles politische Leben er-
stickt; die schöne Literatur bot einstweilen den einzigen Kampfplatz, 
auf dem die bürgerlichen Klassen um ihre soziale Emanzipation rin-
gen konnten. 
 
 A new Magna Charta of Human Reason, a declaration of human 
rights in the area of reason, is needed to be established during the 
great process of Enlightenment. This means a new legislation of 
critical methods against old laws of repression and terror, “Legisla-
tion in the world of Reason and Wit,” a safe against them in form 
of a Constitution and Republic of the Wise. It was a cultural revo-
lution, a revaluation of all values. The ruling power of taste — “le 
gout française” or court-suitable taste — is not only dogmatic in 
classical sense, but reactionary and a weapon in the hands of re-
pression, and Thorild’s own revolt against it in the field of litera-
ture is a political revolt or even more profound revolution: “The 
authorities have chosen Blind Faith, deism in religion and dead 
classicism in arts, to be their leading Star which is dark; the En-
lightenment emancipates itself from this and leans on Light and 
Pantheistic and Materialistic trends.” These trends were considered 
extremely radical and very dangerous for the society and Christian 
faith. They also led Thorild into big troubles, which is a story that I 
cannot treat shortly here. 
 Classicists, or arbiters of taste, wanted to go back to nature by 
designing parks, radicals wanted to go back to nature itself, as a 
wild and living organism in itself. This can be applied in every 
field: senses and sensibility, natural religion, natural law, art, sci-
ence and literature. “Nature is powerful and great, pretentious 
court-life is small and weak. Nature is infinite and has infinite op-
portunities. In literature the voice from the court is a mockery 
against the real voice of nature and freedom” (Thorild). Wild poet-
ry is revolt against pseudo-classist form-culture, which Thorild 
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calls ”chameleonic art” (kameolontisk konst) that lives in the air 
and changes its colors according to who is in power. True poetry 
must paint with natural colors: “If my colors are awful when I 
paint the Evil, so I choose the most beautiful and noble colors to 
describe the Good. Words are a writer’s colors. It may be easy to 
own colors but it is not easy to do a painting.” Thorild criticizes 
the pseudo-poetry of French taste powerless, pleasing, flattering — 
and because of these: unnatural or not nature at all (Onatur). 
 Thorild attacked furiously Johan Kellgren’s literary society, 
Utile dulci, which had over 500 members, accusing it of trying to 
make poetry out of economic interests and utility. Private needs 
can be of benefit for the court as for the public (allmänhet och 
menighet). The difference is to whom they appeal. According to 
Kellgren literature is meant only for the chosen ones (in Finland 
Ahlqvist: ulosvalitut). For Thorild it is meant ultimately for the 
whole People. Literature is not for the aristocrats and royalists, it 
belongs to the People. And to exclude wild and natural poetry from 
literature will be a slander against the People. 
 For the arbiters of taste it was natural to speak about “mistakes” 
in poetry and for them the task of the critique is to find out these 
mistakes and exclude and uproot them out of literature, which 
Thorild called a raging to see everything in its mistakes (raseriet 
att se allting i sina fel). Fight against bad poets, also in Finland 
against Kivi, was marked by an orthodoxy in writing and thinking. 
Snellman however defended Kivi’s right to do mistakes quoting 
Thorild: A work of art is not done because of its faults but of its 
achievements. Do not call attention to mistakes but to the merits 
(Man skall inte räkna felen utan ta fasta på förtjänsten). Pseudo-
classical dogmatists called the poetry of Thorild epileptic and in-
sane, chaotic disorder and mess in his brain (“kaotiska virrvarret i 
Thorilds hjärna”), “lunatic asylum poetry” and socially anarchist. 
”Ni rime, ni raison!” (Kellgren). But for Thorild even wild or bad 
poets the have Rights of the Citizens in the Republic of Reason. 
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Classical poets want to be court-suitable but become court-jesters 
while the true citizens of the Republic instead want to inspire the 
sense of freedom of the people. Real reason for the critique of the 
bad poets was however their inherent radicalism. 
 Can childhood be radical? The dawning, nascent and emerging 
free spirit must do also mistakes before it can achieve truths. 
Dawning free spirit may babble like a baby, it can be full of fumble 
and stumble, it can limp and bungle, but only because it is in its 
childhood. Age of Childhood will become the Age of Manhood 
and Virility and after that Age of Law and legislation. “The age of 
virility and manhood is as conformed with nature as is golden age 
of childhood with sincerity” (Holbach: “L’age viril est autant con-
forme a la nature de l’homme que l’age d’or l’enfance est de la 
foiblesse”). 
 Original Genius makes laws himself, in the sense that he bursts 
out of given conventions and goes for a voyage of discovery in na-
ture´s infinite world. It has a right to do mistakes. The new and 
never before sought has a value in itself and for itself even if it 
fails in results, because mankind must carry out experiments to 
find the true way. Philosophy needs to go beyond its horizons, it 
should be not critical in the negative sense but charged with opti-
mism: “Freedom of the Genius and Freedom of the dawning spirit 
is the only way forward. The task of the Genius (Snillet) is not to 
lower itself to all, but to heighten all towards itself (inte att nedlåta 
sig til alla, utan at uplyfta alla til sig). The highest power of the 
Spirit is the highest Harmony. Intellectual Beautiness and Political 
Beautiness create a Totality (Dygd är mänskliga Själens eller 
Varelsens högsta Kraft med högsta Harmonie. Intellektuella 
Skönhet och Politiska Skönhet bildar en Enhet)” (Thorild). 
 What is the role and task of philosophers? To promote systems 
or freedom of the spirit? Already Aristotle pointed out the differ-
ence between aporias and systems. Thorild uses two words: those 
who pursue the intellectual beauty of an empty style use what he 
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calls “system-snit” (stil, style, that is in the guise of a style of sys-
tem) which easily and almost imperceptibly changes into a “sys-
tems-nit” (fanatiska, fanatics of system). The task of philosophy is 
not to start from readymade logics and systems or to recycle the 
styles of systems, which may turn to intellectual fanatics, but “to 
start anew” (Merleau-Ponty) from the changing reality and its 
aporias. 
 What can be learned from the poets? Nothing or everything? 
Lessing said: “If pomp and etiquettes make machines out of men, 
it is the task of the poet to make men again out of these machines.” 
For Thorild “the real task of Poetry is to learn Philosophy to 
speak.” Are poetical utopias “babbles which philosophy uses in its 
age of childhood when it does not yet know how to talk” (Tho-
rild)? How sincere are these babbles and even mistakes? What can 
we learn from childhood? What does sincerity mean in poetry? 
According to Eino Leino, another Finnish poet, Aleksis Kivi, who 
admired Thorild and owned his collected works, was not much re-
spected and thus not understood by the so-called “ohjelmasuoma-
laiset,” program-oriented Fennomans, because of his “most subtle 
nuances” (hiuksenhieno havainnointi) in poetry. 
 Great things must be said greatly for sure, but should subtle 
things be said subtly? What if sincere mistakes are in search of a 
greater sensibility? How important are the thoughts of Thorild on 
Holbach’s sensualism and its role in radical revolutionary philoso-
phy? Can Thorild be connected to the ideas of “the politics of Sen-
sibilité” by poet Sylvain Marechal? Is “poetical dreaming” a sin-
cere response to too abstract intellectual principles? Is it thus also 
radical? 
 Thorild opposed, in his own words a “Kantian notion of tran-
scendental tramps,” that intellectual principle, which expresses the 
spontaneity of the Ego, is a leading and active principle, in which 
activity is clad in the form of the synthesis, while sensuality is a 
passive principle. Sensuality for Thorild is an active force in poeti-
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cal dreaming and action that follows it. “Utopian poetics pursues 
to sense sensitively it´s time and future. Poetic utopias try to ex-
tend senses and thinking and to civilize passions to a higher level” 
(Barthes). 
 Freedom has been used very freely in philosophy and history. 
“Liberty cannot be built on Freedom,” said Robespierre. Meta-
physics of freedom says that freedom is an Idea. Physics of free-
dom says that it is a Matter. Why are Utopias formed as ideas or as 
matter? Why as a Topos and why not as a leap into future intellec-
tually? Are there actually two Utopias in the same manner as there 
exists “two faces of Enlightenment”? How radical ideas of free-
dom and democracy are needed to establish a true kingdom of lib-
erty? And more precisely: how radical a life can an intellectual 
lead? Maybe a better understanding of Radical Enlightenment 
needs a better understanding of radical passions and radical life of 
a philosopher at his time. Maybe Thorild has some enchanting an-
swers to these questions and some disturbing questions to these 
answers? Is it worthwhile to study his thinking, not only through 
his faults and achievements, but also as a process, as a philosophi-
cal episode and as one example of radical philosophical life in the 
historical reality of the changing world in age of Enlightenment? 
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THE FIRST FINNISH UTOPIAN? 
GABRIEL ISRAEL HARTMAN AND HIS POEM 





 The Magisterial Promotion of 1805 at the Royal Academy of 
Turku was held amidst an atmosphere of imminent war. On 28 
June, when the public attended the celebration that, according to 
the academic statutes, was held every fifth year to nominate the 
new magisters, Sweden had already broken off diplomatic rela-
tions with France. Later, in the autumn of the same year, Sweden 
joined the Anti-Napoleon Coalition that consisted of England, 
Russia and Austria. By 31 October, 1805, the untenable position of 
King Gustav IV Adolf, who felt that Napoleon was nothing less 
than the Beast of the Apocalypse, had led to a declaration of war 
against France. Although this imprudent step might have had dis-
astrous consequences for Sweden, all ended happily, since before 
the Swedish troops could reach the war theatre in Central Europe, 
Napoleon had obtained a magnificent victory at Austerlitz, and the 
Coalition was dissolved for a while. 
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 However, it is important to have this background in mind when 
trying to understand the poem that Gabriel Israel Hartman, docent 
of philosophy and the librarian of the academy, presented at the 
promotion. Although it was customary to present a poem, often of 
more or less didactic character, at these jubilees, Hartman’s poem 
nevertheless raised the eyebrows of many listeners. Captioned as 
Den tredje Odlingen (The Third Culture), it presented for a wider 
public a social and cultural utopia that Hartman had earlier culti-
vated only in a small circle of a secret society. 
 
The philosopher in Turku 
 
 Hartman (1776–1809) may be the most intriguing personality of 
the Finnish Enlightenment. He never had a prominent social posi-
tion, instead having had to accept modest and poorly-paid academ-
ic jobs. The professorship of philosophy he had applied for in 
1804, was granted to another man, the poet Franz Michael 
Franzén. As a philosopher, however, Hartman had high ambitions, 
claiming that he had created an altogether new system of philoso-
phy. He had lectured on this new system at least since 1804, but 
his book on the subject was published somewhat later, in 1807 and 
1808, with the title Kunskapslära (Doctrine of Cognition). It is a 
singular book,1 revealing its author as having an acute mind. De-
spite this, Hartman’s magnum opus did not arouse much interest — 
partly because the reading public in Finland and Sweden that could 
                                                          
1 Suffice it to mention that Hartman was the first author to use the term “gno-
seology” in the modern that is — Kantian and post-Kantian — sense. He 
stressed that the “Doctrine of Knowledge,” for which he himself gives the Latin 
and Greek counterparts scientia cognitionis and gnoseologia, was a new disci-
pline that was “hitherto unheard-of” (Kunskapslära, vol. I, § 1). In a comment 
on this subject, Hans Vaihinger noted that Ernst Reinhold should have been the 
first to use the word “gnoseology” (Erkenntnistheorie) in the contemporary 
sense in 1834, but it seems that Hartman preceded him by a quarter of century 
(see H. Vaihinger’s note in Philosophische Monatshefte. Bd. 12, 1876). 
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understand such a philosophical work was minimal compared to 
the more populous European countries, but even because more 
powerful influences, the philosophies of Kant and German Ideal-
ism, soon superseded it. 
 
 
Gabriel Israel Hartman. 
A miniature portrait by W. Le Moine, 1805, Turku. 
 
 In my previous studies, I have attempted to analyze Hartman’s 
philosophy, which hitherto has been largely neglected.1 Generally 
                                                          
1 See, for example: Vesa Oittinen, “Der Akt als Fundament des Bewusstseins? 
Zur Differenz zwischen G.I. Hartman und nachkantischer Transzendentalphilos-
ophie,” in: Nordeuropäische Beiträge aus den Human- und Gesellschaftswissen-
schaften Bd. 9, Frankfurt am Main/Bern: Peter Lang 1996; Vesa Oittinen, “Ein 
nordischer Bewußtseinsphilosoph. ”Reinholdianische” Themen bei G.I. Hart-
man,” in: Martin Bondeli & W.H. Schrader (Eds.), Die Philosophie Karl Leon-
hard Reinholds, Fichte-Studien, Supplementa, Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi 
2003. P. 55–75. 
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speaking, Hartman’s philosophy received decisive impulses from 
the Kantian and post-Kantian discussion around 1800, but it is an 
attempt to reconcile the Kantian “Copernican turn” with the tradi-
tions of earlier Enlightenment thought. Consequently, Hartman re-
jects both Fichte’s version of the Transcendental Philosophy and 
the German Idealism that, at this time, was already nascent and 
had in many ways been anticipated by the Swedish philosopher 
Benjamin Höijer (d. 1812). 
 There are some striking parallels between Hartman and the so-
called Elementary Philosophy developed by Karl Leonhard Rein-
hold in the 1790s. Like Reinhold, Hartman starts from the “Ex-
pression of Consciousness” (in Reinhold: Satz des Bewusstseins) 
which consists of the subject, the object and the consciousness it-
self connecting them. However, whilst Reinhold understood his 
Elementary Philosophy as a continuation and systematization of 
Kant’s Criticism, Hartman was a resolute opponent of Kantianism. 
He stood on the positions of the earlier Enlightenment, which, like 
the representatives of the German Popularphilosophie of the late 
18th century, saw Kant’s attempt to show the limits of reason as an 
attack on the main principle of the Enlightenment itself. Hartman’s 
leitmotif was to save the Enlightenment by elevating it on a new 
level, not to insist on its limits as Kant (seemingly) did. This is 
where the core of Hartman’s utopianism and its philosophical 
grounding lay. 
 For Hartman, the “grounding” (in Hartman’s original text 
grundläggning, which is a direct rendering into Swedish of the 
German expression Grundlegung, which was en vogue in Central 
European discussion at the time) of knowledge was important not 
only for theoretical reasons, but for practical reasons too. Both 
Hartman and Reinhold thought that, for the morality, a fundamen-
tum inconcussum should be found, which could serve as an anti-
dote to the relativism proposed by many Enlightenment thinkers. 
At the same time, this fundament for morality should be immedi-
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ately evident for everyone. In this respect, Hartman’s viewpoint is 
again close to that of Reinhold, who offered, as Sabine Roehr 
writes, “a new kind of ‘popular philosophy’, which had only the 
name in common with the ‘popular philosophy’ of Feder, Garve 
and Nicolai.” At the same time, however, Reinhold did not make 
any concessions to criticism of Reason formulated by the Sturm 
und Drang movement or Jacobi’s “philosophy of faith.”1 Like 
Hartman’s “expression of consciousness,” the “proposition of con-
sciousness” of Reinhold had the advantage of being both a rational 
principle and attainable to every man. 
 In addition to his Kunskapslära, which presented his theoretical 
philosophy, Hartman worked on a book on practical philosophy, 
which never went into print. It seems for a long time that the man-
uscript of this book had disappeared, but in the 1990s the Finnish 
philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright managed to find substantial 
fragments of the work — most of them written by Hartman’s own 
hand — in the Russian State Library in Moscow.2 The manuscript 
bears the title Bestämmelselära (Doctrine of Destination), which 
Hartman believed to be the “practical” pendant to the Doctrine of 
Knowledge. The title alludes to the discussions in the German En-
lightenment, which had already been stirred up from 1746, when 
J.J. Spalding published his Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The 
Destination of Man), a book that had “a huge public impact” as it 
started a discussion that led to the old Christian idea of Man being 
replaced by a new concept of humanity as creators of their own 
                                                          
1 Sabine Roehr, A Primer on German Enlightenment. With a Translation of Karl 
Leonhard Reinhold’s The Fundamental Concepts and Principles of Ethics, Co-
lumbia/London: Univ. of Missouri Press 1995. P. 142–144. 
2 The story of the discovery and the contents of Hartman’s Bestämmelselära are 
described in: Georg Henrik von Wright, Vesa Oittinen, “G.I. Hartmans Kun-
skapslära. Ett ofullbordat filosofiskt systembygge,” in: Historiska och littera-
turhistoriska studier. 77, Helsingfors 2002. P. 71–104. 
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destiny.1 In the time Hartman was most active, that is, the first 
years of the 19th century, this discussion had again become actual 
as Fichte published his Bestimmung des Menschen in 1800. How-
ever, Hartman’s and Fichte’s doctrines of human destination do 
differ considerably in that whilst Fichte followed Kant in rejecting 
the eudemonistic ethics of happiness, Hartman expressly built his 
ethics solely on happiness (sällhet) as the highest good. 
 
 
Hartman’s poem at the magisterial promotion of 1805 in Turku. 
National Library of Finland. 
 
 Even before the promotion poem and the publication of Kun-
skapslära, Hartman was known publicly for his poems and articles 
                                                          
1 Roehr, op. cit., p. 46. “Destiny” may not be an adequate English translation of 
the German Bestimmung, which has the additional connotation of “definition,” 
“determination”. Thus, the new Enlightenment idea of menschliche Bestimmung 
is that humanity is called upon a self-determination of what it wants to do. 
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in the local gazette Åbo Tidning. In 1799, he had published a poem 
entitled Til den lidande Menskligeten (To the Suffering Humanity), 
in which he laments à la Rousseau the incompleteness of the world 
and declares that only a return to the Nature will cure Man of his 
self-induced contradictions. Another interesting work by Hartman 
was a short story En dröm (A Dream), published in the same ga-
zette in 1803, which has been described as the first Finnish sci-
ence-fiction. The author describes a presentation of a microscope 
in 1899 — over a century into the future, where it turns out that the 
worlds include smaller and smaller worlds in infinitum.1 
 
Sällskap för Sanning och Sällhet 
 
 The eighteenth century was generally, and in Sweden especial-
ly, an age of secret societies, which foreshadowed — or functioned 
as an ersatz to — the more developed modern civil society. These 
societies ranged from freemasonry lodges to seamen’s societies 
and many of them actually functioned only as an alibi for eating 
and drinking. The Aurora Society, founded in 1770, has become 
famous in Finnish cultural history. It can count as its members 
such well-known names as Porthan, Mennander, Kalm, Clewberg, 
Calonius, Chydenius and other prominent representatives of the 
enlightened academic élite. 
 According to some records, a further secret society, the 
Sällskapet för Sanning och Sällhet (The Society for Truth and 
Happiness — the name reflects the idea of the unity of theoretical 
and practical philosophy), was founded in Turku in the 1790s, and 
included younger members of the Academy, such as the poet 
                                                          
1 See Jari Koponen’s comment in: Jari Koponen and Vesa Sisättö (eds.), Aivo-
peili. Autonomian ajan tieteiskirjallisuutta, Avain 2011. According to Koponen, 
Hartman’s sci-fi narrative seems to be the first of its kind in world literature; 
Fitz-James O’Brien’s The Diamond Lens from 1858 is usually regarded as the 
first story built on the microcosm motive. 
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Franzén. Unlike the established and elitist Aurora Society, whose 
interest lay mainly in promoting science and historical research, 
the new society had a clear social-reformatory scope. There are in-
dications that Rousseau belonged to its favorite philosophers, but 
Schiller, too, was admired. Although it is difficult to reconstruct 
the activity of this society, it seems that Hartman played a promi-
nent role there. Few documents have survived, but the National 
Library of Helsinki contains a short speech which Hartman held in 
a meeting of this society.1 Although the speech is not dated, it must 
have been written around 1800. 
 In this speech, Hartman converses primarily on the problem of 
the “suffering Mankind,” which he presents in the language of 
Rousseau’s critique on civilization. However, his approach differs 
from that of Rousseau in that he does not see the “heart” or the 
will as being guilty of the misfortunes of human social life, but, 
above all, the understanding: 
 
Do not seek the origins of the calamities and sufferings of humanity, 
of the corruption of manners which dishonours and yet vexes the 
people, in the heart or the will of Man, but seek it in his understand-
ing. Those laws that determine the direction of the desires and thus 
prepare the way to the deeds are eternally unchangeable — that is, we 
desire that which in our thoughts presents itself us as good […] But 
the understanding can lose its way in innumerable manners, and in-
deed it does so. All this evil of which Man laments are caused by its 
desires…2 
                                                          
1 I have published the text as an appendix to my study on Hartman, see: 
Oittinen, Der Akt als Fundament des Bewusstseins. P. 134–143. 
2 Oittinen. Op. cit. P. 134: “Söken icke Källorna til Menklighetens olyckor och 
lidanden, til det sedeförderf som vanhedrat och ännu qual detta slägtet, uti Men-
niskjans hjerta eller villja, utan söken dem i hennes förstånd. De äro evigt 
oföränderliga dessa lagar som bestämma begärens Riktning och derigenom 
förbereda gerningarne — nämligen at Vi begäre det som uti tanken framställes 
såsom godt […] Men förståndets förvillelser kunna vara otaliga, och äro det. 
110  Vesa Oittinen 
 This is a methodologically important point, since if the squalors 
and deficiencies of civilized life are produced above all by the er-
roneous ideas created by the understanding, the only way to cor-
rect societies is not to turn back to primitive life, as Rousseau re-
commended, or at least seemed to such moderate Enlighteners as 
Voltaire to recommend (“J’ai reçu, Monsieur, votre nouveau livre 
contre le genre humain […] On n’a jamais tant employé d’esprit à 
vouloir nous rendre bêtes; il prend envie de marcher à quatre 
pattes quand on lit votre ouvrage”1). Instead, Hartman sees the so-
lution to the crisis of civilization in moving forward; that is, en-
forcing the already existing Enlightenment and driving it towards 
new heights: 
 
Only by the well-doing influences of the Enlightenment, only by the 
light of a more purified understanding, in which the real side of the 
things becomes obvious, the desires get the direction they need to 
have [in order to] unite happiness and virtue. — It is this general light 
of the Enlightenment which makes the delusions to dissolve like the 
darkness of night cedes for sunlight, and the crimes and vices become 
ashamed to show themselves in their invariably foul shape.2 
 
 Another important consequence of this position is that the sick-
nesses and faults of present forms of social life are best overcome 
by giving to the Reason a stable foundation, which is done by 
grounding it so that it becomes undisputed. It is specifically for 
this reason that the philosophy becomes so important; in philoso-
                                                                                                                                 
Det är dess drifter som förorsakar allt detta Onda hvaröfver menniskjan 
klagar…” 
1 From Voltaire’s letter to Rousseau, 30 August, 1755. 
2 Oittinen. Op. cit. P. 137: “Endast igenom Uplysningens välgörande inflytelser, 
endast igenom et Renare förstånds ljus, hvari tingens sanna sida blir uppen bar 
[sic!], och begären vinna den riktning som de böra hafva til förening, sällhet och 
dygd. — Det är vid Uplysningens allmännare dag som förvillelserna skola 
bortsmälta som Nattens mörker för Solljuset, och som brotten och Lasterna 
skola blygas at visa sig i sin oföränderligt ohyggliga gestallt.” 
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phy, the most important part is the theory of cognition, which will 
show us how apodictic certainty is possible and how it can be ob-
tained. 
 For Hartman, it was quite clear that the Enlightenment had not 
yet exhausted its potential. A look at the present-day situation of 
the European Enlightenment shows that the “foundations and val-
ue of thought” have not yet been established, the difference be-
tween justice and wrong is yet uncertain, the destination of Man is 
not yet found, and the “nature of our real happiness” remains ob-
scure: 
 
Has yet even one of those truths which all are important for the hu-
manity been solved and determined? Have the foundations and the 
value of the thinking been determined? Is the difference between jus-
tice and injustice obvious? Is our destination found and specified? Is 
the nature of our real happiness known and recognized? — Ah! How 
far are we yet from this all?1 
 
 For Hartman, the reformation of philosophy is, if not the only, 
then always the best way to find answers to these ardent questions 
posed by humanity. In the final passages of his speech, he hints 
that a solution might be near: “No! This Light will rise, and the 
humanity will have reason to be happy that it exists.” The solution 
is the philosophical system that Hartman himself has been devel-
oping in recent years. Although it is still at the development stage, 
Hartman asserted that if he can find the answer to the question of 
“which is the first thing in our knowledge,” we can determine what 
is our destination and what our real happiness consists of, and he 
exhorts his listeners to join into the common project: 
                                                          
1 Oittinen. Op. cit. p. 138: “Är någon enda sanning af alla dem som äro viktige 
för menskligheten afgjord och bestämd? Äro tankens Grunder och värde 
fastställda? Är skilnaden mellan rätt och orätt uppenbar? Är vår bestemmelse 
funnen och utveklad? Är naturen af vår verkliga sällhet känd och erkänd? — 
Ach! Huru långt äre vi ännu derifrån?” 
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If you, by fixing your attentive eye upon the results of my efforts of 
thought, find anything valuable in them, so will I, [starting] from the 
ultimate groundings of knowledge, where I by the means of a highest 
speculation shall dispel all the absurdities of speculation, [and pro-
ceeding to] the application of knowledge to our refinement and hap-
piness. [That is,] from the answer to the question “What does that 
which is primary in our knowledge consist of?” to decide what con-
sists our destination, our true happiness, and through which means we 
can obtain it — develop my whole philosophical system. I expect to 
receive advice from your examination, light from your knowledge 
and support and help from your virtues…1 
 
 What Hartman here had only professed in the closed circle of a 
secret society, he made public when the first opportunity to do it 
appeared. He was invited to write the poem to the magisterial 
promotion, a task he gladly accepted. 
 
The Promotion Poem of 1805 
 
 In Den tredje Odlingen, Hartman first describes, in somewhat 
stodgy verse and with some horror, the political upheavals of the 
day. He writes that the “shadows of grief and crime” will not cede 
and the “egoism” rampages overall, “stamping out all the feelings 
for the rights of the brethren”: 
 
 
                                                          
1 Oittinen, op. cit., p. 142: “Om Ni, då ni fästen et granskande öga vid re-
sultaterna af min tankemöda finner något Värde deri, skall jag, ifrån de yttersta 
Kunskapens grunder, där jag genom höjden af speculation ville störta alla Spec-
ulationens orimligheter, intil Kunskapens tillämpning til vår förädling och 
Sällhet ifrån at besvara den frågan: Hvad är det första i våra Kunskaper, intil at 
afgöra den [:] Hvartil äro vi bestämde, hvar i består vår sanna sällhet, och ge-
nom hvilka medel, kunne vi vinna den? utvekla hela mit system [i] Philoso-
phien. Jag väntar igernom Eder granskning Råd och Ljus af Edra Kunskaper och 
stöd och hjälp af Edra Dygder…” 
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Se Egoismen i menniskjans hjerta 
qväfver all känsla för Medbröders rätt: 
skyr inga brott, inga svekfulla sätt: 
rörs ej af smärta. 
 
Än emot våldets besoldade härar 
folkslagen fåfängt få söka et värn, 
då han med härjarens mordlystna järn 
verlden förfarar.1 
 
 Of course, the emphasized “he”, who “with the murderous iron 
/ Terrifies the world” is Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 After these initial comments on the political situation at the 
time, Hartman goes over to the motives he had already developed 
in his secret society speech. In short, he says, in the “depth of 
time,” one sees but darkness. It was different in earlier times: in 
ancient Greece beauty and taste reigned supreme and the philoso-
phers were enlivened by freedom; after the crumbling of Greek 
culture, the torch of genius shined in Rome. But the world of an-
tiquity perished, and upon its ruins a new European culture 
emerged, that of the Enlightenment. However, it soon became ob-
vious that even Europe “could well master the art of murdering 
and torturing.” The enlightened Europe has boasted of its excel-
lence, but there is actually much to wish for: 
 
 
                                                          
1 Lo, the Egoism in the heart of Man 
Stifles every feeling of the right of the brethren: 
Does not startle any crimes, any deceit: 
Is not moved by pain. 
 
Against the hired armies of violence 
Yet the nations have in vain sought escape, 
As he with the murderous iron 
Terrifies the world. 
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Ach, Europa! med ljuset du skryter! 
Döfvad af lofsångens smekande rop, 
hör du nej mera den furiehop 




Har ditt upplysningsbegär ej förgiftat 
Fredliga folkslagers sällare lott? 
ryser du ej för de qval och de brott, 
hvilka de stiftat? 
 
Än dina lärde, med vanvettets ifver, 
tvista om grunder för sanning och dygd: 
än dina vise, förnuftet till blygd 
tro föreskrifver.1 
 
 These strophes show Hartman as a critic of the Enlightenment, 
“from the Left” rather than from conservative positions. Like such 
authors as Abbé Raynal, whose Histoire des deux Indes con-
demned European colonialism, Hartman sees the actions of the 
“enlightened Europe” in not just a positive light. In fact, the pro-
                                                          
1 Ah, Europe! You boast of having light! 
Deafened by the flattering sounds of panegyrics, 
you do not hear any more that heap of furies 




Has not your desire of enlightenment been poisoned 
The happier lot of peaceful nations? 
Are you not shivering for the suffer and the crimes 
caused by it? 
 
Your learned men, with a madman’s zeal 
Are yet disputing on the grounds of truth and virtue: 
Your sages, infamously for the reason 
Yet prescribe the faith. 
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ject of the Enlightenment is far from being completed, since a firm 
foundation for knowledge and virtue has not yet been discovered. 
Furthermore, some even have suggested an escape into religious 
faith as the only remedy from the insecurities created by a half-
hearted Enlightenment. As Hartmann proclaims, with unmistaka-
bly Rousseauian tones, this Europe has not drunk from the foun-
tain of truth nor learned from Nature. Nonetheless, a new epoch is 
dawning, the epoch of the third Enlightenment: 
 
Frid vare menskjan! — des möda har hunnit 
öfver det andra upplysningens steg.1 
 
 As in Greece, the arts are flourishing again, the taste has spread 
out into societies and the fruits of culture have become visible to 
all. Unfortunately, the Enlightenment had hitherto been content 
with “the charm of superficiality.” Although the Enlightenment did 
not know “how to combine duty and happiness” (an allusion to 
Kant’s moral philosophy!), it was “insecure in its path towards the 
happiness.” That is why a new, third phase of culture, a higher 
form of Enlightenment must come: 
 
Snart skall den tredje förädlingen börja: 
snart skall man skönja bestämmelsens stråt: 
fatta dess renhet — ej lämna sig åt 
villornas mörja: 
 
skall i naturen och tankan erfara 
Sanningens, jemviktens, ordningens lag: 
och vid des enkla, förädlande dag 
sällhetsvärd vara.2 
                                                          
1 Peace to the Man! — its efforts have reached 
Over the second step of the Enlightenment. 
2 Soon will the third [stage of] refinement begin: 
soon one will have insight into the path of the destination: 
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 Now “Liberty will reign with Benevolence”, and there are no 
more egoists, tyrants or slaves, concludes Hartman his poem. The 
men of this coming final phase of culture will live all the days of 
their lives without sorrows. 
 
 
Åbo Tidning of September 21, 1805, 
with a comment on the poem of Hartman by an anonymous author 
 
 It is difficult to say how Hartman’s contemporaries in Turku 
viewed the utopian declarations of the docent of philosophy in 
their academy. However, it is possible, even probable that he was 
                                                                                                                                 
comprehend its purity — not succumbing to 
the muddle of illusions: 
 
shall experience in Nature and in thought 
The law of Truth, equilibrium, order: 
and in its simple, ennobling light 
Be worth of happiness. 
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not taken at all seriously as a thinker and was instead regarded as a 
dreamer, a Schwärmer. This is indicated already by the fact that 
Hartman never obtained any important academic posts at his uni-
versity and remained a docent and poorly paid librarian. Moreover, 
soon after the magisterial promotion, an anonymous review of 
Hartman’s poem was published in the local gazette Åbo Tidning 
was published an anonymous review of Hartman’s poem. The re-
view was almost surely written by Professor J.F. Wallenius, who 
had followed the newly deceased Porthan as the eloquentiae pro-
fessor of the Academy. Although Wallenius’s critique was written 
in an outwardly polite manner, its tone was mainly ironic. Accord-
ing to Wallenius, didactic poems — “versed metaphysics” — such 
as the one by Hartman, were generally not preferable and, even 
worse, Hartman’s attacks against the Enlightenment could not be 
tolerated. Wallenius was clearly bothered by Hartman’s radicalism, 
although it did not have any politically dangerous — that is, Jaco-
bin — tones, but was, instead, a diffuse and utopian depiction of 
what a “true” Enlightenment should be. As we have seen, Hartman 
had insisted that contemporary Enlightenment thought was insuffi-
cient and had not been able to answer to the demands for ground-
ing human happiness. 
 Here is not the place to give an account of the discussion on 
Hartman’s poem in Åbo Tidning, despite the fact that it has some 
interest as the first modern literary polemics in Finland.1 Hartman 
did not want to give in a newspaper polemics any exhaustive an-
swer that would have convinced his opponents that his views were 
well grounded. Instead, he hurried to publish his chef d’oeuvre, the 
Kunskapslära, the book that should finally resolve the main prob-
lem of the Enlightenment — the lack of an unswerving fundament 
                                                          
1 For an exposé of the polemics, see: Oittinen. Op. cit. P. 55–57; see also: Hen-
rik Knif, “Lärda resonörer och arga kritiker,” in: Clas Zilliacus and Henrik Knif, 
Opinionens tryck, in: Skrifter utg. av Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland 526, 
Helsingfors 1985. 
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of knowledge. In the book, which was published in 1807 and 1808, 
there is a passage in its § 100 entitled ‘Reflections on the Influ-
ences of the Philosophical Systems’, in which Hartman tries to 
deepen the ideas from the secret society speech and the promotion 
poem. In this passage, Hartman analyses the history of humanity 
from the point of view of how the different ages have managed to 
embrace the truth. 
 
 
Title-page of the second volume 
of Hartmans main work on philosophy, Kunskapslära. 
National Library of Finland. 
 
 According to Hartman, humanity has on three occasions run 
through the same developmental circle of Faith, Research and 
Scepticism. In antiquity, the period of faith was replaced by the 
“research period” of the Ionic philosophy of nature. Then came the 
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“conceptual or sceptic period” of the Sophists, which closed the 
first circle. The second circle started with the rise of Socrates, who 
declined the speculation of the Sophists, re-animated virtue and 
justice and accepted the doctrine of Anaxagoras on the Spirit of the 
World. This was again, thus, a “period of faith.” A new period of 
research began then with Plato, Aristotle and Zenon, before scepti-
cism returned with Pyrrho, the Academicians and other relativistic 
schools. The third and final circle began with the faith period of 
the Middle Ages. In modern times, a period of research began, 
which led to the thriving of the sciences and the Enlightenment. 
According to Hartman, however, humanity is again at the fringe of 
a new period of the scepticism. This was initiated by David 
Hume’s sceptic philosophy, strengthened by the “brash French epi-
cureans” and Kant’s critique of reason. Therefore, Hartman argues, 
it is time for a new philosophy that will be able to restore the secu-
rity of the faith period by finding a stable fundament for all 
knowledge. 
 Hartman’s historico-philosophical scheme and his poem of 
1805 has a parallel to Fichte’s well-known Grundzüge des gegen-
wärtigen Zeitalters, a series of lectures held in Berlin between the 
autumn of 1804 and the early spring of 1805 and published soon 
thereafter. Hartman knew Fichte — the philosophers in the Acad-
emy of Turku were generally well aware of the newest develop-
ments in German cultural life and, for example, Åbo Tidning had 
published translations of Kant and Fichte since the early 19th cen-
tury. He had even tried to conceive his own system as a kind of an-
swer to the German transcendental philosophy, the subjectivism of 
which he could not accept. The “history schemata” of Hartman and 
Fichte are answers to the same epochal situation created by the 
Napoleonic wars, so it is no wonder that there are some common 
features in them, although these are rather superficial. Both see in 
history a plan or a scheme that proceeds rather mechanically from 
stage to stage, and both see human history as a realization of some 
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philosophical principle. For Fichte, it is freedom, while for Hart-
man, it is the “happiness” (sällhet) that constitutes the final goal of 
human development. Furthermore, both men agree that the present 
age in which humanity lives is far from satisfactory; according to 
Fichte, humanity lived around 1805 in the “age of completed sin-
fulness” (Zeitalter der […] vollendeten Sündhaftigkeit), an as-
sessment with which Hartman would have concurred.1 
 However, whereas Fichte’s history proceeded in a linear manner 
through five stages, Hartman’s scheme moves in triadic circles, 
although he seems to think that it is possible to break out from 
them. The triadic form of history actually reproduces the triad 
found in human consciousness (subject, object and the representa-
tional relation connecting them), which Hartman has made the all-
inclusive structural principle of his theory. It is the same triad that 
occurs in the theories of mind of Reinhold and Fichte, although 
these philosophers have not tried to use it as a key to the universal 




 What makes Hartman’s utopia interesting today is the fact that 
it was a product of the antinomies of Enlightenment thought and, 
at the same time, an attempt to overcome them in the confines and 
by the means of the self-same Enlightenment. I have already men-
tioned the kinship between Hartman’s philosophy and the system 
of Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Both men tried to find the apodictical-
ly certain foundation of knowledge from the analysis of the Ego. 
Here, they followed the strategy that Descartes had used a century 
and a half earlier. Descartes concluded that the only thing that is 
absolutely certain in our thinking is the act of thinking itself: ego 
                                                          
1 For a recent presentation of Fichte’s philosophy of history, see: Manfred Kühn, 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte — Ein deutscher Philosoph. München: Beck 2012. P. 
467 sqq. 
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cogito, ergo sum. In like manner, both Reinhold and Hartman ana-
lyze human consciousness. However, unlike Descartes, who was 
contented with his ergo sum, Hartman and Reinhold find that the 
“I think” has a structure. One can discern a threefold, consisting 
of the subject of thought, the object(s) of thought and the thought 
itself. 
 It has been obvious for a long time that the “Cartesian option” 
does not lead to absolute certain knowledge, but instead to always 
new aporias. One could say this is the irony of all philosophical 
inquiry, but in the late 18th century it yet seemed possible to many 
that an ideal society could be constructed following the precepts of 
Reason, which were considered infallible. This was a one-sided 
conception of reason, since it excluded the idea of a necessary self-
criticism of reason, the idea that Kant proposed in his ground-
breaking works of the 1780s onwards. So, in the last years of the 
18th century, we encounter a form of utopianism that relies on the 
absoluteness of Reason, a kind of Reason that has already found 
all of its truths and only remains to be applied in social life. This 
was the conviction of the Jacobins during their short reign in 
1793–1794, and the same rationalistic-deductive principle for re-
forming the society can be found in Fichte’s Der geschlossene 
Handelsstaat of 1800, which is conceived exactly as a Vernunfts-
staat (State of Reason), whose organization and policy are all de-
duced from rational principles. 
 Of course, such rationalistic utopias are known from all histori-
cal periods. What makes the social utopias of the late Enlighten-
ment (strictly speaking, the decade and a half from 1790 onwards) 
so specific is their connection with the philosophical enquiry to 
find the fundament of absolute certainty for all of our knowledge. 
In German literature, this kind of philosophy is often called 
Grundsatzphilosophie (“grounding philosophy”) and its chief rep-
resentatives were Reinhold and Fichte. It seems to me that Hart-
man’s philosophical system can be referred to this current; in fact, 
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he demonstrates the necessary connection between a Grund-
satzphilosophie and a social utopia in an even more distinct man-





                                                          
The Philosophical Age. Almanac 39. The Northern Lights: Social Philosophies 
and Utopias of the Enlightenment in Northern Europe and Russia. St. Peters-
burg — Helsinki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2013. P. 123–136. 
 
ZUR AKTUALITÄT DER IDEEN 
DER AUFKLÄRUNG IN RUSSLAND 
UND DEUTSCHLAND AM BEISPIEL 
VON KROPOTKINS KOMMUNITARISMUS 







 Die wenigen Berührungspunkte zwischen dem russischen Den-
ker Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin (1842–1921) und dem Deut-
schen Max Stirner (1806–1856) scheinen einen Zusammenhang 
zwischen den beiden Philosophen auszuschließen. Der scheinbar 
einfache Vergleich der Anarchie-Konzeptionen der beiden Denker 
hat auf den ersten Blick vielmehr im Gegenteil eine Entgegenset-
zung beider Konzeptionen, die Hervorhebung der Differenz zwi-
schen ihnen und ihre Verortung in verschiedenen Koordinatensys-
temen zur Konsequenz. 
 Während Kropotkin nämlich der Ansicht ist, daß der vollständi-
ge Zustand des kommunistischen Anarchismus Ziel der Revolution 
ist, glaubt Stirner im Gegenteil, daß alle Formen des Kommunis-
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mus bewältigt werden müssen. Er tritt für die Eigenart der Persön-
lichkeit ein, für die ihr eigene sogenannte Antigesellschaftlichkeit, 
ihre spezifische Individualität, die Kropotkin eher kritisch sieht. 
Während Kropotkin den Aufstand des Allgemeinen gegen das Ein-
zelne für unerläßlich hielt, spricht Stirner von einer Notwendigkeit 
des Aufstands des Einzelnen gegen das offenkundig totalitäre und 
destruktive Allgemeine. 
 Offenbar ist außerdem die Unvereinbarkeit der philosophischen 
Positionen, die Kropotkin und Stirner beziehen: des Positivismus 
im Fall Kropotkins und des Neuhegelianismus im Fall von Stirner. 
Dabei ordnet Kropotkin die Ethik der Wissenschaft unter, indem er 
die Gesetze der Gesellschaft auf die Natur überträgt. Stirner tritt 
gegen das wissenschaftliche Herangehen an den Menschen auf, 
weil der Mensch seiner Meinung nach kraft seiner Besonderheit, 
Individualität und Eigenartigkeit außerhalb des Kompetenzberei-
ches der Wissenschaften steht. Wissenschaft verwandelt ihrerseits 
das Einzelne ins Allgemeine, sie verwandelt alles Lebendige in 
abstrakte Konstruktionen, innerhalb derer alles ihnen wirklich Ei-
gene verloren geht. Stirners Ethik ist eine Ethik des Egoismus und 
des individuellen Willens. 
 Offensichtlich ist also, dass es um Vertreter ganz verschiedener 
Wert- und Normativsysteme geht. Und diese Systeme widerspre-




 Auffällig in diesen Systemen ist aber nicht das, was darin ver-
schieden ist, weil es sowieso klar ist. Für unser Thema interessiert 
uns vielmehr etwas ganz Anderes. 
 Warum finden wir uns in ein und demselben konzeptuellen Be-
reich wieder — im libertären Bereich des Anarchismus, wenn wir 
Stirner und Kropotkin studieren, und nicht in ganz verschiedenen 
Bereichen? Warum scheint der Positivist Kropotkin dem Neuhege-
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lianer Stirner näher zu stehen als anderen Positivisten — zum Bei-
spiel den liberalen Positivisten? Und warum ist der Neuhegelianer 
Stirner trotzdem Vertreter des Anarchismus, während die meisten 
Neuhegelianer Verfechter des Kapitalismus und der Sakralität des 
Privateigentums und in diesem Sinn keine Anarchisten sind? 
 Anders gefragt: wie ist diese nicht auf den ersten Blick zu erklä-
rende epistemologische Situation zu beschreiben, in der sich der 
Neuhegelianer und der Positivist gegenseitig näherstehen als den 
Vertretern der philosophischen Traditionen, zu denen sie formell 
gehören? Was macht die Spezifik dieser Situation aus? Und worin 
besteht ihre Bedeutung für die Gegenwart? 
 Dieser Vortrag hat die Suche nach Antworten auf diese Fragen 
zum Gegenstand. Wir beginnen mit der Klärung einiger zentraler 
Ausgangspunkte. 
 
Hauptthesen von Kropotkins Kommunitarismus 
 
 Wir beginnen mit Kropotkins Lehre und beleuchten einige ihre 
Hauptthesen. 
 Kropotkins Kritik ist auf die Zeit gerichtet, in der die freien 
Städte von Europa ihre Freiheit zu verlieren begannen, also unge-
fähr das 15. Jahrhundert. Stattdessen verwandelten sie sich in den 
starken Staat, in dem alle gesellschaftlichen Kräfte dem Staat un-
tergeordnet wurden. 
 Kropotkins Kritik ist außerdem die Kritik der herrschenden Me-
thodologie der Geschichte und sie klingt in der Tat wirklich über-
zeugend. Diese Kritik betrifft Folgendes: von einer bestimmten 
Zeit an beschrieben die Chronisten nur Kriege und Unglücksfälle 
des Volkes, weil ihnen alles Andere unwesentlicher Alltag zu sein 
schien. Schließlich entstand eine Täuschung: die ganze Geschichte 
schien ausschließlich aus Blutvergießen und aus der Gewalt des 
Starken zu bestehen. Dieser Umstand bewirkte natürlich, dass viele 
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totalitäre Systeme in allen Zeiten sich damit rechtfertigten, dass sie 
und ihre Gewalt echt naturgemäß und üblich seien. 
 Aber dieses Bild hat nach Ansicht Kropotkins nichts mit der 
Realität der wirklichen Geschichte zu tun. Nur die Friedenszeiten 
könne man vielmehr für repräsentativ halten; die Zeiten, in denen 
man einfach lebt, arbeitet, verkehrt, und seine schöpferischen Züge 
äußert. Nur die Friedenszeiten seien für die Forschungen zum 
Menschen und zur Gesellschaft wissenschaftlich relevant und 
wirklich informativ und nicht die Zeiten der Kriege, durch die nur 
sehr wenige Menschen in die Geschichte eingingen und die ganze 
Gesellschaft übergangen wurde. 
 Trotzdem hat sich bis jetzt keine Tradition herausgebildet, die 
diese Zeiten beschreibt. Deswegen erscheint es jetzt so selbstver-
ständlich, in der Autorität und in starken Hierarchien nichts Unan-
nehmbares zu finden. 
 Während des Werdens der Staatlichkeit im 15. Jahrhundert gin-
gen auf diese Weise die Solidarität und der gesellschaftliche Ins-
tinkt verloren, die den Menschen und der Gesellschaft zuvor eigen 
waren. Die schriftliche Geschichte ist eine Art Spiegel geworden 
und die Gesellschaft hat begonnen, sich durch diesen Spiegel zu 
untersuchen und zu begreifen. Man begann, diesem Spiegel zu 
glauben und ging von nun an in seiner Selbstbesinnung von die-
sem Spiegelbild aus. 
 Die mit gegenseitiger Hilfe und Solidarität erfüllte Welt fing an 
zu verschwinden. An ihre Stelle trat eine ganz andere Welt — die 
Welt, in der das Allgemeine das Einzelne völlig verschlang, und in 
der die Individualität und der Egoismus herrschende Werte gewor-
den sind. Kropotkin schreibt: “während die Pflichten der Men-
schen gegenüber dem Staat zunahmen, verringerten sich die 
Pflichten der Menschen einander gegenüber.”1 Jedem Menschen 
blieben nur die Pflichten sich selbst und dem allumfassenden Staat 
                                                          
1 Кропоткин П.А. Взаимная помощь как фактор эволюции. Минск: Бело-
русская энциклопедия, 2006. С. 238. 
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gegenüber. Individualismus wird zum grundlegenden Prinzip der 
gesellschaftlichen Organisation — zum Entfremdungsprinzip. 
 Aber gerade hier gibt es ein äußerst kompliziertes Moment, das 
man sehr selten beachtet. Ist dieser von Kropotkin missbilligte In-
dividualismus derselbe wie der, den Stirner schützt? 
 
Stirners Begriff des Eigentums 
 
 Können wir Stirners Individualismus mit dem Individualismus 
von zum Beispiel Bentham nur deshalb identifizieren, weil Stirners 
Ideen zu den Ideen von Kropotkin im Wiederspruch stehen? So 
einfach verhält es sich nicht. 
 Viele Forscher lassen den Umstand unberücksichtigt, dass Stirner 
oft ein Wortspiel verwendet und den Leser möglicherweise verwirrt. 
Um so mehr gilt das für die Übersetzungen der Texte von Stirner in 
andere Sprachen, zum Beispiel ins Russische. Das Hauptproblem 
besteht darin, das Wort “Eigentum” zu übersetzen oder auszulegen. 
Denn man kann dieses Wort nicht wörtlich übersetzen: wir müssen 
natürlich von dem konzeptuellen Kontext ausgehen. Im Zusammen-
hang der Logik von Stirners Konzeption hat dieses Wort keine di-
rekte Bedeutung, sondern ist vielmehr eine Metapher, mit der er die 
Eigenheit/Einzigartigkeit des Individuums bezeichnet. Die Eigen-
heit ist das Eigentum des Einzigen (erinnern wir uns an den Namen 
von Stirners Buchs “Der Einzige und sein Eigentum”). Was bedeutet 
das und wozu braucht Stirner diese Metapher? 
 Man kann annehmen, dass Stirner hier unter dem Wort “Eigen-
tum” das Folgende versteht: menschliche Individualität ist von 
dem Allgemeinen zu erlösen und zu entlasten und muss von dem 
Menschen wiedergewonnen werden. Diese wiedergewonnene Frei-
heit wird gerade zum Eigentum des Menschen — zum Eigentum, 
neben dem der Mensch kein anderes ebenso wichtiges Eigentum 
hat, weil alle anderen Eigentümer ihn wieder zum Allgemeinen 
machen können. Deshalb wird die Unabhängigkeit und die Unde-
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terminiertheit der Persönlichkeit so wörtlich erklärt — wie ein Ei-
gentum. Das äußerliche Eigentum wird dem Menschen im Gegen-
teil als etwas Inneres aufgezwungen, aber der Persönlichkeit, dem 
Einzigen kann das überhaupt nicht eigen sein. Deshalb können wir 
annehmen, dass Stirner unter dem Eigentum nicht wirklich etwas 
Ökonomisches versteht, sondern etwas Philosophisches. Der 
Mensch, der Einzige und seine Eigenheit, seine Substanz – das ist 
sein wirkliches Eigentum und nicht etwas Äußerliches. Stirner 
spricht in seinem Text überhaupt nicht über Wirtschaft. Deshalb 
wäre es seltsam, diesem rein philosophischen Kontext so plötzlich 
einen wirtschaftlichen Sinn zuzuschreiben. 
 Also können wir jetzt annehmen, dass Stirners Begriff des Ei-
gentums sich wesentlich von Benthams Konzeption des Eigentums 
unterscheidet. Ebenso unterscheidet sich Stirners Individualität 
von Benthams Individualität. 
 Und gleichzeitig steht Stirner in diesem Sinn Kropotkin nicht so 
sehr gegensätzlich gegenüber wie Kropotkin zum Beispiel Bent-
ham oder dem Anarchokapitalisten Benjamin Tucker1 gegenüber 
steht. Im Gegenteil redet Stirner in seiner Lehre von der Persön-
lichkeit und ihrer Eigenheit — worüber Kropotkin fast nichts ge-
schrieben hat. Dennoch unterstrich auch Kropotkin die wichtige 
Rolle der Persönlichkeit, woraus wir ersehen können, dass Stirners 
Lehre über die Persönlichkeit Kropotkins Lehre nicht in dem Maße 
widerspricht. Kropotkin sagte wörtlich: “…eine nicht genügende 
Persönlichkeitsentwicklung und ein Mangel an der eigenen schöp-
ferischen Kraft der Persönlichkeit sind zusammen eines der größ-
ten Probleme unserer Zeit. Wirtschaftlicher Individualismus brach 
                                                          
1 B. Tucker (1854–1939), Proudhons Nachfolger, war ein Verfechter des markt-
wirtschaftlichen Systems. Im Laufe seines Lebens änderte er unter dem Einfluss 
verschiedener Sozialdenker gelegentlich teilweise seine Konzeption. Dabei 
blieb er aber maßgeblicher Ideologe des Anarchismus und Chefredakteur der 
anarcho-individualistischen Zeitschrift “Liberty”. Sein bekanntestes Buch heißt 
“Statt eines Buchs” (Instead of a Book, by a Man Too Busy to Write One. 1893, 
1897). 
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sein Wort: er brachte keine wirkliche Entwicklung der Individuali-
tät des Menschen.”1 
 
Ein scheinbarer Widerspruch zwischen Stirner und Kropotkin: 
die Sozialisation 
 
 Jetzt untersuchen wir die Frage, welche Widersprüche es zwi-
schen den Lehren von Stirner und Kropotkin gibt. Es ist bekannt, 
dass Stirner ein Gegner der Sozialisation war. Aber in welchem 
Sinn? Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist sehr wichtig. 
 Wenden wir uns wieder Stirners Text zu und erinnern wir uns 
daran, dass er zwischen den Begriffen “Gesellschaft” und “Bund” 
unterscheidet. Die Gesellschaft verlangt, dass der Mensch seine 
Freiheit (das heißt sein Eigentum, seine Eigenheit) opfert. Der 
Bund hingegen gibt der Person die Möglichkeit, ihre Eigenheit zu 
verwirklichen und sich schöpferisch und individuell zu entwickeln. 
Die Gesellschaft ist für Stirner fast dasselbe wie der Staat — etwas 
Mächtiges, das den Menschen zwingen will, seine Eigenheit unter-
zuordnen. Der Bund ist etwas Freies, wo es keinen mächtigen Al-
gorithmus gibt, der den Einzigen und sein Eigentum zerstört. Der 
Bund entsteht nur dann, wenn die Gesellschaft stirbt. Und umge-
kehrt: die Gesellschaft entsteht eben dann, wenn der Bund zerfällt. 
Daraus entnehmen wir, dass Stirner den Bund für etwas sehr Kon-
struktives hält, obwohl er diesen Gedanken im Buch “Der Einzige 
und sein Eigentum” nicht ausführlich betrachtet. 
 Vergleichen wir mit Kropotkin: vertritt dieser nicht dieselbe Po-
sition, wenn er sagt: “In den Städten entwickelt der Mangel an ge-
meinsamen Interessen in den Menschen nur Gleichgültigkeit. Mut 
und Kreativität finden keine Anwendung und verschwinden […] 
Seit dem 15. Jahrhundert zerstörten die in Europa entstehenden 
Staaten alle Institutionen, in denen die Menschen gegenseitige Un-
terstützung praktizierten. Der Staat und seine Beamten ergriffen 
                                                          
1 Кропоткин П.А. Взаимная помощь как фактор эволюции. С. 260. 
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und bearbeiteten den ganzen zwischenmenschlichen Raum der 
Städte.”1 
 In diesen Worten klingt Stirners Entgegensetzung zwischen dem 
Bund und der Gesellschaft an. In ähnlicher Weise betrachten so-
wohl Stirner wie auch Kropotkin den Staat also als die treibende 
Kraft der Entfremdung, durch die sowohl der Bund (das heißt die 
freundschaftliche Gesellschaft) als auch der Mensch unterdrückt 
werden. 
 
Unterschiedliche Akzente, ein Gegenstand 
 
 Es gibt aber auch Unterschiede zwischen den Akzenten, die 
Kropotkin und Stirner setzen. Im 18. Jahrhundert waren die meis-
ten Ethiksysteme individualistisch. Stirners Philosophie entspricht 
diesen Tendenzen. Er beschäftigte sich nicht mit der Philosophie 
der Geschichte oder mit den Problemen der Anthropologie, des-
halb kam er zu keinen allgemeinen umfangreichen Schlüssen so-
wohl bezüglich der Wendepunkte der Geschichte als auch bezüg-
lich des Wesens der Gesellschaft. Kropotkin unternahm eine retro-
spektive Untersuchung — mit Rücksicht auf die Besonderheiten 
des historischen Weges des menschlichen Gemeinschaftslebens 
und auf seine Gesetze. Der methodologische Unterschied zwischen 
diesen beiden Konzeptionen wurde also auch durch das Ziel der 
jeweiligen Theorie verursacht. 
 Stirner bezieht seinerseits die Position, die für seine Zeit cha-
rakteristisch ist — für die Zeit, als die ethischen Systeme von 
pragmatischen Gründen auszugehen beginnen. Er reagiert auf die 
Prozesse, die Kropotkin in seinem Werk “Ethik” auf folgende Wei-
se beschreibt: “Die Persönlichkeitsrechte wurden nur auf einem 
Gebiet mit dem innigsten Streben verwirklicht — auf wirtschaftli-
chem Gebiet. Aber auch hier blieb die persönliche Freiheit sowohl 
in der Praxis als auch in der Theorie eher etwas Scheinbares als 
                                                          
1 Ibid. С. 237. 
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etwas Zentrales. Was die anderen Bereiche angeht — zum Beispiel 
das politische, das intellektuelle und das künstlerische Gebiet — 
kann man wohl Folgendes feststellen: während der Individualis-
mus sich immer mehr verstärkte, nahm die Unterordnung des 
Menschen unter eine Kriegsorganisation des Staates ständig zu.”1 
Diese Präzisierung des geschichtlich-kulturellen Kontextes des 18. 
Jahrhunderts erklärt wesentlich das Protestpathos von Stirner. Da-
bei werden die Voraussetzungen seiner Haupterwiderungen und die 
Gründe seiner rebellischen Ideen deutlich. 
 Wir können also schließen, dass der Unterschied zwischen den 
Theorien von Kropotkin und Stirner hauptsächlich durch die me-
thodologische Basis bestimmt wird und nicht durch die wesentli-
che, substantielle Seite der Frage. Beide Lehren, die jeweils von 
gegensätzlichen Grundsätzen ausgehen, sind also auf ein und das-
selbe gerichtet: auf die Problematik des Staates und der Staatlich-
keit, der Herrschaft, der Unfreiheit. Und weil beide von gegensätz-
lichen Positionen ausgehen, umfassen sie diese Problematik er-
schöpfend, jede aus ihrer Perspektive. 
 Gerade heute bekommt dieser Umstand eine entscheidende Be-
deutung, denn unter den postindustriellen Bedingungen gilt es, die 
Problematik des Staates und der Herrschaft neu zu durchdenken 
und zu begreifen. Die jüngsten politischen Ereignisse in Europa, 
Lateinamerika und in den USA zeigen uns, dass jetzt eine Suche 
nach neuen Formen der gesellschaftlichen Gemeinschaftlichkeit 
wiederaufgenommen wird. Diese neuen Formen und Ideen er-
scheinen als eine direkte Entgegensetzung zu den Werten, die seit 
der Blüte der Konsumgesellschaft herrschen und die wesentlich 
auf dem radikalen Individualismus beruhen. Deshalb erhalten die 
Lehren von Stirner und Kropotkin jetzt nicht nur methodologisch 
eine neue Aktualität, sondern auch, weil sie neue Einsichten für 
 Probleme vorschlagen, die sich dem gegenwärtigen Menschen 
besonders dringlich stellen. 
                                                          
1 Кропоткин П.А. Этика. М.: Политиздат, 1991. С. 42. 
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Paradoxe Ordnung der Gegenwartsgesellschaft 
 
 Hier berühren wir ein sehr wichtiges Problem: das Problem der 
paradoxen Ordnung der heutigen Gesellschaft. 
 Einerseits positioniert diese Gesellschaft die Persönlichkeit als 
den wichtigsten Wert. Darüber reden die Regierungen, die Mas-
senmedien und die Gesellschaftsinstitutionen — das ist eigentlich 
ihre offizielle Rhetorik. Die Persönlichkeit ist das am meisten ge-
forderte Produkt des gegenwärtigen wirtschaftlichen und politi-
schen Diskurses. Der Kult um die Persönlichkeit ist der populärste 
Kult der Gegenwart. Das Wort “Persönlichkeit” trifft uns über-
all — als ob sein Inhalt wirklich bedeutsam wäre. Diese Kategorie 
wird zum guten Schutz nicht nur gegen Angriffe, sondern leider oft 
auch gegen verschiedene Kontakte mit der Aussenrealität. 
 Der Mensch kann sich heute in der Persönlichkeit wie in einem 
Futteral verstecken und als Antwort auf alle Reizfaktoren der Rea-
lität sein Recht geltend machen, in diesem Futteral zu bleiben — 
um nichts in sich und um sich her zu ändern, um die Anstrengun-
gen des Lebens auf ein Minimum zu reduzieren und um alle Unbe-
sonnenheiten und Dummheiten mit dem Satz “Ich bin eine Persön-
lichkeit und das ist mein Recht” zu erklären. 
 Hier stoßen wir auf die andere Seite der paradoxen Ordnung. 
Folgt man den zahlreichen Definitionen, ist die “Persönlichkeit” 
etwas Ganzheitliches, Aktives und Schöpferisches. Sie ist auf eine 
Art das Ergebnis der langen und anstrengenden Arbeit des Men-
schen, sie ist eine Leistung. 
 Aber die eben dargestellte Betrachtung der Persönlichkeit als 
Futteral, in dem man sich verstecken kann, zeigt uns einen prinzi-
piell anderen Sinn dieses Wortes an, den es für sich selbst seit eini-
ger Zeit unerwartet bekommen hat. Wir sehen also, dass anstelle 
der Ausgangsbedeutung des Wortes “Persönlichkeit” eine ganz ge-
gensätzliche Bedeutung entstanden ist. Gerade diese letzte Bedeu-
tung versteckt sich hinter dem edlen Sinn des Wortes “Persönlich-
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keit” und man bemerkt diese Unterschiebung leider fast nie, ob-
wohl es um ganz verschiedene Dinge geht. 
 
Ein dritter Typ des Individualismus 
 
 Daraus entnehmen wir, dass wir jetzt nicht mehr nur von 
Stirners und Benthams Auslegungen des Individualismus sprechen 
können. Heute verstehen wir unter dem Wort “Persönlichkeit” et-
was Neues — und das haben wir eben betrachtet. Deshalb können 
wir von einem dritten Typ des Individualismus sprechen, denn so-
gar Benthams Individuum ist ohnehin autonom — wenn auch dank 
seiner wirtschaftlichen Leistungen — zum Unterschied von der 
gegenwärtigen “Persönlichkeit.” 
 Wir haben also gute Gründe, zwischen diesen drei Varianten des 
Individualismus zu unterscheiden. Dieser Umstand zeigt uns, dass 
Stirners Lehre vom Individualismus dadurch in Misskredit ge-
bracht wird, dass man zwischen den drei Typen von Individualis-
mus nicht unterscheidet. Und daraus resultiert auch ihre scheinbare 
Gegensätzlichkeit gegenüber der Lehre von Kropotkin. In Wirk-
lichkeit könnte sein Verständnis des Individualismus jedoch nicht 
nur für einen Menschen, sondern auch für die ganze Gesellschaft 
wirklich konstruktiv sein. 
 Der Kommunitarismus klagt heute über den radikalen Individu-
alismus der Gegenwart und sieht darin die Ursachen und die Vo-
raussetzungen des gesellschaftlichen Verfalls und der umfangrei-
chen Krise in vielen Bereichen — zum Beispiel im Bereich der 
Kultur, der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen, der Umweltbe-
handlung — und so weiter. Aber wir sehen jetzt, dass der Kommu-
nitarismus in diesem Sinn nicht Stirners Individualismus meint, 
sondern die zwei anderen Formen des Individualismus — den In-
dividualismus von Bentham (das heißt den rein wirtschaftlichen 
Individualismus) und den Individualismus der passiven, faulen und 
fruchtlosen sogenannten „Persönlichkeit.“ Aber wenn der Kom-
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munitarismus sogar Stirners Individualismus ablehnt, verfällt er in 
das Extrem des autoritären Kommunitarismus, das ebenso maxi-
malistisch und schädlich für den Menschen und die Gesellschaft zu 
sein scheint wie das Extrem des äußersten Individualismus von 




 Deshalb kann der Ausweg aus der schwierigen Situation des In-
dividualismus in der gegenwärtigen Welt in Folgendem bestehen. 
Es erweist sich nicht als notwendig und hilfreich, dem Individua-
lismus immer sofort sein scheinbar antagonistisches Modell des 
Sozialismus gegenüberzustellen. Vielmehr anzustreben wären eine 
umfassende Untersuchung des konstruktiven Potentials des Indivi-
dualismus und der entsprechende Rückgriff auf die Theorie 
Stirners, der gerade dieses konstruktive Potential beschrieb. 
Dadurch könnte auch das Problem des Autoritären, das viele For-
men des Kommunitarismus kennzeichnet, behoben werden und 
dieser als gute und überzeugende Alternative zur heutigen krisen-
haften Gesellschaft fruchtbar gemacht werden. 
 Stirners Form des Individualismus ist außerdem die einzige 
Form, die noch nie maßgeblich ausprobiert wurde und die deshalb 
den Individualismus überhaupt rehabilitieren kann — in der Ge-
sellschaft, in die der Individualismus so viel Verheerendes und 
Verderbliches gebracht hat und in der deshalb seine Chancen, als 
attraktive Möglichkeit betrachtet zu werden, gegen Null gehen. 
 Hinzu kommt, dass Stirners Individualismus dem Konzept 
Benthams und dem oben beschriebenen gegenwärtigen Verständnis 
von Individualismus ebenso konsequent entgegen steht wie Kropo-
tkins Kommunitarismus — allerdings aus einer anderen Perspekti-
ve. Die Ursache besteht in Folgendem: beide Konzeptionen ver-
sklaven die Persönlichkeit und determinieren sie total, statt sie frei 
zu machen — wie sie es versprechen. Die Gesellschaft, die aus den 
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versklavten Menschen besteht, kann nicht frei sein und hat 
schlechte Aussichten — sowohl im Bereich der zwischenmensch-
lichen Beziehungen und der Organisation der Gesellschaft als auch 
in Politik, Umweltbedingungen und in vielen anderen Bereichen. 
 Deshalb bietet eben Stirners Individualismus ein gutes Mittel 
gegen die verderblichen Formen des heutigen Individualismus, der 
die Gesellschaft atomisiert. Und dabei scheint er gleichzeitig der 
Weg zu einer gesunden und aktiven Gesellschaft zu sein — zu ei-
ner Gesellschaft, die auf Bünde gegründet sein könnte — wie sie 
Stirner beschrieb und wie sie auch Kropotkin für das Beste hielt 
(erinnern wir uns daran, dass für ihn die beste Form der Gesell-
schaft der Bund der Föderationen — das heißt Bündnisse — ist). 
 
Stirner und Kropotkin — zwei Seiten einer Medaille 
 
 Etwas Ähnliches geschah mit der sozialistischen Lehre von Kro-
potkin. Einerseits wurden fast alle Formen des Kommunitarismus 
durch die schmerzhaften Erfahrungen beim Aufbau des Kommunita-
rismus in der Sowjetunion, in China und in einigen anderen Ländern 
im 20. Jahrhundert in Misskredit gebracht. Deshalb ruft die Rede da-
von schmerzliche Reaktionen bei vielen Menschen hervor. Anderer-
seits entstand im 20. Jahrhundert ein Phänomen, das Ortega-y-Gasset 
den “Aufstand der Massen” genannt hat. Und dieser „Aufstand der 
Massen“ bringt die Idee der Demokratie auch in Misskredit und reha-
bilitiert im Gegenteil den Etatismus und den Elitarismus. 
 Wir müssen aber begreifen, dass das, was Kropotkin unter der 
Demokratie und dem Kommunitarismus, also unter den Föderatio-
nen verstand, nichts mit diesen zwei Varianten der gesellschaftli-
chen Organisation zu tun hat. Er spricht nicht vom komfortablen 
Sitzen im Kinosaal — wie im Fall der anspruchsvollen aufstehen-
den Massen; und nicht von dem aktiven Verhalten im Tanzparterre 
während des Konzerts — wie im Fall der sogenannten wirtschaft-
lich-freien Gesellschaft. 
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 Er redet vielmehr von der Sozialisation, dank der die Menschen 
aufeinander orientiert sind, um ihr gesellschaftliches Leben selbst 
zu organisieren — ihren gemeinsamen Vorstellungen über die Ge-
rechtigkeit entsprechend, die sie auch zusammen ausarbeiten. Das 
heisst, er spricht von den freien Menschen, die zusammen ihr 
Bündnis bauen wollen. 
 Solche Einigkeit kommt nicht „von oben,“ von der Ideologie 
her — wie im Fall der Sowjetunion. Auch kommt sie nicht aus den 
Medien und der Werbung — wie im Fall, den Ortega y Gasset be-
schrieb. Diese Einigkeit, von der Kropotkin spricht, kommt von 
unten — aus den Menschen, die zu Persönlichkeiten im Ausgangs-
sinn dieses Wortes zu werden beginnen, also in dem Sinn, den 
Stirner meint, wenn er von dem „Einzigen und seinem Eigentum“ 
spricht. Ähnliche Prozesse betrachten wir schon seit dem Jahr 
2010 in der ganzen Welt: in Europa, in Lateinamerika, in den 
USA, teilweise sogar in Russland. 
 In diesem Sinn schließen die Ideen von Kropotkin und Stirner 
einander nicht aus, sondern ergänzen einander. Stirners “Persön-
lichkeit” füllt die Lücke in der Lehre Kropotkins, in der dieses 
Thema nur flüchtig betrachtet wird. Das sozialistische Paradigma 
von Kropotkin hingegen betrachtet die Koexistenz der Persönlich-
keiten, was wiederum Stirner nur flüchtig untersucht hatte. 
 Mit den historischen Erfahrungen der Gegenwart ist eine ver-
nünftige Beurteilung der starken und der schwachen Seiten der so-
zialphilosophischen Konzeptionen der Vergangenheit möglich. Ei-
ne auswählende Synthese von Schlüsselpunkten der Lehren von 
Kropotkin und Stirner könnte deshalb eine adäquate Antwort auf 






ANDERS CHYDENIUS’S RHETORIC 
FOR THE FREEDOM OF FOREIGN TRADE 





 The year 1765 meant a great change in the life of Anders 
Chydenius (1729–1803). As the young chaplain of Alaveteli in Os-
trobothnia, he was chosen to be one of the delegates of the Estate 
of Clergy at the Diet (Riksdag) in Stockholm in 1765–1766. He at-
tended the Diet and began to participate in the political debates of 
the Swedish capital. Meanwhile, he deepened his knowledge of 
major political and economic issues by studying papers and books 
and meeting other politicians. Already during the first year of the 
Diet, Chydenius published two powerfully worded tractates: The 
Source of Our Country’s Weakness and Memorial on the Freedom 
of Printing. 
 In my essay “Anders Chydenius and Radical Swedish Enlight-
enment,” published with the papers of the previous symposium on 
the Enlightenment in Northern Europe and Russia,1 I presented a 
                                                          
The Philosophical Age. Almanac 39. The Northern Lights: Social Philosophies 
and Utopias of the Enlightenment in Northern Europe and Russia. St. Peters-
burg — Helsinki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2013. P. 137–153. 
1 Sarje K. “Anders Chydenius and Radical Swedish Enlightenment,” in: The 
Philosophical Age. Almanac 36. The Northern Lights. Facets of the Enlighten-
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general introduction to Chydenius’ career as a political and eco-
nomic writer and politician in 18th-century Sweden (and Finland), 






Portrait of Chydenius, 
an engraving by J. F. Martin, 
1805. 
The poem hints 
to the engagement of Chydenius 
with the cause of the poor: 
“Animum tenem ac benignum / 
Amicis, Propinquis, Miseris 
devotum.” 
Chydenius Institute, Kokkola 
 
of the leading actors of the Swedish Enlightenment, a brave and 
just polemicist and politician, who developed a basic theory of 
economic liberalism in his tractate The National Gain in 1766, al-
ready eleven years before Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations 
was published. 
 In this paper I to concentrate on the arguments, rhetoric, and di-
rect and indirect sources of Chydenius’s tractate Källan til Rikets 
Wan-Magt, The Source of Our Country’s Weakness published in 
1765, a year before his most famous pamphlet. Of all the political 
writings by Chydenius Källan was the only one to be translated in-
to a foreign language (German) during his lifetime; Die Quelle von 
                                                                                                                                 
ment Culture. Ed. by T. Artemyeva, M. Mikeshin, V. Oittinen. St. Petersburg — 
Helsinki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2010. P. 83–95. 
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Schwedens Unvermögen appeared in 1765. Both the original pam-
phlet and the German translation were published anonymously. 
The translator and the motive for the translation are not known. 
One of Chydenius’s ceremonies was, however, published in Finn-
ish in 1786, and in fact his first printed text from 1751, Giösta 
Kulda, a poem to celebrate the fifth birthday of the Prince Gus-
taf — was written in Finnish. 
 Quite recently in 2012 the first English translation of Chydeni-
us’s Källan appeared in a new selection of his writings entitled 
“Anticipating The Wealth of Nations” in the series Routledge Stud-
ies in the History of Economics. Peter C. Hogg is the translator, 
and the book was edited by Maren Jonasson and Pertti Hyttinen 
with a biographical introduction by Lars Magnusson. 
 In my presentation, which is an outline for further research ra-
ther than a detailed study, I juxtapose the quotations of Chydeni-
us’s original text with the 18th-century German translation and the 
new English translation to permit possible for the reader to com-
pare the rhetoric and argumentation in different languages. I also 
try to shed light on the assumed sources of the text. 
 In the first paragraph of Källan, Chydenius wants to legitimize 
his politically severe critique of social and economic conditions in 
Sweden by expressing in one sentence the starting points of his po-
litical philosophy, or maybe some of the commonly accepted social 
and philosophical principles of the time. 
 Human beings are by nature so constituted that they need the 
help of others and must therefore gather together in larger or 
smaller societies, but as soon as that happens, the society is 
promptly beset by enemies, both external and internal.1 
 
                                                          
1 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness, Anticipating The 
Wealth of Nations. The selected works of Anders Chydenius (1729–1803). Ed. 
by M. Jonasson and P. Hyttinen, with an Introduction by L. Magnusson. Trans-
lated from the original by P.C. Hogg. L. and N.Y.: Routledge, 2012. P. 124. 
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Människan är af Naturen så fatt, at hon behöfwer andras hjelp, och 
måste därföre samla sig i större eller mindre Samfund; men så snart 
det är skedt, blifwer det oförtöfwat ansatt af fiender, dels utom, dels 
innom sig.1 
 
Der Mensch ist von Natur in einem Zustande, dass er anderer Hülfe 
nöthig hat, und muss sich daher in grössern oder kleinern Gesell-
schaften zusamen thun. Die Gesellschaft aber ist kaum geschlossen, 
so sind ausserliche und innerliche Feinde da, welche sie antasten.2 
 
 The quotation concerns the social contract and its challenges. 
The phrase refers to philosophical discourse on the development of 
mankind from the natural condition or the state of nature to civil 
society. We can hear echoes of the political theories of Hobbes, 
Pufendorf, Locke and other European philosophers of the 16th, 
17th and 18th centuries. 
 The German philosopher Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) 
had an official position in Sweden in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
He was appointed a professor at the University of Lund in 1668. In 
Lund he published some of his major books, such as De Jure Nat-
urae Et Gentium Libri Octo (1672), and its summary De Officio 
Hominis Et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem Libri Duo (“On the Duty 
of Man and Citizen,” 1675), which was also translated into Swe-
dish in 1747 with the title Twenne Böcker om Människians Lefnads 
och Samlefnads Plicht. Pufendorf was an authority on political 
theory in Sweden, and many professors of the Academy of Turku 
lectured in accordance with his philosophy. Chydenius began his 
studies at the Academy of Turku in 1745, and it is very likely that 
he was acquainted with Pufendorf’s ideas. 
 
                                                          
1 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt, Trykt hos Direct. Lars Salvius. 
Stockholm: Imprimatur N. von Oelreich, 1765. P. 2. 
2 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. Aus dem Schwedi-
schen. Stockholm: Imprimatur N. von Oelreich, 1765. P. 2. 
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Chydenius’s pamphlet describing the causes of the weakness 
of the Swedish realm, 1765 (left) and its German translation (right). 
Chydenius Institute, Kokkola. 
 
 What must have been the will of God when he created man, was 
one of the questions of speculation in Pufendorf’s philosophy. Ac-
cording to Pufendorf, people in the state of nature were free and 
equal, and both natural liberty (libertas naturalis) and natural 
equality (aequitas naturalis) ruled. People together made the social 
agreement followed by an agreement with their ruler.1 
 Pufendorf’s idea of the state of nature was more civilized than 
that of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Half a century older, this 
English philosopher had a disillusioned vision of “the way in 
                                                          
1 Sarje K. “Anders Chydeniuksen liberaali ajattelu ja sen lähteitä,” in: Chydeni-
us-Instituutti, Tutkimuksia 15, Kokkola, 1985. P. 63; Tenkku J. “Oikeus ja elä-
män arvo. Aatehistoriallinen tutkimus 1600-luvun oikeusfilosofiasta,” in: Aja-
tus, Suomen filosofisen yhdistyksen vuosikirja XXV, Helsinki, 1963. I also 
wish to thank Professor Kari Saastamoinen for his helpful comments. 
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which men, being what they are, would necessarily behave if there 
were no authority to enforce law or contract.”1 The Canadian pro-
fessor of political science C.B. Macpherson writes: “…Hobbes’s 
picture of the full state of nature is clearly the negation of civilized 
society: no industry, no culture of the earth, no navigation, no 
commodious building, no arts, no letters, no society, ‘and the life 
of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.”2 
 While Hobbes’s ideas were known in 18th-century Sweden, 
Pufendorf’s and John Locke’s (1632–1704) more moderate and 
pragmatic social philosophy had stronger influence in Swedish po-
litical discourse. The latter part of Locke’s major study of social 
philosophy Two Treatises of Government (1689) was translated in-
to Swedish and published in 1726 titled Oförgripelige Tankar Om 
Werldslig Regerings Rätta Ursprung, Gräntsor och Ändamål, 
which reflected interest in Locke’s philosophy, and the desire of 
Swedish readers to learn to know his thinking. 
 “Locke’s state of nature is a curious mixture of historical imag-
ination and logical abstraction from civil society,” Macpherson de-
fines.3 Locke thought that in a state of nature people were free, but 
natural freedom was — if not a Hobbesian war of everyone against 
everyone — nonetheless very fragile. The social contract was 
needed to strengthen the safety and stability of society. Chydeni-
us’s position was close to Pufendorf’s and Locke’s views.4 
 
* * * 
 
                                                          
1 Macpherson C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Hobbes to 
Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. P. 19. 
2 Ibidem. P. 23. 
3 Ibidem. P. 209. 
4 Patoluoto I., Sarje K. “Anders Chydeniuksen luonnonoikeudelliset opit,” in: 
Aate ja maailmankuva. Ed. S. Knuuttila, J. Manninen & I. Niiniluoto. WSOY, 
Helsinki, 1979. P. 82. According to Ilkka Patoluoto, Chydenius’s ideas on social 
agreement are closer to Pufendorf’s philosophy. 
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 History also shows that nowhere near as many societies have 
been overthrown by external enemies as by internal ones who have 
concealed themselves in the garb of fellow citizens. 
 Yet it is a curious fact that most states keep a watchful eye on 
those who are outside that society but often leave those within it 
well armed, since we ought to know that human beings are similar 
wherever they are and are always more easily able to do harm un-
der the cloak of patriotism than in the guise of an enemy, and un-
der cover of a spurious faithfulness than in open hostility.1 
 
Historien wittnar ock, at de utwärtes ej på långt när störtat så många 
Samhällen öfwerända, som de, hwilka dolt sig i med-borgares drägt; 
men det är underligt, hwarföre de fläste Stater, hafwa sina ögon 
upmärksamma på dem, som finnas utom Samfundet; men lämna ofta 
swärdet bart i deras händer, som äro innom det samma, då wi likwäl 
borde weta, at människan är lik sig sjelf hwaräst hon är, och har altid 
tilfälle at lättare skada under en Patriotisk kappa, än i en fiendes 
skapnad: under et falskt förtroende, än i fullt harnesk.2 
 
Die Historie zeuget auch, dass die ausserlichen bey weitem nicht so 
viele Societäten umgestürzet haben, als die in Mitbürger-Tracht ver-
kleideten. Aber das ist zu bewundern, warum die meisten Staaten zu 
aufmerksame Augen auf auswärtige Feinde richten, denen aber, die in 
ihnem sind, das entblösste Schwerdt in Händen lassen. Sollten wir 
nicht wissen, dass der Mensch, er sey wo er sey, sich immer gleich 
ist, und immer Gelegenheit hat, viel leichter unter einem patriotischen 
Mantel, als in Feindes Gestalt: unter einem falschen Vertrauen, als in 
voller Rüstung, zu schaden.3 
 
 The above quotation of moral disapproval concerns corruption 
in the Kingdom of Sweden as projected into Roman history. The 
text echoes the thoughts of Charles-Luis de Secondat, Baron de La 
                                                          
1 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 124. 
2 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 2. 
3 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 2. 
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The Swedish translations of Locke’s A Treatise of Two Governments 
(Stockholm 1726) and of Samuel Pufendorf’s De officio hominis et civis 
juxta legem naturalem libri duo (Stockholm 1747). 
The National Library of Finland. 
 
Bréde et de Montesquieu (1689–1755), whose writings were 
known in 18th-century Sweden. Montesquieu’s concepts of moral 
and physical causes are almost analogical to Chydenius’s “inter-
nal” and “external” causes or “enemies,” and both philosophers 
shared the notion of unchangeable human essence. Montesquieu’s 
book Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et 
de leur décadance (Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur 
and Decadence of the Romans) from 1734 was translated into 
Swedish in 1755 by the poet Olof von Dalin with the title Herr 
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Montesquieus Tankar öfwer Orsakerne til de Romares Wälde och 
Fall.1 
 
It was thus no longer a mystery among the Romans that extensive 
amounts of property in private hands constituted a danger to liberty, 
but no one was any longer able to strike a blow against self-interest 
unless he wished to receive two in return.2 
 
Det war då mera ingen gåta hos de Romare, at stora ägodelar hos wis-
sa personer woro äfwentyrliga för friheten; dock war ingen mera i 
stånd at gifwa egennyttan en släng, om han ej wille hafwa twå tilba-
ka.3 
 
Damals war es den Römern kein Räthsel mehr, dass grosse Guter bey 
gewissen Personen für die Freyheit gefährlich sind. Aber niemand 
war mehr im Stande, dem Eigennuss einen Streich zu geben, wo er 
nicht zwey wieder haben wollte.4 
 
 Chydenius continued his critique of the political economy of 
Sweden based on Mercantilism and its privileges and restrictions. 
The staple towns and their monopolists controlled foreign trade. 
Chydenius’ targets were the Staple Ordinance, which allowed di-
rect export from only a few ports in Sweden and Finland, and the 
Commodity Ordinance (produktplakatet), which “was aimed at in-
hibiting foreigners from shipping to Sweden anything but their 
own produce.”5 Chydenius’s indirect critique of the political sys-
                                                          
1 Sarje K. “Anders Chydenius Montesquieun ihailijana,” in: Sarje K. Usko, tou-
hu, rakkaus — ajatusmuotojen arkeologiaa Suomessa. Jyväskylä: Tutkijaliitto, 
1986. P. 49–65. 
2 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 124. 
3 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 4. 
4 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 4. 
5 Magnusson L. “Anders Chydenius’s life and work. An introduction,” in: Antic-
ipating The Wealth of Nations. The selected works of Anders Chydenius (1729–
1803). Ed. by M. Jonasson and P. Hyttinen, with an Introduction by L. Magnus-
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tem was, however, camouflaged in Montesquieu’s manner in the 
Roman past. 
 
Every free state that fails to pay careful and studious attention to this 
internal enemy is as certain to collapse, even without war, pestilence 
and years of bad harvests, as is a clock bound to stop when the main-
spring has broken, no matter how often one sets the pendulum in mo-
tion.1 
 
Hwar och en fri Stat, som ej tager noga och sorgfällig akt på denna 
inwärtes fienden, måste utan krig, pest och misswärt-år så wisst falla 
öfwerända, som et urwerk måste stanna, då drif-fjädern brustit, om 
man aldrig så ofta satte pendelen i rörelse.2 
 
Ein jeder freyer Staat, der auf diesen innerlichen Feind nicht genau 
und sorgfältig Acht giebt, muss ohne Krieg, ohne Pest und Hungers-
noth so gewiss über den Hausen fallen, als ein Uhrwerk stille stehen 
muss, wenn die Feder gesprungen ist, so oft man auch das Pendul in 
Bewegung bringet.3 
 
 Social structures and general tendencies determined the expla-
nations of historical processes in Montesquieu’s philosophy, and 
Chydenius often used the same kind of reasoning in Källan. Mon-
tesquieu writes: 
 
It is not chance that rules the world. Ask the Romans, who had a con-
tinuous sequence of successes when they were guided by a certain 
plan, and an uninterrupted sequence of reverses when they followed 
another. There are general causes, moral and physical, which act in 
every monarchy, elevating it, maintaining it, or hurling it to the 
                                                                                                                                 
son. Translated from the original by Peter C. Hogg, L. & N.Y.: Routledge, 2012. 
P. 14. 
1 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 124. 
2 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 4. 
3 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 4. 
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ground. All accidents are controlled by these causes. And if the 
chance of one battle — that is, a particular case — has brought a state 
to ruin, some general cause made it necessary for that state to perish 









The Swedish translation 
of Montesquieu’s 
Considérations sur les causes 
de la grandeur des Romains et 
de leur décadence 
(Stockholm 1740); 
the translator was 
Olof von Dalin. 
The National Library of 
Finland 
 
 Montesquieu confirms his theory by pointing to an illuminating 
example in the warlike history of Denmark and Sweden: 
 
We see that the land forces of Denmark, for nearly two centuries, 
have almost always been beaten by those of Sweden. Apart from the 
                                                          
1 Montesquieu. Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans 
and Their Decline. Transl. with notes and an introduction by D. Lowenthal. Ith-
aca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968. P. 169. 
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courage of the two nations and the chances of war, there must be an 
inner vice in the military or civil government of Denmark which has 
produced this effect — and I do not believe it is hard to discover.”1 
 
 Sweden had collapsed from its role as a leading European pow-
er through the desperate wars of Carl XII, with these events culmi-
nating in the violent death of the king in 1712. Chydenius thought 
that after tyranny, and under the rule of the estates, the crucial 
cause of the country’s weakness was the unequal or unnatural dis-
tribution of economic resources. That was the source of corruption 
and moral decadence, and the obstacle that prevented people from 
maintaining their moderate lives. Liberty and equality became al-
most synonyms in Chydenius’s theory. 
 
One can see from this how it is possible for the greatest national prof-
it in trade and commerce, if it is concentrated in a few hands, to be far 
more harmful to the country than if it loses an entire province as a re-
sult of war. As desirable as it is for a nation to preserve its liberty, so 
too must it pay equal attention to the wealth that accumulates in cer-
tain places.2 
 
Häraf kan man se, huru det är möjeligt, at den största nationela winst 
i handel och rörelse, kan, då den faller i få händer, wara Riket långt 
skadeligare, än då det genom Krig förlorar en hel Province. Så kärt 
det altså är för en Nation, at bibehålla sin frihet, så upmärksam måste 
han ock wara på de rikedomar, som samlas på några wissa ställen.3 
 
Hieraus kann man sehen, wie es möglich say, dass der grösste Natio-
nal-Gewinnst im Handel und Verkehr, wenn er in einige wenige Hän-
de fällt, dem Reich weit mehr Schaden bringen kann, als der Verlust 
einer ganzen Provinz. So lieb daher einer Nation die Erhaltung ihrer 
                                                          
1 Ibid. P. 169. 
2 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 124–125. 
3 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 4. 
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Freiheit ist: so aufmerksam muss sie auf die Reichthümer seyn, die 
auf gewissen Stellen gesammlet werden.1 
 
 Chydenius’s political conclusion was that liberty and economic 
equality are the preconditions of the success of the country. His 
position foreshadowed contemporary Nordic egalitarian and dem-
ocratic society. He even questioned the legitimacy of private prop-
erty if the political conditions of the acquisition of the capital had 
not been “natural.” This standpoint must have been rare in liberal 
politics in the 18th century. 
 
The community at large may have no right to the property of private 
individuals when it has been legally acquired, but on the other hand it 
also contributes to the ruin of the country if it does not promptly open 
those dams that have gathered wealth together in few places and im-
poverished the rest.2 
 
Det almänna äger wäl ingen rättighet til Privatorum ägodelar, när de 
likmåtigt Lagarna tilfallit dem; men deltager och på andra sidan uti 
Fosterlandets fördärf, om det ej skyndsamt öpnar de dammar, som 
samlat skatter på några få ställen, och utarmat de andra.3 
 
Das Publicum hat zwar kein Recht an Privatpersonen Güter, wenn sie 
denselben rechtmässig zugefallen sind; aber auf der andern Seite nimt 
es auch an des Vaterlandes Verderben Theil, wenn es nicht bald die 
Dämme öffnet, welche auf einigen wenigen Stellen die Schässe ge-
sammlet, alle andre aber ausgearmet haben.4 
 
 Chydenius’s economic policy combined the demand for equali-
ty with the idea of the night-watch state. He was convinced that 
freedom produced equality and would not cause the accumulation 
                                                          
1 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 4. 
2 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 125–126. 
3 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 4. 
4 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 4. 
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of capital in the hands of the few. On the other hand he called for 
the active political role of the state “to open the dams” and to make 
the markets work for common interest and equality. Otherwise, the 
state must interfere in the system but only to guarantee fair play. It 
seems that free trade and economic liberty were not values unto 
themselves for Chydenius but rather means for welfare and moder-
ate equality in society. 
 
The closer a nation has remained to nature, the wealthier and more 
populous has it become, the more evenly is its wealth distributed and 
the more felicitous is its government. Likewise, the more anyone has 
interfered with commerce and industries, the worse and the more 
wretched is the state.1 
 
Ju enfaldigare någon Nation fölgt naturen, ju förmögnare och talri-
kare har han blivit, ju jämnare finnas rikedomarna utdelte oh ju lyck-
ligare är dess Regemente: twärt om, ju mera någon konstlat i handel 
och näringar, ju sämre och olyckligare Stat.2 
 
Je ungekünstelter eine Nation der Natur gefolget ist, desto vermögen-
der und zahlreicher ist sie geworden, desto gleicher finden sich ihre 
Reichthümer vertheilet, und desto glücklicher ist ihr Regiment: Hin-
gegen je mehr sie in Handel und Erwerb gekünstelt hat, desto 
schlechter und unglücklicher ist der Staat.3 
 
* * * 
 
 “China, the wealthiest country in the whole world, provides in-
controvertible proof of this. There, towns have no privileges, and 
there is no difference between urban and rural industries, so that 
the entire country is like a town and all the towns are like the most 
                                                          
1 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 126. 
2 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 4–5. 
3 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 4. 
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attractive countryside,” Chydenius writes.1 He shared with many 
contemporary authors the belief, suggested by the French writer 
Jean Baptiste Du Halde (1674–1734) in his book Description de la 
Chine, that China would be a model country of freedom and equal-
ity.2 In Europe only Holland and maybe England could have been 
comparable with “the state that has freed its commerce and crafts 
the most.”3 
 In contrast to that, Sweden has believed that financial and 
commercial secrets, exclusive privileges, bounties, constraints, and 
a variety of prohibitions would bring us prosperity. We have now 
struggled with all this for a long time and have finally come to the 
point that, without pestilence and war, we have become underpop-
ulated; without commercial liberties, the commissioning agents of 
foreigners; without bad harvests, hungry; and with the greatest of 
mines, destitute of coin,” Chydenius paints the sad landscape of 
Swedish society.4 He wanted to prove how the Chinese utopia 
could be realized in his motherland by combining the free market 
with the love of the people. The invisible hand of liberty would 
create a society of justice, prosperity and equality. 
 
Nature itself … demonstrates that nothing but liberty and love of hu-
manity are the appropriate building materials to endow societies with 
power and prestige. … how all the trades combined, when free, move 
people to the right places, where they are most useful to themselves 
and the whole country: and finally no political laws in the world have 
been able to correctly regulate this, which nature achieves so easily 
and effortlessly.5 
 
                                                          
1 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 126. 
2 Ibid. P. 137 (Notes). 
3 Ibid. P. 126. 
4 Ibid. P. 126–127. 
5 Ibid. P. 136–137. 
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Naturen sjelf … wisar, at intet annat, än frihet och människo-kärlek 
äro de rätta byggnings-ämnen, som gifwa Samhällen styrka och an-
seende. … huru alla näringar tilsamman tagne i sin frihet, jämka fol-
ket på sina rätta ställen, där de äro nyttigast för sig sjelfwa och hela 
Staten: och ändteligen huru inga Politiska Lagar I werlden warit i 
stånd, at rätt reglera detta, som naturen så lätt och utan möda uträt-
tar.1 
 
Die Natur selbst … weiset, dass Freyheit und Menschenliebe die rich-
tigen Baumaterialien sind, die dem Staat Kräfte und Ansehen geben. 
… Wie alle Gewerbe in ihrer Freyheit zusamengenommen behusige 
Leute genug nach ihre rechte Stellen hin vertheilen wird, wo sie für 
sich und dem ganzen Staat am nüsslichsten sind, und endlich: Wie 
keine politische Gefesse in der Welt im Stande gewesen, das recht zu 
reguliren, was die Natur so leicht und ohne  Mühe ausrichtet.2 
 
* * * 
 
Should the gentle Reader find that I have taken truth as my guide on 
this subject, he will presumably not refuse to agree with me; but if, 
despite my best intentions, I have overstepped the mark, it behooves 
him to convince me of that with reasoned arguments.3 
 
Finner den Benägne Läsaren, at jag härutinnan fölgt sanningens rätte-
snöre, lärer han icke wägra mig sitt bifall: men har jag i min wälmen-
ing stigit af wägen, så tilkommer det honom, at med skäl öfwertyga 
mig därom.4 
 
Findet der geneigte Leser, dass ich in meinen Gedanken die Wahrheit 
zur Richtschnur gehabt; so wird er mir seinen Beyfall nicht versagen. 
                                                          
1 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 20, 21–22. 
2 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 18, 19–20. 
3 Chydenius A. The Source of Our Country’s Weakness. P. 137. 
4 Chydenius A. Källan Til Rikets Wan-Magt. P. 22. 
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Habe ich aber in meiner guten Meynung des rechten Weges verfehlet, 
so ist es seine Pflicht, mich mit Grunden davon zu überzeugen.1 
 
 The culmination of Chydenius’s tractate Källan resembles Im-
manuel Kant’s principles of the Enlightenment in his essay Was its 
Aufklärung? from 1784. The issue here was the maturity of man-
kind. Enlightened discourse is neither obeying or believing but ar-




                                                          
1 Chydenius A. Die Quelle von Schwedens Unvermögen. P. 20. 
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THE WORKS OF ANDERS CHYDENIUS: 
A SPRINGBOARD 





 Anders Chydenius (1729–1803) was one of the most notewor-
thy politicians and political writers in the Swedish realm during 
the eighteenth century. He is most of all remembered as an out-
spoken, and sometimes even fierce, defender of freedom in all are-
as of life. Chydenius’s views on freedom of trade and industry for 
instance were a consequence of his general ideology of freedom. 
According to him, democracy, equality and respect for human 
rights were the only way towards progress and happiness for the 
whole of society. Chydenius is oftentimes categorized, together 
with Peter Forsskål (1732–1763), as a representative of the more 
radical wing of the Enlightenment movement in the Swedish 
realm.1 Besides being an active and influential actor on the politi-
cal scene, Chydenius worked as chaplain in Alaveteli and later as 
                                                          
The Philosophical Age. Almanac 39. The Northern Lights: Social Philosophies 
and Utopias of the Enlightenment in Northern Europe and Russia. St. Peters-
burg — Helsinki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2013. P. 154–165. 
1 For Chydenius’s role in the Swedish/Finnish Enlightenment, see contributions 
by Kimmo Sarje and Vesa Oittinen in: The Philosophical Age. Almanac 36. The 
Northern Lights: Facets of the Enlightenment Culture. St. Petersburg — Helsin-
ki: St. Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas, 2010. 
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rector (vicar) in Kokkola in the county of Ostrobothnia in today’s 
Finland. By his peers he was elected as their representative in the 
Estate of Clergy at the Diets of 1765–1766, 1778–1779 and 1792. 
His most important political achievement was the Ordinance on 
Freedom of Writing and Printing, the first Freedom of Information 
Act in the world, passed by the Swedish Diet in 1766. Chydenius 
played a crucial role in the process leading up to this historical law. 
The publishing of the complete works of Chydenius in Swedish 
and Finnish and his selected works in English will function as an 
important springboard for comparative research in the future. 
 The international research community has over the years di-
rected several inquiries to the Anders Chydenius Foundation in 
Finland (and other institutions involved in promoting Anders 
Chydenius’s legacy) concerning the availability of English transla-
tions of his texts. Every time the Foundation has been forced to re-
ply that only one text was available in English, The National Gain, 
originally written in 1765 and published in English in 1931 by 
Ernest Benn Ltd.1 Earlier Swedish editions of parts of his works, 
E.G. Palmén’s of 1880 and Georg Schauman’s of 1908, are also 
difficult to access, not to mention the original manuscripts and 
prints, available only in special reading rooms at archives and li-
braries mainly in Finland and Sweden. The translations into Finn-
ish made in the 1920s did not meet the academic requirements, nor 
did they hold up for scrutiny. Understandably the situation was 
most unsatisfactory. The Anders Chydenius Foundation in coop-
eration with the University of Jyväskylä/Kokkola University Con-
sortium Chydenius and the Support Association of the Chydenius 
Institute in Finland therefore launched a project to publish a criti-
cal edition of Anders Chydenius’s works, and most importantly for 
the international readership, a selection of Chydenius’s most im-
portant writings translated into English. 
 
                                                          
1 The same edition appeared in facsimile in 1994. 
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Portrait of Anders Chydenius at the age of 41 years, 
in the church of Alaveteli, by Per Fjällström 1770. 
By courtesy of Chydenius Institute, Kokkola. 
 
 The aim is to publish the complete works in five 500-page vol-
umes in their original language Swedish in the coming years.1 All 
five volumes will also be translated into Finnish and published in 
five corresponding volumes. It was decided by the initiators of the 
project that the principal works of Chydenius in English were to be 
accompanied by a comprehensive biography. By this the publish-
                                                          
1 The first volume in Swedish was published in September 2012 and the corre-
sponding volume in Finnish in November 2012. 
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ing project and its financers hope to prepare the ground for fruitful 
transnational comparisons and lift Chydenius from the footnotes to 
the keynotes. Reading Chydenius today, one is astonished by how 
modern his thoughts still are, in a world where democracy, free-
dom of information and freedom of religion are burning questions 
worldwide. 
 The English selection, with its clear reference to Adam Smith’s 
opus magnum, Anticipating The Wealth of Nations. The selected 
works of Anders Chydenius (1729–1803) was published in Sep-
tember 2011 by Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group). Eleven texts, 
out of the roughly 85 written documents (including both prints and 
manuscripts) that have survived, were selected for this volume. In 
addition to the 85 writings, Chydenius’s literary remains include 
fifteen letters written by him. The number of surviving letters is 
remarkably low considering that Chydenius probably was a busy 
letter-writer. We can assume that hundreds of letters have been lost 
over the years. Moreover, at least five known manuscripts have 
been lost. Likely there are unrecorded cases as well, and the whole 
body of his works will therefore never be known to its full extent. 
 The selection was made according to certain criteria. The edito-
rial board wanted to include texts that most likely would appeal to 
an international audience, pieces that thematically touch upon uni-
versal issues, such as freedom of movement, expression, religion 
and enterprise. The pieces dealing with Chydenius’s views on eco-
nomic matters perhaps dominate somewhat in this selection. Alt-
hough he wrote extensively on religious matters, homiletics in par-
ticular, none of his theological texts were included, partly due to 
his views being fairly common in this regard, partly due to their 
sheer length. Another criterion in selecting the texts was their im-
portance and impact at the time they were written. Many times 
Chydenius’s political pamphlets caused quite a stir and they active-
ly promoted the process towards an extension of many freedoms 
and rights. The last piece included is his Autobiography written in 
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1780. It was selected because it sheds light on how Chydenius 
himself regarded his work and his input, and it is an interesting ac-
count of his life the way he chose to present it. 
 When only so few texts could be included, complete subject ar-
eas had to be left out. If we look at the actual number of surviving 
pages, his printed sermons on the Ten Commandments and on the 
latter part of the catechism form the largest group, in total almost 
700 pages. It is regrettable that none of his theological texts could 
be included, as this would have given a fuller picture of his author-
ship, of him as a person and of the many roles he played as a poli-
tician, clergyman, and economic thinker. Then again, the selection 
is indeed quite versatile if we consider that the book was published 
in a Routledge series on the history of economics. 
 In the case of these eleven texts selecting the editions on which 
the translations were to be based caused almost no difficulties as 
they as a rule were only printed once during Chydenius’s lifetime, 
or, in the case of manuscripts, only one written copy has survived. 
Two of the texts, The Source of our Country’s Weakness and A 
Remedy for the Country by Means of a Natural System of Finance, 
were, however, printed twice. In both cases the second edition was 
published within weeks from the first edition and the differences 
between the two are miniscule, consisting mainly of mistakes 
made by the printer or typesetter and variations in spelling, and 
thus only rarely having any consequences for the translation. The 
editorial board decided to base the translations on the version con-
taining fewer obvious mistakes, well aware of the possibility that 
the selected edition might be the second and not the first. 
 The structure the volume is easy to follow. Firstly Anders 
Chydenius’s life and work are presented in a comprehensive biog-
raphy written by Professor Lars Magnusson. The biography is fol-
lowed by the Selected works. Each text by Chydenius is followed 
by a short commentary placing the text in its historical and themat-
ic context. All eleven commentaries are written by Professor Mag-
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nusson. The eleven texts are divided thematically and chronologi-
cally into four parts. The first part consists of four texts, all written 
during the important Diet of 1765–1766. Here you can find for in-
stance, The National Gain, which perhaps is his most well-known 
piece, and the no less important The Source of Our Country’s 
Weakness. Thematically they all deal with economic matters and 
the sorry state of the Swedish economy at that time. The second 
part presents three texts on the issue of free access to official doc-
uments and freedom of the press, or freedom of writing and print-
ing as Chydenius said. These were questions that Chydenius very 
actively promoted during that same Diet in the mid-1760s. The 
third part of the book has been given the title “Radical rector of 
Kokkola,” Kokkola being Chydenius’s hometown, and it consists 
of three texts written during the last years of the 1770s. This is a 
period in Chydenius’s life when his political thinking and ideas 
can be called quite radical and his proposals undaunted. He de-
manded equal rights for masters and servants, promoted freedom 
of trade and industry, and argued successfully in favour of an in-
creased religious tolerance. The fourth part only consists of one 
text, the already mentioned Autobiography. Notes to the biog-
raphy, to the translated texts and to the commentaries are placed 
after each text. At the end of the book appendices, a glossary, lists 
of referenced literature and Anders Chydenius’s central writings 
and indexes are included. 
 The publishing project was fortunate enough to engage retired 
librarian Peter C. Hogg in the demanding and sometimes very dif-
ficult task of translating eighteenth-century Swedish into modern 
English. Peter C. Hogg spent most of his career at the Department 
of Printed Books of the British Museum Library in London, from 
which he retired as head of the Scandinavian Section. The aim was 
to create a translation which is loyal to the original without being 
stiff and cumbersome to read. Something which caused the transla-
tor and the editors Maren Jonasson and Pertti Hyttinen some se-
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vere difficulties is Chydenius’s habit of being somewhat inexact in 
his use of pronouns, making certain sentences almost impossible to 
understand, alternatively giving the reader and the translator sever-
al alternative meanings to choose from. The structural resemblance 
between Swedish and English allowed us to stay fairly loyal to the 
original, not forcing us to intervene in the order of the phrases or 
clauses too much. We did, however, choose to split up some of the 
sentences as a single sentence in Chydenius’s texts easily stretches 
over 10–15 lines, which, of course, was very common at the time, 
but would cause today’s readers unnecessary strain. The im-
portance and value of an excellent translator cannot be exaggerated 
in a book project of this type. After all, 90 per cent of the book 
consists of original eighteenth-century writings by Anders Chyde-
nius translated into modern English. We had some very intriguing 
discussions with the translator Peter C. Hogg trying to come to a 
conclusion on what Chydenius wanted to say at points where the 
text turns foggy and confusing. The discussions also gave interest-
ing insights into the processes of understanding written text and 
how discrepant the interpretations can be, although everybody in-
volved are reading the exact same text. Translations are interpreta-
tions – there is no way around that. Judging from the feedback 
given so far, we feel certain Peter C. Hogg did an excellent job. 
 Chydenius’s texts are, as any text, very much bound to their 
contemporary, political context. Many of them are contributions to 
the political debate and need to be understood as such. To grasp 
and present that context to the readers was notoriously difficult. 
How to explain the Swedish and Finnish eighteenth-century con-
text for the readers of today, for a global readership that cannot be 
expected to have very deep insights in Swedish history, let alone in 
the finest details of the economic system and on-going economic 
crisis in Sweden in the mid-1760s? Another big challenge was to 
come up with good English equivalents for the many political and 
administrative terms used in the original texts, names for different 
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committees and institutions, laws and ordinances, which often-
times were specific for the conditions in the Swedish realm and 
therefore do not have natural equivalents in English. The editorial 
board consulted several experts and academic works, articles and 
books written on Swedish eighteenth-century conditions and 
events in English and tried to use the same or similar terms as the 
authors of these. In many cases, however, there seems to be very 
little consensus on which terms to use, and we, like the rest, found 
ourselves inventing new terms in English. Occasionally we sup-
plied the text with the original Swedish term in parenthesis. For 
the sake of transparency a more comprehensive list of English 
terms together with definitions on the corresponding Swedish 
terms was included in a Glossary. 
 Place names and persons mentioned in the texts were indexed 
for the convenience of the reader. Names of places and persons 
were given their modern form and spelling both in the translation 
and in the index. In cases where cities and other locations in to-
day’s Sweden and Finland that have an English version of their 
name, i.e. Gothenburg, Karelia and Lapland, that form of the name 
was used, whereas other cities and locations in today’s Sweden 
have their present day name in Swedish and cities and locations in 
present day Finland have their name in Finnish. Many cities and 
locations in Finland have a parallel form of their name in Swedish. 
In these latter cases the parallel form in Swedish is mentioned in 
parenthesis the first time the name appears. In the eighteenth cen-
tury a person’s name oftentimes had a parallel form in Latin. The 
principle here was to present the names in their current form, the 
way they are spelled today in Swedish, unless there is an interna-
tionally established form, i.e. for royalty and renowned scientists. 
Eighteenth-century currencies, measures and weights kept their 
original form in the translated text, due to the impracticality and 
impossibility of finding exact equivalents in the past or present 
English measuring systems. The complicated monetary system is 
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presented in a separate appendix where currencies and monetary 
terms used in the volume are given a definition. Measures and 




Chydenius’s pamphlet of 1778 
where he defended the “natural rights” of servants and farmhands. 
By courtesy of Chydenius Institute, Kokkola. 
 
 The Swedish and Finnish versions aim at different audiences. 
The readership of the critical edition in Swedish will most likely 
consist of researches and academics interested in the exact word-
ing and expressions used by Chydenius, whereas the translation in-
to Finnish aims mainly at Finns, who have not had the opportunity 
to acquaint themselves properly with of thinking of Chydenius 
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since the somewhat unreliable translations made in the 1920s. The 
modern Finnish translation made now will also serve Finnish re-
searches as the translation is more easily read than the original 
eighteenth-century Swedish. All texts are accompanied by a com-
mentary contextualizing the original, and footnotes are included to 
explain difficult words in the original. The original page number-
ing is given in both language versions to facilitate referencing, 
comparison and cross-checking between the translation and the 
original. 
 The fact that Chydenius dealt with subjects ranging from poet-
ry, mechanics, chemistry, medicine, economy and freedom of the 
press to agriculture, social injustices, the art of preaching, potato-
growing, the production of saltpeter and vaccinations has forced 
the editors to consult and engage more than twenty external ex-
perts for the commentaries. Every text by Chydenius has been 
commented by the foremost Swedish or Finnish expert within his 
or her field. Professor of History and Senior International Officer 
at The University of Mississippi, Michael F. Metcalf, who is an 
expert on the Age of Liberty in Swedish history, showed a keen in-
terest in the English translation and provided valuable advice and 
suggestions regarding the use of terms and concepts. 
 Without forgetting the outstanding exceptions, one of the obsta-
cles for high-quality comparative research is the unfortunate fact 
that researches too often lack sufficient skills in other languages 
than their own native language and some world languages. This 
prevents them from using source material from smaller language 
areas and obstructs actual comparative research. Translations are 
one way around this obstacle. The volume Anticipating The Wealth 
of Nations. The selected works of Anders Chydenius (1729–1803) 
is an invitation to the international research community to do com-
parative research. The title of the book should not restrict our 
thinking. Let it be no secret that the title was suggested by the pub-
lisher Routledge, but the editorial board was hesitant: would such a 
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title exclude other potential readers interested in other aspects of 
Chydenius’s thinking? Chydenius’s economic ideas can be fruitful-
ly compared to Adam Smith’s ideas, no doubt, but Chydenius’s 
above mentioned versatility and wide scope of activities and ideas 
offer many more opportunities. Interesting points of comparison 
between Chydenius and other authors remain to be discovered. 
 Another fact rendering fruitful comparisons possible is Chyde-
nius’s astounding topicality. Religious tolerance and freedom of in-
formation and expression, for instance, were subjects of keen in-
terest to Chydenius, and they are burning questions still today. In 
television debates, newspaper columns and social media of today 
the arguments and opinions expressed are oftentimes identical to 
what Chydenius wrote 250 years ago. It could just as well be 
Chydenius debating subsidy policies, the economic crisis, censor-
ship, transparency or religious tolerance. Researches willing to 
make the effort will not be disappointed. This volume will open up 
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